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'HI5 D 
Chapter V: The long march to merger, 1965-1970 
From February 1965 the SIC had begun to deliberate on how to re-invigorate the 
competitive ability of the British shipbuilding industry in relation to international 
competition. Thereafter, oral and written evidence was taken from the Shipbuilding 
Conference and Shipbuilding Employers Federation, the Chamber of Shipping, the 
Dry Dock Owners and Repairers Central Council, the National Association of 
Marine Engineers, and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. 
In addition to the SIC sponsor department, the Board of Trade, which also provided 
its Secretary, Victor Chapman, other departments, particularly the Admiralty's 
successor, the Ministry of Defence, Navy Department, MoD (N), and the Ministry of 
Labour were also consulted, as were a wide range of individual experts and sub- 
contracting firms. By a series of visits to shipyard and engineering establishments 
throughout the UK and abroad, the SIC, and the Secretary of State (Shipping) at the 
Board of Trade, Roy Mason, attempted to gauge both the extent and the prospects of 
the industry relative to both internal and external competition. 1 
During three days in April 1965, with the exception of the Swan Hunter owned, 
Barclay Curle, the SIC visited all of the larger shipyards and marine engineering 
establishments on Clydeside. 2 Individual members were given specific briefs, but 
Geddes had already decided in advance to visit Scotts'. This was in all probability 
due to Michael Scott's position as Chairman of the Warship Group and as the 
President elect of the Shipbuilding Conference. 3 Recalling the Geddes visit to 
Greenock, it was noted that Scotts' investment in plant and equipment was not so 
much a programme as a continuous process with humps'. Although £2,250,000 had 
been spent since 1945, Scotts' Secretary and Director, John Lee advised Geddes that 
investment decisions had not been made on the basis of a return on capital 
employed, but as a result of the need to survive. Nor, in terms of overall profitability 
was a return on individual equipment calculated. However. Scotts' methods of' 
production had tended to minimise changes in tempo between civil and naval work. 
Welders, for example, were on time rates for naval work and lieu rates for civil work 
as different standards of inspection applied. Due possibly to their accent on close 
supervision, Scotts' found it possible to compete with Swan Hunter and Harland and 
Wolff at 20,000 tons, and could also compete with small builders because of modere 
methods of production. Although Scotts' could build up to 50,000 gross tons, the 
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firm preferred to build two 35,000-ton vessels instead; however. at the time of the 
Geddes visit they were also building a small coasting vessel. The firm's system of 
steelwork control although simple was nevertheless adequate. but the need to change 
the direction of steel throughput was accepted. On the labour front, the workforce 
would not accept the need to work on nightshift, and demarcation was more intense 
on naval work. Moreover, a recent quarrel over two weeks riveting work for two 
apprentices had resulted in a three-week stoppage involving sixty men. George 
Hilton, the President elect of the Shipbuilding Employers Federation, defined 
flexibility, `as a temporary arrangement whereby one man took over another's job 
on an ad hoc basis' with interchangeability being a permanent switch of occupation 
involving in due course a change in union card. To this, Geddes general impression 
was that Scotts' through, `its somewhat paternalistic management attitude [was] out 
of line with modern life and unlikely therefore to break through traditional 
demarcation barriers'. On the engineering side, he noted that Scotts' had 
superficially excellent housekeeping, and were proud of their production methods 
particularly the application of naval practice to civil use, which in the Engine Works, 
but not in the shipyard tended to reduce costs. Geddes noted that in particular, the 
works production control system, `seemed very good'. 4 Nevertheless, although this 
was not officially referred to, Scotts' claimed to have a maximum annual 
engineering capacity of 180,000 hp. Clearly, if the evidence of the past five years 
was any guide, the engine works had been severely under-utilised, as engines 
totalling only 70,470 hp had been produced, although modernisation was certainly a 
contributing factor. ' 
Geddes and most of his committee had visited Lithgows on the previous day and 
noted that the yard was crowded, but that plans were afoot to extend it by 400 feet 
by diverting the route of the A8 motorway. 6 It was also noted that the Kingston yard 
was the locus of more modern methods of production, whereas the, `conventional 
and unimpressive' East yard, appeared to have little spent on it, and that the former 
Glen yard of William Hamilton was being used, `virtually as a dump'. Nonetheless, 
Lithgows had spent £4,000,000 since the war, but mostly in the past five years on 
investment concentrated on the Kingston yard. The programme had began as an 
`orderly modernisation, but had been converted into a crash operation... but in 
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practice, [Lithgows] have had to decide on investment just to sure i% e". Although the 
firm had in some years exported seventy per cent of its output, it preferred to keep 
export work to around thirty per cent, but the firm had now to sell on credit w\ ith 
financing of home orders remaining difficult. Budgets were worked out on a 
historical cost basis with the control of manpower being the main object of' cost 
control. At this stage Lithgows total labour force numbered 2.089 and the number of 
berths three with a maximum building capacity of 125,000 gross tons. Nevertheless, 
the firm believed that 500 to 600 men were the best manpower unit in a shipyard. 
which, it was noted, partly accounted for the two separate yards. ' At this stage, 
however, Lithgows still remained in control of Fairfield-Rowan, Fairfield, and 
Ferguson Brothers, and also held a thirty per cent stake in John Kincaid. 
Before Geddes had returned to London he had been asked by a fellow member of the 
SIC, Professor Lighthill, how he saw the effects of family control over so many of 
the yards visited in relation to the competitiveness of the industry as a whole" 
Geddes later noted that the longevity of the family firms had engendered a sense of 
trusteeship and the will to resist mergers, however, the visit had pushed him, 'a bit 
more in favour of specialisation and medium size, (whatever that is) than of a few 
giant corporations'. To him, Lithgows had, `a harder more competitive feel than 
John Brown', but overall on the Clyde in relation to labour the dominant strand was 
paternalism. Both Scotts' and John Brown had provided excellent canteen and 
welfare blocks, but according to Geddes it seemed that firms had missed the point, 
which was, the look in the donor's eye as much as the facility'. However. Geddes 
did praise Lithgows shop stewards, for, the natural and relaxed way in which they 
joined the lunch party [which] was an experience'. Through talking to them he 
gained the impression that they did not have the outlook of casual labour, and mused 
that there was perhaps an advantage in location outside Glasgow, but if there was 
one, Scotts' had not found it'! 8 
Unlike ship repairing which, by its nature, was inherently casualised. shipbuilding 
labour by this stage could be more properly described as being prone to intermittent 
periods of unemployment as work on the hull or on the fitting out stage came to a 
halt. Firms strove to maintain an adequate balance between the trades and attempted 
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to plan their production accordingly. Nevertheless, by this stage, there was a general 
feeling from the trade union leadership, and from some of the more enlightened 
shipbuilders in the industry that employment had to be made more secure to attract 
and maintain an adequate supply of labour. Attempts by a Ministry of Labour 
Working Party to encourage this in part had been frustrated, but Geddes did note that 
Scotts' management would welcome its resurrection. On main engines, Geddes 
noted that neither family nor public firms were able, `to break out of the familiar 
pattern for diesels'. Scotts' like others were much influenced by installing engines of 
their own manufacture, `but had little sense that engine costs could be improved by 
series production'. Nevertheless he noted that two family firms, Lithgows and 
Yarrows would like to widen their connections with land-based firms. Overall, 
Geddes felt that it was not easy to determine the effect of family control on the 
efficiency of the business. 9 Given that his visits were to a large extent superficial, 
his conclusion, at this stage, was just that. 
Labour 
By this stage, the overall labour question in the industry remained unanswered. 
Moreover, little would be gained by the SIC lambasting restrictive practices and 
demarcation if no quid pro quo was offered from the employers in guaranteeing 
some security of employment, as it was precisely the inherent insecurity of 
employment in shipbuilding that had given rise to the trade protectionism of 
individual unions. At the national level the employers maintained the stance that 
there was an acute shortage of skilled labour in the industry. Total employment had 
fallen by a quarter in the previous five years, and the intake of apprentices had 
apparently been drastically restricted by the unions and in some areas had ceased 
entirely. 10 Accordingly, the Shipbuilding Conference and the SEF, somewhat 
breathtakingly, remained convinced that the trade unions attitudes remained 
`Victorian and inflexible', and had prevented the industry from reaping the benefit 
of modernisation by using labour in the most efficient manner. 1I 
Throughout its inquiry the SIC to an extent recognised this, but later thought it 
desirable to introduce major changes in the utilisation of labour by stages. although, 
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`not so gradually that they could not be seen'. The onus was on the employers and 
unions to improve the climate in the industry. and that a suggested formula for 
discussion in the SIC was, inter alia, that the employers should. 'accept the 
desirability for greater security of workers' and the unions the need for. 'better 
utilisation of labour'. 12 At a later meeting with the office holders of the SEF and 
SIC, the former still were unconvinced on security of employment, as it seemed to 
be of `little concern to shipyard workers, although the union executives were 
interested'. In addition, the workers, apparently, `were only concerned with the 
amount of pay they could take home'. Nevertheless, the SEF did, however, 
acknowledge the lack of enthusiasm for job security might reflect the present labour 
situation in the industry. 13 All things considered, these attitudes hardly, augured 
well for the future of labour relations in the industry. 
The Naval Dimension 
It is perhaps remarkable in reading the official record of the SIC minutes of evidence 
that the Warship Group of private shipbuilders were not subjected to any searching 
analysis as the dozen firms shared a naval order book worth £187,400,000 stretching 
to 1969.14 Modestly, the Warship Group portrayed itself as a mere conduit in the 
provision of liaison between builders of naval craft and MoD (N) containing as it did 
all of the builders who built or were likely to build larger warships. For the record, 
no questions were asked over possible collusion in tender prices, and would have 
been met in any case with the standard answer that Restrictive Practices legislation 
precluded it. Nevertheless, given the Admiralty's lack of will to rationalise the 
Warship Group firms in the post-war period it would seem that rationalisation could 
be achieved by a back door method pending the outcome of the SIC Inquiry. Both 
Scotts' and Lithgows, the latter at this stage through Fairfield, had to be concerned 
that in an increasingly competitive mercantile market as much naval orders as 
possible had to be won to remain profitable. The portents, however. were not good 
as by June 1965 the SIC had begun to take oral evidence from MoD (N) 
representatives to discuss points arising from the latter's earlier written evidence, 16 
The naval deputation hoped to commit in the region of £70.000.000 a year over the 
next ten years to the future new building programme in private yards, and subject to 
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a Defence Review, a new aircraft carrier, (which was not subsequently built) would 
be included. The priority, however, remained the construction of nuclear submarines 
and escort vessels, with the former accounting for one-sixth of annual expenditure. 
Moreover, the deputation saw little point in phasing orders to even out the building 
cycle, and although no single Warship Group firm could be singled out as being 
markedly below standard all firms in the Group, `were having difficulty in coping 
with the increasing complexity of modern warships'. 17 
Beforehand, however, MoD (N) had suggested that the Warship Group should be 
reduced to three or four large (in terms of size of management, drawing office and 
planning resources) firms, and three or four medium-sized builders (which would 
specialise) for the smaller types of vessels such as frigates. 18 MoD (N) felt that this 
limited type of rationalisation should be brought about by mergers, rather than by 
casting out particular firms. For the larger yards, it was noted that, `there should 
possibly be one on the Tyne, one on the Clyde, and two in North West England and 
Northern Ireland'. However, although MoD (N) wanted fewer establishments, they 
could not undertake to provide all of them with work. Save for natural selection in 
the case of Denny, and soon to be the case for J. Samuel White, MoD (N) continued 
to rely on the industry to reform itself An unlikely scenario even in good times, and 
a course of action that the SIC recognised for what it was, a transparent attempt to 
evade responsibility. The SIC therefore insisted that MoD (N) providc a list of its 
choice of firms for the future Group, which would not however, be attributed to 
them. 19 Of the larger yards, only Swan Hunter and Vickers had the capacity to build 
capital ships on the Tyne, as did Cammell Laird and Vickers on the North West 
Coast. On the Clyde, two yards on the upper reaches, Fairfield or John Brown could 
do so, as could Harland & Wolff at Belfast. Moreover, all of these firms could also 
build destroyers and frigates, a position that could in theory lead to further 
concentration at a later date. At this stage, however, MoD (N) in effect wanted it 
both ways, an industry as it stood large enough to provide 'competition' for their 
orders, whilst simultaneously being unable to rely upon those orders. As well as 
passing the buck to the industry, MoD (N) also attempted to pass it to the SIC, as it' 
the latter found that future prospects were not bright and that if capacity in terms of 
slips were reduced by half, MoD (N) `would not worry'. This insouciance also 
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applied to the marine sector where MoD (N) concluded that too many firms were 
building Sulzer, Doxford and Pametrada type engines and that these firms should be 
also be drastically reduced. Again MoD (N) was unwilling to nominate particular 
firms. 20 
After MoD (N) representatives had left, the SIC then went on to discuss by itself the 
possible grouping of yards, and suggested that at this stage. there might perhaps be 
two groups on the Clyde, one for the upper and one for the lower reaches. It was 
recognised however, that the `individualism of Lithgows might be a problem' .'1 
Geddes later noted regarding a discussion on grouping that Scotts' had a question 
mark over them, and that, `it would be acceptable to the Navy Department that they 
should join a Lower Clyde group of specialised yards if such a thing happened for 
other reasons'. 22 Geddes did not make it clear just what those reasons were. 
Thereafter, the SIC received a deputation from the Warship Group including its 
chairman, Michael Scott, and Jim Lenaghan of Fairfield, and produced a paper on 
the general subject of rationalisation. As the Warship Group did not represent the 
industry as a whole, Scott therefore stalled. Nevertheless, Geddes considered that 
eventually some recommendation on rationalisation would have to be made and in 
the interim the SIC paper should be taken away and read widely on the basis of a 
working paper. 23 Overall, the MoD (N) agenda of the rationalisation of warship 
firms and of engine building capacity even at this stage was a powerful one, and as 
later events would subsequently prove, that agenda chimed with SIC thinking. 
Moreover, the rationalisation agenda also appeared to be closely in step with that of 
the Board of Trade itself. 
Before the formal establishment of the SIC, Roy Mason had already visited 
numerous shipyards at home and abroad and had suggested plans for improvements 
in the shipbuilding and marine engineering industry, and continued to do so 
throughout the lifetime of the Committee. 24 By April 1965, however, Mason had 
given the SIC a resume of his visits to twenty-two shipyards in the UK, and to a 
number of yards in Sweden and Japan. 25 In the UK. Mason had apparently been 
shocked to find out just how old-fashioned techniques and management were in the 
majority of shipyards. In his opinion, only four unidentified yards had adequate 
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production control. Moreover, labour and management relations were unsatisfactory. 
there were too many trade unions, and the industry was very much behind the best 
practice available in other industries. Mason had found a higher technical standard 
of management in Sweden, with the new yard at Arendal being more of a factory 
rather than a conventional shipyard. Of his visits to five Japanese yards, Mason 
stressed the importance of building docks for the construction of large vessels, and 
that production planning and group organisation all permitted central purchasing, 
design, budgeting and control. He also noted that a degree of automation and full use 
of plant and equipment combined with good labour relations had resulted in 
increased productivity, and if the UK industry was to compete with the Japanese 
then far-reaching changes were required. In answer to questions from the SIC. 
Mason thought that too much emphasis was put on quality in UK shipyards meaning 
that vessels would last far longer than required and that time was wasted through 
rigid adherence to demarcation. 26 By this stage, however, Mason had conveniently 
forgotten that he had previously stated that the quality of British shipbuilding was, 
`unrivalled in the world'. 27 Shipyard labour also needed to be more flexible, but 
somewhat controversially for a Labour Government Minister, Mason thought that 
the industry, `could be halved in size, but doubled in capacity''. 28 There is little 
doubt that Mason's opinion in this regard was very much motivated by his 
experiences in visiting foreign shipyards. 29 In Japan, to take only one example, as 
Chida and Davies inform, the government had an all-pervasive influence on the 
present and future policies of the Japanese maritime industries, whether by part 
financing ship construction, or guaranteeing interest payments on private sector 
loans. Moreover, the Japanese State influenced the concentration of its shipping 
industry, which resulted in a reduction in the number of ocean-going shipping firms 
from eighty-eight, into six huge groups. 30 As with the UK, legislation was enacted 
with the implied threat that no further finance would be made available if these firms 
did not merge. On the domestic scene, as Hogwood has noted, Mason also disabused 
the trade unions of the idea that nationalisation was the answer to the industry' s 
ills. Mason had also been impressed by the high levels of Japanese productivity. 
which he felt had grown because of a number of factors. First, a permanent labour 
force organised in a single shipyard union, paid at marginally lower rates than their 
UK counterparts, but working 'reasonably hard in good conditions ... and enjoying 
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collective bonuses paid twice yearly in lieu of piece work'. Other factors %v ere, 
membership of large heavy engineering groups and diversification into other areas 
of economic activity other than shipbuilding and marine engineering, thus allowing 
the full use of overheads, the widespread use of simple and, `relatively cheap' 
machine tools, and a strong middle management structure. Indeed, the size and 
quality of Japanese management and the emphasis on production planning were 
indicative of its shipbuilding competitiveness. Mason also noted that if the UK was 
to truly to compete in the world market then it had to eclipse Japan on productivity, 
moreover, he believed that this was possible, despite Japan's `substantial lead'. 32 
Taking Japan as only one example, then there was little doubt that even at this earl`, 
stage, that the Government had a somewhat fixed idea that concentration and 
rationalisation of production would be a prelude to greater efficiency. In this 
scenario, Scotts' was highly vulnerable, not only because of its size but also in terms 
of its marine engine building capability. On main engines, a SIC member, Professor 
Lighthill had earlier noted, quoting Len Redshaw of Vickers, that the present 
system stinks'. On Clydeside, apart from John G. Kincaid whose major customers 
were Lithgows and the Greenock Dockyard, Lighthill thought that Scotts', John 
Brown Engineering, Barclay Curle, Stephen and Fairfield-Rowan should all cease to 
produce engines for merchant ships. As a harbinger for what was to come in the 
marine engineering sector, the Lighthill view was remarkably prescient. 33 
1966: Towards a Merger 
At the end of 1965 Lithgows had for the fifth year in succession topped the Clyde 
output table with five ships launched of 92,925 gross tons and were second only to 
Harland & Wolff in the UK. However, to put this in some kind of perspective. the 
Japanese yard of Mitsubishi at Nagasaki had launched sixteen ships of 618,226 gross 
tons, the largest output in the world and almost double the entire Clyde output for 
the year. Moreover, two Scottish and one English shipping company, all of %t hom 
had been previous customers of Lithgows had confirmed that they %\ ere placing 
orders worth £9,500,000 for seven vessels with Scandinavian shipyards. Lyle 
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Shipping had placed an order for three bulk carriers in Norway, and Hugh Hogarth 
& Sons for two, with Lithgows former partner in William Hamilton. Brocklebank. 
placing for the first time outside the UK an order for two general cargo vessels in 
Sweden. Lyle's managing director, Bill Nicholson stated that four factors had 
swayed his firm's decision to order in Norway, price. quality. specification and 
better credit terms. Brocklebank, who had previously had eighteen ships built at 
William Hamilton and one at Stephen of Linthouse also confirmed that the Swedish 
price was £100,000 lower than were two tenders from British shipyards. 34 Given that 
many domestic shipping firms were now ordering abroad, Lithgows, although by 
this stage they had not yet lost their naval yard, Fairfield remained in a very 
vulnerable position. The Port Glasgow firm's mercantile strategy had been to 
modernise its fabrication facilities, and to extend its berths and cranage to build 
larger bulk carriers and tankers. In so doing, it would eventually have to compete 
with far larger yards with greater capacity, such as Swan Hunter and Harland & 
Wolff who would fight tooth and nail to retain their bespoke customers. In any event 
the available pool of British owners in this market could not be relied upon to 
continue to build in the UK with any real sense of confidence. Neither could the 
multi-national oil companies who were just as likely to order abroad, particularly if 
available capacity was occupied in the UK. Moreover, unremunerative contracts 
would eventually tell on Lithgows Balance Sheet, as would the firm's increasing 
reliance on offering extended credit terms to owners. Liquidity remained all- 
important to finance work in progress, as did temporary bank overdrafts, and once 
again, despite its potential losses over Fairfield, the Bank of Scotland approved an 
overdraft limit to Lithgows of £ 1,500,000 in December 1965.35 It had also 
been 
reported a month earlier that Lithgows had sold a vessel from its Dornoch 
Shipping 
Company, the Vimeira for £725,000, less commission to the Johnson Line of 
Liverpool. The proceeds of which were placed on short-term loan with Lanarkshire 
County Council at an interest rate of 6.125 per cent. 
36. For Scotts' unremunerative 
mercantile contracts could at least be balanced by naval work. The priority, given 
the uncertain future of the export market for conventional submarines in light of 
MoD (N). concentration on nuclear craft, was to retain some surface naval building 
capability. It was by no means certain, however, that Scotts' would be competitive 
enough to win orders for frigates and destroyers. 
189 
The Greenock Dockyard Company Limited 
By this stage, Scotts' had advanced its take-over plans for the adjacent shipyard of 
the Greenock Dockyard, and had already given assurances that no redundancies 
would ensue with a long-term view to complete integration to achieve greater 
production. Combined output would be increased to around 100.000 gross tons per 
annum and management and workforces would be harmonised after Greenock 
Dockyard went into voluntary liquidation on 2 April 1965.3' A wholly-owned 
subsidiary of British and Commonwealth Shipping, Greenock Dockyard had built 
most of its long run of ships for the Clan Line of its parent company, and had spent 
£1,750,000 on yard modernisation since 1957, which, in addition to better 
fabrication methods through flow line production, had comprised reducing the 
number of berths from three to two and introducing four twenty-five ton travelling 
cranes. The running of the Cartsdyke shipyard, which had just over 1,000 
employees, was entrusted to local management whose number did not exceed ten. 
However, the firm had no engine works, but did have the largest ship repair facility 
on the lower reaches at the Garvel Dry Dock, prior to the advent of the Firth of 
Clyde Dry Dock Company. At March 1965, Greenock had three ships under 
construction but no new orders, but the yard saw its future in fast cargo liners and 
refrigerated food ships. Both management and unions had expressed themselves 
satisfied with labour relations in the yard to the SIC. Profits in the previous two 
years, however, which had been due partly to increases in production and income 
from investments, were unlikely to be repeated due to keen competition for orders. 38 
The latter certainly played a large part in the ongoing negotiations for the Dockyard. 
in which Scotts' had the upper hand, but did increase its original offer of £200.000 
to £264,000, plus £1 for the goodwill. Scotts' undertook to complete contracts in 
hand for the benefit of a new company formed by the vendor by being reimbursed 
for direct labour and materials plus a fixed rate of fifty-eight per cent on labour for 
overheads. However, this was conditional upon a final settlement whereby British 
and Commonwealth placed a fixed price order for a single screw cargo vessel for the 
Clan Line worth £ 1,520,000 with Scotts' to facilitate the transfer of the Dockyard 
assets. When accepted, this allowed Scotts' to register a ne« company, the 
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Cartsdyke Dockyard Company Limited, with an authorised capital of £ 100 which 
held its first meeting with Michael Scott as Chairman and Andrew Paxton. formerl\ 
of the Greenock Dockyard as Managing Director on 24 March 1966. '9 The 
underlying motive for the purchase of the Greenock Dockyard was clear as John 
Swire had earlier noted to Michael Scott, whichever government was in power. 
strong pressure was likely to be applied to merge with Lithgows. 'whether that is the 
right answer or not'. Swire suggested that if he were right then with the Greenock 
Dockyard in his quiver, Scott would be in a stronger bargaining position in advance 
of any proposed merger with Lithgows. 40 This, the retention of skilled labour on the 
Lower Clyde, and the increase in capacity combined with British & 
Commonwealth's willingness to sell seemed to be the motivating factors in the 
purchase. 
The SIC Report 
By the time of its publication, the SIC Report, popularly referred to as the Geddes 
Report after its chairman, Reay Geddes, was in many respects a confidence boost to 
an industry that had basically lost the plot since the heady days of the late 1940s and 
most of the 1950s. Prior to its publication, it was noted by an interdepartmental 
committee of civil servants that Ministers had agreed that the Geddes Report should 
be published by 24 March 1966, as they did not consider it to be, `a highly political 
document'. Nevertheless, Redman of MoD (N) was concerned over the precise 
nature of the recommendations pertaining to rationalisation of warship building into 
three firms where, `there was likely to be too little real competition for naval orders'. 
The feeling of his department was that some six to eight yards with facilities for 
building warships should be envisaged. However, he was a little unclear whether 
MoD (N) should only order from yards who were members of proposed groups. as 
opposed to withholding orders from yards who wished to remain independent. To 
this, MacMahon of the Board of Trade presciently pointed out that MoD (N) 
`1 purchasing policy, `would be an important factor in the early stages' . 
Nevertheless, the publication of the SIC Report a week before a General Election 
was held certainly did not hamper the Labour Party's chances of re-election in the 
191 
majority of the shipbuilding districts. The SIC Report authors firml\ believed that 
shipbuilding was still a growth industry. In a raft of recommendations. four stood 
out: the geographical grouping of yards through mergers: the rationalisation of the 
eleven warship firms capable of building frigates and destroyers into three yards-, the 
separation and concentration of engine building from shipbuilding into four 
production units, and the creation of a Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB) to oversee 
the process within a strict timetable. 42 However. if grouping was to be effective, then 
specialisation of shipyards within a group was necessary. Geddes noted that the 
technical requirements of the naval and merchant markets were diverging, and in 
this sense the industry with a large number of shipyards geared to naval and other 
sophisticated work could be at a disadvantage. Of the mixed naval and mercantile 
yards in particular it was also noted that as naval work was so thinly spread, no-one 
yard could concentrate on naval work alone. The result was a production line on 
which, `lorries and racing cars were intermingled' a situation that led to inefficiency 
and is an important source of weakness'. 43 Groups would therefore include three 
types of yards; an `S' yard building sophisticated ships such as naval vessels, 
passenger ships or ferries, an `M' yard building multi deck mixed cargo ships and 
finally a `B' yard building vessels such as bulk carriers and tankers. Geddes did not 
recommend that any group should have more than one 'S' yard but did allo%% two or 
more each of `M' and `B' yards, with an element of interchangeability. It was felt 
that the ideal numbers for competitive mercantile building in yards was around 
1,500 to 2,000 men, and for an `S' yard, 3,000 men, within a group structure 
comprising 8,000 to 10,000 employees on shipbuilding aiming to achieve an output 
of 400,000 to 500,000 gross tons per annum. 
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There was in all this, however, a largely uncosted belief in the efficacy of economies 
of scale and scope in that greater size would equate with competitiveness and 
efficiency. On the face of it, combined central purchasing, design, drawing. 
estimating, costing, production planning and personnel functions. combined with 
interchangeability of labour were superficially attractive only if the collective ww ill 
was there to make these changes work. Given the individuality of the shipbuilders. 
however, there was never likely to be any guarantee that this would be the case. A 
point not lost on the SIC, who had recommended the establishment of the SIB to 
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provide an incentive to concentration in the industry to encourage mergers through 
payment of consultancy fees, and then through grants and loans. 
In his capacity as president of the Shipbuilding Conference. Michael Scott publicly 
welcomed the SIC Report, as a `great report' and stated that the industry would, 
`work like blazes' to keep to the timetable. 46 Clearly, most of the Geddes proposals 
had been to a large extent flagged up beforehand, in particular those on grouping and 
rationalisation of main engine and warship building. Nevertheless, the promise of 
SIB incentives when many firms were taking on contracts at cost in inflationary 
conditions was a powerful incentive to group in the expectation that market 
conditions could eventually improve, and even if they did not. Government might in 
any case bail them out. However, as John Swire again noted, to throw a number of 
disparate companies into a large group at short notice [was] going to lead to the most 
fearful headaches and probably some expensive mistakes'. Swire then advised 
Michael Scott that it would be `vital' for the latter to be in the `central direction of' 
whatever Group we go into'. Nevertheless, even at this early stage, Sw ire thought 
that a single Clyde group would be, `altogether too unwieldy. He hoped that it 
would be possible to get a separate group formed on the lower reaches, in which 
Scotts' would be in a fairly strong position to take the leading part, but only if thc\ 
moved quickly so as not to be, `left out on a limb'. Swire then promised Scott the 
backing of his company for anything that the latter would do in this connection. 
47 
Geddes had, however, omitted to recommend a single grouping on the Clyde. 
Instead, he effectively gave both Scotts' and Lithgows a get out clause by stating 
that rationalisation would thus, `provide for not more than two groups' 
48 
Consequently, in the wake of the publication of the SIC Report, Michael Scott and 
Sir William Lithgow had been involved in tentative discussions about a possible 
lower Clyde grouping of yards. Indeed, this was expressly acknowledged in a reply 
to a letter of 4 April 1965 on possible grouping sent by Sir Eric Yarrow, the 
chairman of the Scotstoun warship building firm of Yarrow and Company. In repl\ , 
Scott wrote that a single Clyde grouping did not attract Sir William Lithgow. From 
the outset it was clear that Sir Eric Yarrow did not favour one either. Yarrow 
wondered if one or two groups on the river were the answer to the problem Geddes 
had set the firms on the river? And, if it was too much to ask that this would be 
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resolved in principle before the SIB arranged, 'marriages of convenience with the 
resultant honeymoons resembling hell rather than heaven' ! 49 
Contemporaneously, two other Warship Group firms on the upper reaches. Stephen 
and John Brown were already in financial trouble, as was the third of the quartet, 
Fairfield. 50 The other, Yarrow, which had increasingly specialised on frigate 
construction and design to the exclusion of most other building, was in contrast to 
the three other mixed mercantile and naval builders in a strong position to become 
the `S' yard in any future grouping. Meanwhile on the Lower Clyde, a merger 
between Scotts' and Lithgows had apparently much to commend it. Both firms ww ere 
geographically isolated, had co-operated on labour matters and superficially mct the 
Geddes criteria for a group. With Scotts' Cartsburn yard as the `S' yard. the 
Cartsdyke Dockyard as the `M' yard and Lithgows Kingston and last shipyards as 
the `B' yards, and with Ferguson, Scott of Bowling and Scotts' engine works thro\\ n 
in the potential group was just about big enough. However. il 'in line with SIC 
recommendations, the eventual rationalisation and separation of Scotts engine works 
did take place, the `group' could not hope to have anything near the requisite eight to 
ten thousand employees originally envisaged by Geddes. Moreover, oiy en the 
urgency required to make the shipbuilding industry more competitive. Geddes had 
indicated a timetable for the establishment of the SIB, in which firms were expected 
to give that body detailed proposals for grouping and rationalisation between March 
and December 1967.51 
From the outset, however, any real merger between Scotts' and Lithgows was in no 
way a foregone conclusion. Both were family firms with a narrow shareholder base, 
even more so with Lithgows, and were organised accordingly. In the Lithgow case, 
Fairfield and Fairfield-Rowan were proof that it was not sufficient just to keep a 
weather eye on developments and delegate much of the day-to-day running of firms 
to local management. Ominously, Lithgows had yet to digest this message. as it \% as 
envisaged that the Group concept would be similar to that which pertained under the 
old Lithgow Group of companies. Individual companies would operate as separate 
units: 
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Thus retaining all the advantages of relatively small compact teams using 
their own initiative and having their own individuality-but still sharing 
certain common services and enjoying all the advantages of being, part of a 
larger group... [giving] the best of both worlds. 52 
How this strategy could work across a Geddes group of companies remained to be 
ascertained. However, pared management teams and individuality, did not augur well 
for central direction and control of a complex group of companies where the whole, 
in terms of management, had to be more important than the sum of its parts. 
Contemporaneously, in the case of Scotts' at least the Greenock Dockyard was next 
door, yet Scott of Bowling was upriver, but was comparatively insignificant. Public 
companies, such as Swan Hunter on the Tyne, for example, would inevitably be 
better geared to merge its activities without the baggage of family tradition and 
loyalties. What had in essence prompted the Lower Clyde merger talks was a 
realisation that the survival of major shipbuilding in Greenock and Port Glasgow 
was at stake. Scotts' owing to the lock-up investment of Swire could hardly re-locate 
elsewhere, but Lithgows could more easily have liquidated, and even moved their 
shipbuilding activities abroad if they had chosen to do so. Family tradition and 
loyalty to the local community in which they had formerly prospered was to some 
extent important. Of more likely and pressing importance, however, was the enticing 
lure of SIB funding for consultancy studies, transitional grants to cover losses borne 
in re-organisation, and loans for capital schemes and for working capital. This 
government largesse provided a powerful incentive to both firms to de-merge their 
shipbuilding activities into a separate merged firm, whilst retaining all of their other 
interests in a holding company to preserve their family assets. Business sense 
dictated that both Scotts' and Lithgows could not keep throwing money at their 
shipbuilding activities in a period of declining profits merely on the expectation that 
market conditions would improve. Each firm had after all modernised just to survive 
in the market, but an unanswered question remained as to whether their view of the 
market as it stood and of future trends justified an attempt to try to recoup some of 
their capital outlay to at least justify it. Moreover, in the case of Scotts' in particular, 
the dual cornerstones of its policy throughout the century, the retention of naval 
orders and bespoke linkages was no longer guaranteed. Nevertheless, 
fe\\ 
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commentators could have guessed just how protracted the merger negotiations 
would turn out to be. 
Talks about Talks 
Although the trade unions had given a guarded welcome to the SIC Report, it was 
not until May that a joint meeting was held between the SEF and the CSEL' on 
implementation of the Geddes proposals at York. There. Dan McGarvev the 
chairman of the CSEU and the president of the Boilermakers Society gave an 
undertaking on behalf of the nineteen shipyard unions represented, that, 'there would 
be no more stoppages from who-does-what disputes'. Two weeks later seventy sheet 
metal workers went on strike over a demarcation dispute at Scotts' Cartsburn yard. 
and were then followed three days later by two hundred boilermakers, before 
eventually returning to work on 6 June. 53 Despite this, however, talks on a Lower 
Clyde merger had moved on as both Scotts' and Lithgows had agreed in principle 
that grouping might be in the interests of both. Scotts' had appointed William Giles 
of Baring Brothers as their financial advisor on grouping and Lithgows, Larr\ 
Tindale, of the Industrial, Commercial and Financial Corporation (ICFC). Both 
firms had also appointed a former SIC member, Anthony Burney, of Binder Hamlyn 
to put their proposals on grouping to the SIB. In addition, Deloitte, Plender, Griffith 
& Company were appointed to submit a report to Giles and Tindale on the audited 
accounts covering five years to 31 December 1965, the activities to be merged, the 
possible forms of merger, and the profits and losses for the period, and as estimated 
for 1966.54 Thereafter, at a meeting on 26 June 1966, which is worth considering 
extensively, Sir William Lithgow and Michael Scott learned from Burney, that, 
despite not employing 10,000 men in the proposed group, in his opinion the merger 
was likely to be acceptable to the SIB. The problem of what to do about engine 
building was nevertheless recognised, but not discussed. Both Lithgow and Scott 
had given much thought to alternative patterns of grouping with Upper Clyde yards. 
Scott had already been approached by Yarrow who had, `proposed a scheme, but 
although his warship know-how and business would be valuable, the yards on the 
Lower Reaches [did] not want to be "contaminated" by Upper Clyde wage rates'. 
Another scheme of grouping for all of the yards on the Clyde had also been 
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proposed by Lord Aberconway, to be headed by John Brown. It was noted that this 
ostensibly had the backing of Roy Mason. On the latter point, it is difficult to 
comprehend why this would be the case, given the Clv debark yard's losses. short of 
an expression of preference by Government for a single Clyde grouping. By this 
stage, however, both Scott and Lithgow had privately closed their minds to a merger 
with Upper Clyde yards but had not publicly said so. Nonetheless. the question of 
whether naval work would continue was crucial, as a group would require Scotts' to 
provide the `S' yard. Warship building at the moment was much more profitable 
than mercantile, because of longevity of building contracts. the full recovery of 
overheads, modifications and price escalation clauses. By this stage, both 1_ithgow 
and Scott believed that the only way that Fairfield could be kept going was if the 
Government awarded it plum naval contracts. Burney, however, thought it unlikely 
that a Lower Clyde group would not qualify for naval work, but, nevertheless the 
anxiety lest the naval fuse be pulled out' remained. 55 
It is clear that at this juncture, Sir William Lithgow remained sceptical, it was not 
sufficient for him, ` to be convinced that Lithgows and Scotts' would be better off 
together than separately'. He would also need `to be satisfied that it was in his 
shareholders' interests to continue in the shipbuilding business at all'. Niloreovver, 
inflation imposed a tremendous burden on shipbuilding owing to the long building- 
cycle, but nevertheless, `the arguments in favour of two of the most efficient 
companies in the industry going into liquidation were formidable. The shareholders 
interests were his prime concern, not what the SIB thought was right'. 
56 Lithgow's 
concern with inflation was understandable, before the publication of the 
SIC Report 
and the General Election, he had publicly stated that, the Wilson regime's 
contribution to inflation, the curse of our time, had made a mockery of all 
[his] 
company's efforts. 
' In contrast to Lithgow, Michael Scott was not so pessimistic 
as he remained convinced that if Scotts' and Lithgows could not make a go of 
it in 
shipbuilding, `then no-one could'. Nevertheless, his principal anxiety was the 
retention of his naval business. Thus far, however. 
it was noted that the chief motiv c 
for grouping seemed be the negative one of the consequences of not grouping. 
Tellingly, even at this stage, both Lithgow and Scott said that they did not intend to 
integrate production facilities. Lithgow emphasised that the key to successful 
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shipbuilding management (evidently missing at Fairfield under Lithgowz Group 
control) was `quick decisions. Drawing offices could not be centralised since naval 
and merchant ships presented different problems (this did not seem to too 
problematic at Scotts'), however, both Lithgow and Scott agreed that, 'a ne«- palace 
of varieties was unnecessary'. At this stage, however. Scotts' was profitable. whilst 
Lithgows was not. Scott stated that his present order book, barring accidents, , could 
be profitable for three to three and a half years. There were, however, certain parts of 
his business that he would not want to transfer as he had built up. ' certain reserves, 
which he would like to distribute to shareholders'. Regarding this, he then asked 
Burney whether the SIB would be prepared to lend working capital to the proposed 
group? Burney replied that in the light of paragraph 560 (b) of the SIC Report, Scott 
might have to satisfy the SIB that it was `unreasonable to expect the shareholders to 
invest these spare funds in shipbuilding'. Burney then advised that they prepare their 
case for the SIB, and work out the financial terms of the merger, and plan the 
integration of the operations of the companies. Scott then asked Burney whether or 
not to announce publicly the fact that they were thinking of merging. if only to 
disabuse Roy Mason of the idea that Scott acquiesced to the scheme for a single 
Clyde group put forward by Lord Aberconway. However, he recognised that, on the 
other hand, going public might well smoke out the warship builders to protect their 
interests on the Upper Clyde. Burney, adroitly, advised them to hold their fire. 58 
By July, however, Lithgows managing director, Ross Belch thought that it might be 
advisable to disclose the merger in order that Government might be put off any idea 
of a single Clyde group, but Burney again cautioned against it. This was in keeping 
with the grave situation that the Upper Clyde yards found themselves in. Burney 
informed that at a meeting with Board of Trade, Ministry of Technology and 
Treasury officials to look at financial figures for mergers, it had emerged that those 
figures were based on the assumption of two groups on the Clyde. Lithgow, 
however, still remained reticent, and noted that four alternatives faced his firm; to 
get out of shipbuilding, to go on alone, to merge with Scotts' or to merge 
internationally. However, while remaining rightly sceptical about the Government's 
ability to control inflation, he was, 'inclined to favour a diversification of the 
business out of shipbuilding altogether'. Conversely, he was not 'unenthusiastic' 
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about merging with Scotts', which was easier than going it alone. but all in all he 
remained unconvinced. He informed that there were stronger arguments for merging 
with Swedish or German firms rather than with firms on the Clyde. Lithgo,,, tiw thought 
that `internationalisation, bringing the chance of limiting competition, might be the 
long-term solution for the industry. And if this were so, he did not want to caught 
digesting a domestic merger when the chance arose'. 59 To this apocalyptic 
pronouncement, Scott could do no more that state that he had three or four years 
profitable work in hand. Burney concurred, but stated that he vas making these 
profits from naval orders, and unless they went into a group along Geddes lines, 
`these orders will probably cease'. Lithgows on the other hand were losing money-. 
and if they were, `to liquidate or get out of shipbuilding they would incur substantial 
terminal losses'. The merger offered them a future as a going concern and allo\\ed 
them to obtain some of the benefit of Scotts' profitable contracts whilst rationalising 
their own interests to become more competitive. Burney did, how ev cr. agree that. 'it 
all boiled down to inflation, [and if] it were to continue at the present pace, [without 
a corresponding change in contract terms] so as to spread the burden then the 
shipbuilding industry was a dead duck'. He did, however, recognise that this was on 
the assumption that it would not be possible to quote fixed prices taking present rates 
of inflation into account without pricing oneself out of the market altogether. After 
much more discussion it was agreed that that the immediate task in hand was to 
decide what assets were to be taken over by the merged company? 
60 
At the next meeting, the vexed question of retention or not of Scotts' Engine Works 
was raised by Burney. In reply, Michael Scott stated that its continued existence was 
vital to his company's future survival as a naval builder, as without it, it would be 
impossible to continue to build submarines. The engine works would not be 
competitive, however, without some commercial main engine building as ýv ell. 
Lithgow agreed that the group should have access to an engineering works. and ww ith 
the departure of Fairfield-Rowan from the scene, and with the continuing uncertaint\ 
over Barclay Curle, the situation on the Clyde had materially changed since 
Geddes 
had reported. Burney agreed that it was essential for Scotts' to retain its engine 
works, the problem, however, was not to attract the opposition of the SIB. 
This 
could be done by introducing an element of rationalisation 
into their submission, and 
199 
possibly linking this with the main engine building activities of Kincaid at 
Greenock. 61 In this regard, Harland & Wolff and Kincaid as principal and sub 
licensee respectively were the only marine main engine builders in the UK 
producing the popular Danish patented Burmeister & Wain slow speed marine main 
diesel engine at the time of the SIC Report. The SIC envisaged the concentration of 
marine engine capacity into four main production units manufacturing a single type 
of engine, with each unit having an annual capacity of 300,000 hp. As presently 
constituted, however, no main engine manufacturer in the UK could approach this 
volume, although the SIC noted that Harland & Wolff and Kincaid had a combined 
average annual output over the past six years of 200,000 hp and that the former had 
considerable room for expansion. 62 
The road to the Shipbuilding Industry Board 
On 9 August 1966, the President of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay announced that 
the Government would, in the light of progress already achieved, play its part in the 
re-organisation of the industry. He intimated that William Swallow. formerly the 
chairman and managing director of Vauxhall Motors would be the first chairman of 
the SIB, and that the names of the other two members would be released shortly. All 
three, however, would be able to hold discussions with firms and trade unions in 
advance of legislation as recommended by Geddes. The bad news i'or Scotts' 
however, was that Jay agreed with the recommendation that destro\ er and frigate 
orders should be concentrated in a few yards, but the detailed arrangements 
remained to be worked out with the SIB in light of the re-organisation of the 
industry. 63 Contemporaneously, the vexed problem of credit for home shipowners 
building in the UK as opposed to abroad, already flagged up by Geddes was in the 
event to hold up the passage of a Shipbuilding Industry Bill. 
64 Another telling factor 
was the impending transfer of responsibility for the shipbuilding industry from the 
Board of Trade, which had overseen the entire Geddes process thus far to the 
nascent Ministry of Technology headed by Anthony Wedgwood Benn. Indeed, this 
would be the fourth Ministry to be responsible for the shipbuilding and marine 
engineering industries in the past nine years. 
65 It later transpired, however, that the 
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shipbuilding industry had not been consulted on the proposed change, which in any 
event they were opposed to in principle. 66 
By 19 August, however, Scotts' and Lithgows had jointly announced that they were 
in the process of conducting exploratory talks on a possible Lower Clyde merger. 67 
Following on from this, and with the SIB Chairman, William Swallow due to visit 
the area in the last week of the month; Burney reiterated the importance of 
submitting plans to Swallow before his trip had begun. Michael Scott, although it 
was important to inform Swallow of progress to date, thought it would be unwise to 
send a full submission to the latter, who `was in no position to give it proper 
consideration'. Quite apart from Swallow having no knowledge of the industry, he 
had no office, and had not yet been able to find a suitable trade unionist and 
consultant to be his partners on the three-man SIB. Despite this. how ever, a 
memorandum on progress was sent. Burney, who was in constant contact with civil 
servants, confidentially informed that Sir Richard Powell of the Board of Trade was 
in favour of plans for a merger on the Lower Clyde, but appeared to be wary of any 
merger on the Upper Clyde until the success or not of the Fairfield 'Experiment I 
could be judged. Moreover, Burney had also discussed main engine building v, ith 
Geddes and Powell who both agreed that the timetable for rationalisation laid down 
in the SIC Report was unrealistic. Furthermore, in this regard it would be most 
unfortunate if mergers were held up by non-compliance with the strict guidelines 
in 
the Report. In this light it was decided to re-emphasise the importance of retaining 
Scotts' Engine Works, both for naval work and other commercial engine building in 
a future submission to the SIB, and to re-write the submission accordingly 
in time 
for Swallow's visit. 68 
Thereafter, the two other members of the SIB, Anthony Hepper. and the trade 
unionist, Joe Gormley were appointed to assist Swallow, their work, 
however. 
continued to be on a non-statutory basis. 
69 Hepper subsequently visited the Lo\ver 
Clyde in November, and as Sir William Lithgow noted, the former believed in a 
return on capital employed. By this stage, Lithgow remained reticent about any 
future merger, Deloitte continued to investigate the financial 
implications and a 
working party had been formed to consider the 
benefits of a possible Scott Kincaid 
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engineering merger. Nevertheless, Sir John Hunter. of Swan Hunter had tried to sell. 
in a high-pressure visit' to Lithgow the idea of the Tyne firms subsidiary Barclay 
Curie engine works coming into such a merger. 70 That month, responsibility for the 
shipbuilding and marine engineering industries finally passed to the Ministry of 
Technology (Mintech). 71 In December, Lithgow in company with Swallow had seen 
Wedgwood Benn ostensibly to discuss a credit deal with Clarksons. regarding the 
construction of an oil bulk ore carrier vessel (OBO), a market which Lithgo« was 
keen on entering, but where credit terms were decisive. Before Christmas. Lithgow. 
in a letter to Wedgwood Benn hoped that if the latter were to visit the Lower Qdc. 
he would be encouraged by, `a forward looking enthusiasm'. 72 With seventy-one 
per cent of British orders being placed abroad in the first nine months of the year. up 
by thirteen per cent from the previous year, it remained to be seen whether or not 
73 this enthusiasm was entirely misplaced. 
Earlier in November, Scotts' had launched its second Australian submarine. R . 4. V 
Otway, and by December the firm had also launched from its Cartsdyke yard, Clan 
Alpin, the vessel used to oil the wheels of the deal to take over that facility in March. 
Lithgows, with the launch in August 1966 of the largest bulk carrier at that staoc 
built in Scotland, Naess Talisman at 71,000 deadweight tons, again headed the river 
in output, followed by Scotts' in second place. 
74 Significantly. the total Clyde 
output at just over 304,000 gross tons was the lowest since 1939 with the one 
exception of 1963 when the total was just less than 260,000 gross tons. One vessel, 
the British Commodore, at 40,000 deadweight tons was sufficient to place Fairfield 
in third place. 75 By January 1967, however, William Swallow had been granted a 
knighthood, and in his capacity as chairman of the SIB he wrote a letter to the heads 
of all the shipbuilding firms that he had earlier visited. By this stage, 
legislative 
enactment to quantify the SIB powers had yet to take place. 
Nevertheless. Sir 
William Swallow sought to deny that this had held up the process of mergers, simply 
because even if the SIB had been formally approved, it would have 
been unable to 
act as it had not received any detailed proposals 
from consultants for major 
shipbuilding groups. Moreover, if Swallow 
had received detailed proposals then he 
would have requested that commitments should 
be entered into in advance of 
legislation. Tellingly, in line with the deteriorating competitive situation against the 
'1O2 
industry's international competitors, Swallow believed that the formation of major 
groups must be brought about rapidly, and in this regard he hoped to receive a 
proposal from the Lower Clyde in the near future. 76 Contemporaneously , events 
there had moved on apace, and it is to the ramifications of the Deloitte Plender 
Griffith Report that I now turn to. 
The Deloitte Plender Griffith Report 
By 10 February 1967, Deloitte had at last reported on the audited accounts of both 
Scotts' and Lithgows and their subsidiary firms to be merged within a Lower Clyde 
group. 77 Deloitte found that Scotts' had an approximate number of 4.400 employees 
and had been profitable in the past five years. Efforts were being made to put in 
place a central buying organisation for the Cartsburn, Cartsdvke and engineering 
departments, and also to create one shipyard-estimating department for Cartsburn 
and Cartsdyke, with a separate unit for engineering. In addition to this a combined 
design department for Cartsburn and Cartsdyke would be made available to 
Bowling, with one accounting and costing office covering shipbuilding and 
engineering. Scotts' profits before taxation for the five years ended 31 December 
1965 totalled £1,569,034, however, it will be recalled that Scotts' took their profits 
only on completion of contracts. Accordingly, a conservative view was taken of the 
outcome of the contract for HMS Opportune in the 1964 accounts, but the addition 
of extras and price variation clauses were brought over to the 1965 accounts. 
Similarly, the loss in 1964 on the last frigate built, HMS Eur Alus was computed 
without taking into account extras and price variation clauses. which were again 
added to the 1965 accounts. As Deloitte noted these contracts swung over £300.000 
of profit from 1964 to 1965, and but for this 1965 would have shown an appreciable 
loss, as it stood, profits before taxation amounted to £187,881. Lithgows, with 
approximately 2,500 employees had in contrast to Scotts' performed poorly, with 
trading profits before taxation of £ 112,428 in 1961 and £ 13,114 in 1965. which did 
not include Ferguson, being almost equalled by losses before taxation of 
£47.838, 
£47,649 and £29,637 in 1962,1963 and 1964 respectively. 
78 Lithgo« s performance. 
however, has to be seen in the light of increasingly cut-throat competition for 
mercantile orders, moreover, unlike Scotts' the Port 
Glasgow firm did not have the 
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advantage of regular payments for warship work to fall back on. Despite this, 
however, with this level of profitability, liquidity remained all-important, as did the 
chase for more profitable orders. 
The Deloitte report also gave two alternatives to the form of merger envisaged. First. 
the creation of a new merged company to acquire the whole of the issued share 
capitals of a company formed by Scotts' to which it would transfer. [prior] to the 
date of the merger, its shipbuilding and engineering interests including the work-in- 
progress and liabilities thereon. Similarly, Lithgows would do likewise with their 
shipbuilding and repairing interests. Second, the creation of a new merger company 
to acquire from Scotts and Lithgows [at] the merger date, land, buildings, plant, 
machinery and equipment to be merged. The fixed assets would be valued 
independently, but contracts in progress and orders current at the merger would 
remain in the ownership of the existing companies. Under method one, the formation 
of wholly owned subsidiaries was mooted because both firms had further interests 
that would not be merged, and which would be retained for the direct benefit of the 
existing shareholders. Under this method no taxation disadvantage accrued in 
respect of the non-merged interests, they merely remained with the existing 
companies. If however, the non-merged interests were in the first instance to be 
hived off to newly formed subsidiaries, grave taxation disadvantages would ensue. If 
the second method were chosen, this would secure for Scotts' shareholders, the 
profits on existing contracts and allow maintenance of dividend payments, whereas 
method one would jeopardise the flow of dividends. Moreover, both firms were for 
tax purposes, under the control of five or fewer persons. As such, each would require 
clearance from the Inland Revenue in accordance with the provisions of section 28 
(10) of the Finance Act 1960 as amended (cancellation of tax advantages from 
transactions in securities) on the ground that the proposed transactions were being 
carried out for commercial reasons. 
79 It can therefore be seen without attempting to 
exhaust the various alternative options and scenarios, that a proper merger taking 
into account the relative strengths and weaknesses of either firm. which, on the basis 
of past profits would favour Scotts' was likely to be a drawn out process. 
? 0-4 
Due to the understandable need to get the best possible deal for each firm, it later 
transpired that all was not well in respect of the discussions on the financial aspects 
of the merger between Giles of Barings, and Tindale of the ICFC. Giles informed 
that Michael Scott wished that his shareholders, through the maintenance of 
dividends in the first two years after merger would need a guaranteed income of at 
least £50,000, and that control of the merged undertaking should be 70: 30 in favour 
of Scotts. This ratio was based on past profits, a position that Tindale was loathe to 
accept, but did state that if a deal was done on the basis of fixed assets, then Scotts' 
did have a case for additional income for a total of five years, post merger. In this 
regard, Tindale was prepared for a quick settlement based on the valuations already 
done by James Barr & Company, CA on the fixed assets of both firms, but was 
unable to recommend a 70: 30 split. The following day Giles wrote to Scott on what 
appeared to be an irreconcilable position between the advisors, which was, 'placing 
the goodwill, which existed between [the] principals in jeopardy'. Giles suggested 
that Scott should get together with Lithgow in convivial surroundings and suggest to 
him that, `the atmosphere of cold logic is the wrong one in which to deal with the 
issue of living business'. Clearly. throughout this process, John Lee of Scotts' was 
concerned about Lithgows future profits potential, a factor that had given rise to the 
suggested 70: 30 split. However, both he and Giles did come round to a 60: 40 split, 
which Tindale and Lithgow had consistently assumed to be correct, and advised 
Scott accordingly. 80 
Scott Lithgow Drydocks Limited 
By May 1967, however, another factor had been added to the merger equation when 
it was announced that Scotts' and Lithgows had purchased the 
ill-starred Firth of 
Clyde Dry Dock Company, which had already gone into liquidation. 
8' The Dry 
Dock, which had cost £4,600,000 to build, was sold for £ 1,100.000 
(in effect for the 
fixed assets) and renamed Scott Lithgow Drydocks Limited with an authorised share 
capital of £100 divided into one hundred shares of £1 each. 
Only two £1 shares were 
initially issued one to be held by Scotts' and the other by Lithgows. The consultants, 
Booz-Allen & Hamilton who had been employed to report on the value of the bid 
had put an upper limit on the value of the Dock as £2.750,000 
in a situation of 
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competitive tendering and £1,800,000 if it was not. 82 The sorry saga that had begun 
with much hope had ended with two of the major shareholders buy ing the Dock at a 
knockdown price, with the entire episode resulting in an outright loss to the taxpay er 
of £2,400,000.83 Scotts' and Lithgow later decided to increase the share capital of 
the new company to £500,000 Authorised and £250,000 Issued as the best method of 
financing the purchase. And in this respect, the National Commercial Bank of 
Scotland advanced a credit line to the company of £500,000 at half a percentage 
point over Bank Rate for a period not exceeding six months. 84 The purchase of Scott 
Lithgow Drydocks did give a possible Lower Clyde merger a ready made ship 
repairing facility, but it remained to be seen if the lesson of the Firth of Clyde Dry 
Dock collapse was to be learned. Indeed, if any major shiprepairing facility. by its 
very location on the Clyde was to be successful, it had to depend on the prosperity of 
shipbuilding firms on the river. 85 
Towards a Merger 
At a meeting held between the principals and their financial advisors on 6 April 
1967, it was agreed to request James Barr to re-adjust his initial valuations on the 
fixed assets of both firms by adding back the deductions he had made from the 
valuations in respect of profitability. The next day, Barr produced a revised 
valuation, which in the case of Scotts' had risen from £3,998,650 to £6,090,594, and 
in Lithgows case from £2,856,850 to £4,791,330. This gave a total valuation of the 
fixed assets of each firm of £10,881,924. Again it must be emphasised that these 
valuations were on the basis of an assumption, [a huge one in this case] of the, 
`presence of a willing buyer and a willing seller and viewed as part of a going 
concern'. 86 Just how realistic these valuations were is difficult to determine, 
however, on liquidation, such values would be virtually meaningless. Moreover, 
with past and future profitability assumptions presumably used as a yardstick, there 
seems to a large element of unreality about these figures as a basis for determining 
the ratio of any proposed merger. Nevertheless, Lithgows with its increasing 
experience in the construction of large bulk carriers and tankers had apparently %\ oil 
in May an order for two 130,000-deadweight ton tankers from the Samvan(g 
Navigation Company of South Korea, to be delivered in 1969. This prompted Ross 
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Belch of Lithgows to comment that the Kingston yard was designed with this type of 
vessel in mind, and that the labour force would go flat out to finish the contract in 
the next eighteen months. To oil the wheels of this export deal. Clarksons of London 
and Doddwell's of Tokyo acted as brokers in conjunction with the Bank of Scotland 
and the Export Credit Guarantee Department. Tellingly, however, the deal %% as 
announced despite it being subject to the completion of detailed financial 
negotiations. It was hoped, however, that talks on this aspect of the deal would be 
resolved soon. 87 
By the end of July, however, the long and detailed negotiations between the- 
financial advisors of the respective firms had finally ended. and it was publicly 
announced that both Scotts' and Lithgows had settled the terms of their proposed 
merger. In a joint statement, it was noted that it was not anticipated to make any, 
further announcement until the proposals had been submitted to the respective 
shareholders and the SIB. Nevertheless, it remained the intention of the new group 
to be operational, `as early as is reasonably practicable'. 88 Subsequently-. Michael 
Scott and Sir William Lithgow put the terms precedent upon forming a ne\\ 
company to take over the shipbuilding and engineering interests of their firms to 
their respective shareholders in mid October 1967. By this stage, a fail- and 
reasonable settlement on the financial aspects of the merged firm had been agreed, 
with Scotts' receiving sixty per cent of the share capital. The newly merged firm 
would have at its disposal, the Cartsburn, Cartsdyke and Bowling shipyards of 
Scotts', and Lithgows Kingston, East, Glen, and the Newark shipyard of Ferguson 
Brothers. It was noted that there would be practically no market for which the ne« 
firm could not build, whether they could in fact do so was not considered. 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the Geddes-inspired rationalisation of main engine 
building, and in an attempt to satisfy the requirements of the SIB, which by this 
stage had been formally set up to carry out its statutory functions, it was considered 
that it might be necessary to combine the engineering function of the new firm with 
that of another. However, the other assets of Scotts' such as the two ships built on its 
own account, British Monarch and Bolnes already on a bareboat charter to 
shipowners for fifteen years, and investments. debtors on deferred terms, current 
assets less current liabilities and loans would remain outside the merged firm. 
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Nevertheless, the value of these assets remained to be ascertained until such time as 
the work-in-progress on current contracts was completed. Moreover. the shares in 
Scott Lithgow Drydocks would also be outwith the terms of the proposed merger. 89 
At an EGM called to on 30 October 1967. Michael Scott noted that from the point of 
view of family pride and sentiment, the shareholders might find the proposed merger 
hard to digest. He then admitted that he and his Board. had been suffering from that 
same indigestion for somewhat more than a year'. Scott, reiterated the Geddes 
criteria, and then stated that a merged firm was a. 'natural and logical development 
in the rationalisation of shipbuilding activities in the area" Nevertheless, the 
proposed merger could not be compared with a normal commercial amalgamation, 
as Scotts' had no option but to do so. In the case of Lithgows. Scott reiterated that 
the Port Glasgow firm had many facilities to offer, which would be of 'immense 
value' in an re-organisation, particularly their recent experience in building large 
ships and the space they have to offer for further expansion to build even larger 
vessels. Scott then looked to the future by stating: 
It is our sincere hope and belief that, by re-organising the complete 
production of Scotts' and Lithgows in a rational manner by the combination 
of our management's and with the help which we hope to obtain under the 
Shipbuilding Industry Act, the merger will ultimately be able to earn 
reasonable profits. 
On the question of future dividends, the intention was to pay a ten per cent dividend 
for 1967 and 1968 out of current contracts and assets retained, however, the position 
in shipbuilding had deteriorated rapidly in recent months. Consequently. a 
lack of 
orders and rising labour costs would affect contracts on hand on Scotts' account. 
However, as distinct from the proposed Merger Company-Scott Lithgoýý Limited. 
the Scotts' Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Limited would continue to 
operate as a separate holding company by retaining: 
Two ships on bareboat charters, which would be kept for at least ti-" c years in 
order not to lose investment allowances granted. 
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Shares in Scott Lithgow Limited on the basis of 1.000,000 Ordinary Shares 
of £1 each and 500,000 Participating Preference Shares of £1 each. The 
granting of the latter satisfied the 60: 40 ration in favour of Scotts' and was 
intended to preserve its dividend policy in the future. As such Lithgows 
would hold only 1,000,000 Ordinary Shares in Scott Lithgow Limited. 
Scotts' would retain whatever residue of funds were left after the completion 
of current contracts on its account 
Michael Scott did, however, point out to his fellow shareholders that the SIB might 
insist on their firm providing its share of working capital for the merger. Howw-e\ er. 
in the initial stages, subject to various reservations made. it «-as hoped to make a 
tax-free profit from Scotts' ex merger dividends, after fully depreciating the ships on 
charter. Thereafter, those present approved the proposed merger with Lithgoww s, and 
authorised the Directors to proceed accordingly. 90 
Similarly, Lithgows Limited would also retain its myriad shipowning interests and 
investments outwith the proposed Scott Lithgow Limited. Before any real merger 
took place, however, two major problems affecting the proposed deal remained to be 
thrashed out with the SIB. First, as Sir William Lithgow noted. both Scotts' and 
Lithgows desired to stay out of any single Clyde group. And secondly. as a 
precondition to a formal merger, Scotts' had to retain its ' S' yard status and place on 
the Navy List as both a builder of conventional submarines and surface warships, 
and be allowed to submit tenders accordingly. 
91 Since the completion of the 
Leander class frigate, HMS Euryalus in 1964, Scotts' had continued to tender for 
surface warships, however, a record of two frigates built from fifty-one completed 
from 1953 to 1965 did not bode well for the future construction of these increasingly 
complex craft. 92 
The SIB deliberate. 
In only its second official meeting in March 1967. the SIB had considered the use of 
naval orders to promote rationalisation, but at that stage they regarded the 
direct 
planning of re-organisation of the shipbuilding industry as their. -first priority 
'. The 
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SIB did, however, propose to discuss the use of naval orders with MoD (N) and also 
to keep Mintech informed as to their progress. 93 In the same month. the question of 
a single Clyde group was also discussed. It was noted that an Upper Clyde group 
could not build very large ships, but that there was scope for doing so on the Lower 
Clyde. Nevertheless, in the interim, progress on an Upper Clyde group should not be 
held up. 94 By the end of March, however, the SIB in response to questions set by 
Baylis of Mintech on the acquisition by Scotts' and Lithgows of the Firth of Clyde 
Dry Dock stated that it would recognise a Lower Clyde group as qualifying for 
assistance. However, this would only be an interim measure pending the formation 
of a single Clyde group. On the acquisition of the Dock the SIB noted that the Lower 
Clyde firms seemed mainly concerned with the retention of their own labour force, 
and were accordingly anxious that no outside party would come into the district. 
Indeed, this was a, `dog in the manger attitude, ' and moreover, the SIB had the clear 
impression that the two firms did not want to keep the Dock in regular operation, as 
the terms of their offer did not provide sufficient working capital to do this. It was 
therefore, likely that the firms would take labour from the Dock for their owe n 
shipyards, and that no case had been made through the acquisition to improve the 
firms' shipbuilding competitiveness. 95 
By June, however, Tony Hepper, the SIB member most intimately involved %v ith the 
Upper Clyde merger proposals stressed that the need to achieve sufficient production 
in order to provide continuity of employment on the river ý, N as a strong reason for a 
single Clyde group. 96 With the industry's order book at the end of the first quarter 
of 1967 at its lowest level since 1963, and with orders booked at less than three per 
cent of world orders in the period, some urgency in advancing grouping proposals 
was necessary. 97 The following month, another SIB member, Joe Gormley 
expressed concern at the slow rate of progress on the Lower Clyde. He noted that 
almost a year had been spent by Scotts' and Lithgows on talks about `delicate 
financial measures, with as yet no real sign of a full physical merger, let alone a 
grouping scheme'. To this, Sir William Swallow mused that a public statement b` 
the SIB on the lack of progress should be made, however. timing was crucial and 
issue by autumn at the latest was deemed desirable. 
98 
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In the interim, the Government already concerned at the incidence of British 
shipowners ordering abroad had deemed that a satisfactory system of credit facilities 
for home shipyards had to be devised. Consequently, under section 7 of the 
Shipbuilding Industry Act, 1967, which had received Royal Assent on 28 June. 
Mintech, only on the recommendation of the SIB, could approve and guarantee 
applications for credit facilities for home shipowners on the same terms as those 
available for export credits. The loans applied to British shipowners for the 
construction of ships in British shipyards up to a maximum of £200.000,000 at any 
one time. The Act, however, as Hogwood noted, stipulated that progress on re- 
organisation of resources was necessary as a pre-requisite to SIB approval. 99 
Nevertheless, despite the SIB concern over the snails pace of the Lower Clyde 
merger talks, it did approve an application for section 7 assistance from Lithgows to 
enable the construction of two 130,000-deadweight ton bulk carriers in June. It was 
noted that this would extend Lithgows order book into 1970, a little further ahead 
than the SIB would normally consider, but nevertheless it was agreed to as the. 
`overall advantages outweighed other considerations'. 100 
Although SIB approval had been given to the Lithgows application, it still had to be 
approved by the Treasury. The SIB, however, remained wedded to the idea of a 
single Clyde group, a factor that was stressed to Tony Hepper in Jul`' 1967. Nepper' s 
Working Party on the Upper Clyde had put forward the idea of a new fitting out yard 
costing over £4,000,000 at John Brown's Clydebank yard. This was questioned by 
other SIB members on the basis that adequate fitting out facilities were already 
in 
place on the Lower Clyde, and in this light, `was it right to consider a heavy capital 
investment with the John Brown yard in the circumstances'? Hepper agreed to take 
this into account. 101 In August, the SIB noted that a letter had been received 
from its 
sponsoring department, Mintech, on the progress of Lower Clyde grouping plans. 
This missive advocated holding up submission of Lithgows Section 7 applications to 
the Treasury until up-to-date information was available on substantive plans for 
grouping. The SIB view on this was not recorded, but 
it did agree that progress thus 
far had been unsatisfactory and that both Scotts' and Lithgows should be reminded 
102 
of the ultimate objective of a single Clyde group. 
211 
Clearly, with pressure mounting, Scotts' and Lithgows duly announced their 
intention to merge on 12 September. The following day. however. at a meeting of 
the Shipbuilding and Ship Repairing Council, chaired by Sir William Swallow. 
which included representatives of the employers and trade unions, Swallow 
reiterated the SIB view that the long-term aim was still the formation of a single 
Clyde group. 103 By October, the SIB had received a draft letter from Scott and 
Lithgow, which still sought an assurance that Scotts' would be an ' S' yard capable 
of building both submarines and surface warships. Again, such an assurance was 
regarded as fundamental to the formation of a Lower Clyde group. The SIB. 
however, was unable to give any such assurance, and in any case, the Navy 
Department [did] not consider that Scotts' would ever be able to build sophisticated 
naval vessels'. 104 Despite this negative opinion of the qualities of the Greenock firm. 
MoD (N) nevertheless continued to invite Scotts' to tender for the sophisticated 
naval warships that they were apparently unable to build. Moreover. no decision had 
yet been reached on the composition of the favoured naval yards, \\-here thereafter- 
naval orders would be concentrated. Geddes had envisaged three yards building 
frigates and destroyers, but had not stated that every `S' yard should build for the 
Navy. 
The twin dilemmas of retaining some form of surface warship capability and 
remaining outside a single Clyde group continued to form the stumbling 
block for 
any real Lower Clyde merger. Michael Scott again reiterated this stance at a working 
lunch with the SIB on the subject of a Lower Clyde merger in November. 
On the 
single Clyde group, Joe Gormley for the SIB stated that there was no question of 
forcing Scotts' and Lithgows to merge with the Upper Clyde immediately. However. 
they should hasten their own merger, whilst co-operating with the 
Upper Clyde 
group and move towards a single group in the 
lifetime of the SIB. In reply, the 
Lower Clyde party, correctly, did not think that it was likely that any 
Upper Clyde 
group would be viable or profitable for at least 
four years. Nevertheless, as an SIB 
member had already pointed out, if, in effect, a single 
Clyde group emerged, then 
iuý 
this would offer MoD (N) `a single tendering party on the 
Clyde instead of two ". 
Clearly. Scotts' were in direct competition with Yarrow who were likely. given their 
gearing towards frigate construction and 
design to be the ' S' yard in the Upper 
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Clyde consortium, where negotiations with the SIB were far more advanced than on 
the Lower Clyde. Moreover, there were not enough frigate orders to justify two 
Geddes 'S' yards on the Clyde, and due to the advanced state of negotiations on the 
upper reaches, SIB funding would be granted quicker there. Simply put, no merger 
on the Lower Clyde meant no SIB funding. 
Nevertheless, the Mintech-SIB line on a single Clyde group did not. however. 
necessarily equate with MoD (N) priorities. Previously. Sir William Swallow had 
told the Navy department that as a start he thought that that the requirement to build 
sophisticated warships could be brought down to just four yards. Geographically, 
these yards would be located as follows; one in Northern Ireland, one on the Tyne. 
one on the Clyde and one on the South Coast of England. However, the SIB plan 
was likely to be frustrated by yards that could theoretically build most types of naval 
vessels. 106 An equally frustrated Director of the SIB, Barry Barker stated in a note 
to Baylis at Mintech if the Government thought that three or four yards would be 
enough to handle the future naval programme for sophisticated warships then they 
should clearly say so. Barker then voiced the SIB concern over Scotts' insistence on 
`S' yard status, on which an immediate decision was needed. 107 In reply. Baylis gigot 
to the heart of the matter by stating that, `he saw no prospect of an early agreement 
with MoD (N)', of the type suggested by Barker. Baylis lamented that: 
We know from experience that the Ministry of Defence have their own direct 
links with the shipbuilders, would like to establish such direct links with the 
SIB, and would not hesitate to use these links to advocate policies which 
differ from ours.. . 
This is reasonable enough from their point of view even 
though it causes embarrassment for us. 108 
In a nutshell, Baylis was commenting on Whitehall realpolitik, Mintech remained a 
relatively junior department, and the SIB was but a transitory body. It remained in 
MoD (N) interests to have as many builders as possible bidding for contracts by 
competitive tendering, even though political considerations often outweighed strictl\ 
commercial judgements 
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Given capital constraints, Lithgows intended move into giant tanker construction 
could only be achieved with SIB support. That support had temporarily gone 
elsewhere to two of the Port Glasgow firm's major rivals in the domestic market, 
Swan Hunter, [who had already formed a group] and Harland & Wolff. [ww ho had 
not]. Each had with the aid of Mintech and the SIB secured a joint order for four 
240,000-deadweight ton tankers from Esso Petroleum, on the basis that the British 
shipbuilding industry might break into the VLCC market. Finance was therefore 
granted to extend the facilities of each firm to complete the order, which was 
deemed to be in the national interest. In the case of Swan Hunter. this involved the 
modification of a crossover berth, and an excavation of the opposite bank of the 
Tyne at a total cost of around £200,000. Harland & Wolff needed a much more 
extensive modernisation programme. The first stage of the Belfast scheme required 
that the Musgrave Channel should be emptied, dock gates would then be put in, and 
the bottom of the Channel piled for 1,200 feet. Further work would need to be 
undertaken at the end of the Channel, and the fabrication facilities needed to re- 
organised accordingly at a total estimated cost of between eight and ten million 
pounds. The orders for the four tankers were placed on 26 September 1967 at the 
SIB headquarters in London, with Sir John Hunter of Swan Hunter and John 
Mallabar of Harland &Wolff in attendance, as were Dan McGar\'ev' and Barratt of 
the CSEU. Accordingly, it was noted that this was an historic occasion, as for the 
first time representatives of the shipowners, the shipbuilders and trade unions, the 
SIB, and Mintech had came together to attract an order by giving assurances on 
delivery and union co-operation. 109 A factor other than Government support that 
had aided the deal was the closure of the Suez Canal as a result of the Arab Israeli 
War, which had led to a tanker-ordering boom. At a combined cost of £25,000,000 
and at 1,100 feet in length these tankers were the largest ever built in the UK. 110 
Another factor likely to lead to an increase in overseas orders was the subsequent 
devaluation of sterling in November 1967. 
PE Engine Building Study on the Clyde 
Earlier in July the SIB had commissioned PE Consultants at a cost of 1 1.500 guineas 
to undertake a study of slow speed marine diesel engine building on the Clyde. 
II 
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The results made depressing reading as it was noted that PE personnel had visited 
the engine works of Burmeister & Wain in Denmark, and Sulzer Brothers in 
Switzerland and found that both machine tool and labour utilisation there were much 
superior to those on the Clyde. Moreover, overseas levels of productivity would take 
years of development to achieve on Clydeside. Assuming reorganisation and 
increased capital expenditure along the lines of Sulzer, where a high level of tooling 
and low level of labour was present, would require a productivity increase on the 
Clyde in the region of seventy per cent by 1970. It was noted that discussions had 
already taken place between Scotts' and Kincaid's on a possible merger, but in 
Scotts' case half the labour capacity was taken up in submarine work. This was 
totally different from engine building and if the two firms were to combine then it 
was desirable that the submarine work should be divorced from engine work. In 
Kincaid's case it was noted that fifty per cent of machine tools were over twenty 
years old, and in Scotts' case, sixty per cent were over ten years old. It appeared, 
however, that in recent years both firms had operated regular replacement policies. 
112 This less than ringing endorsement showed the magnitude of reaching continental 
standards in main engine production. Moreover, it obviously gave the SIB 
considerable food for thought if any real attempt was to be made to divorce the 
marine main engine building sector from shipbuilding where the prosperity of the 
former was inextricably linked to that of the latter. 
Meanwhile the Scott Lithgow saga rumbled on and by 1968, despite Mintech and 
SIB dissatisfaction over the MoD (N) line which offered no real support for a 
reduction in warship firms, Mintech remained clearly frustrated at the situation on 
the Lower Clyde. Whilst a volle face in the tone of SIB correspondence was 
undesirable, somehow: 
Things must be brought to a head, if necessary by threats, without the SIB 
giving away essential positions on Clyde reorganisation, or getting embroiled 
in the question of the extent to which reorganisation effects the placing of 
naval work 
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Clearly the essential position remained the creation of a single Clyde group. 
However, it was not thought right that Mintech should buy a lower Clyde grouping. 
at the cost of some moral commitment, which we may not be able to honour in any 
case, that Scotts' must be able to tender for frigates'. 113 Just what these 'threats' in 
fact were remains unclear, but sabre rattling aside, and irrespective of MoD (N) 
insouciance, Mintech and the SIB still remained committed to a single Clyde group. 
Scott Lithgow Limited and the long march to a Scott Lithgow Group 
Earlier on 20 December 1967, Scott Lithgow Limited had been incorporated in 
Edinburgh. Subsequently, Michael Sinclair Scott was formally appointed as 
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Sir William Lithgow as Vice Chairman. 
Each took one share in the capital of the company, with work-in-progress remaining 
the responsibility of the respective firms. Somewhat belatedly, however, Scott 
Lithgow appointed Alan Borland as Director of Marketing Services, whose salary 
would be met equally by Scotts' and Lithgows until the formation of a Scott 
Lithgow Group. 114 Previously, both Scotts' and Lithgows marketing, more properly, 
`selling', efforts had been dealt with at broker and at directorial levels. For Scotts' 
Michael Scott and George Hilton would normally deal with ship orders and 
negotiations thereon, as would Alex White and latterly Ross Belch at Lithgows. It 
must be stressed; however, that in the Heads of Agreement to merge signed in 
September 1967 it was envisaged that the SIB would provide the working capital to 
do so. Moreover, two conditions precedent to the implementation of a full merger 
still remained to be fulfilled- the acceptance by the SIB of Scotts' as an `S' yard, and 
clearance under Section 28 (10) of the Finance Act 1960. 
i1 An earlier SIB minute 
informs that Ross Belch envisaged that the estimated requirement for working 
capital for a merged Lower Clyde group would be £3,000,000, and it was clear that 
the SIB was expected to provide this. On this latter point, the SIB stressed that it 
would only be prepared to consider lending working capital to such extent, 'as this 
could not reasonably be provided from other sources ... 
[and] 
... that money 
in 
shipbuilding should be left in shipbuilding and should not be taken out 
for other 
purposes'. 
116 By this stage, however, it was apparent that Scotts' and Lithgo«'s by, 
their conditions precedent on 'S' yard status and non-membership of a single Clv d 
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group, combined with their expectations as to the provision of working capital were 
already risk averse on the future merging of their shipbuilding activities. 
At the dawn of 1968, therefore, any real merger (joint corporate responsibility for 
finance, working capital, debts, guarantees, workforces etc.. ) of the shipbuilding 
activities of Scotts' and Lithgows seemed just as far away as it had been in the 
previous two years. Contemporaneously, Scotts' had the largest concentration of 
submarines ever at its Cartsburn yard, with HMS Sea Lion and J-L LS Otter (the latter 
launched in 1961) in for refits, and three Australian submarines. Ovens. Otwav, and 
Onslow in various stages of completion. Lithgows were, however, still negotiating 
over the Samyang Navigation Company of South Korea order, which, as it turned 
out, had been prematurely announced in May 1967. The domestic situation was also 
compounded by a hurricane that had hit the Greenock area in Januar` In which two 
people had died. The violent storm caused considerable damage at the Scott I. ithgow 
Dry Dock, which had resulted in a 600-ton crane falling into the dock and a 300-ton 
crane falling across a ship at the Repair Quay. Fortunately one 60-ton crane was 
only slightly damaged and operations resumed a month later. However. the 
continuing saga over the Korean order rumbled on, despite Samyan`7 and the Bank 
of Scotland signing an agreement in January 1968 covering the contract. This 
provided for two down payments for twenty per cent of the contract price, with the 
remaining eighty per cent to be paid in annual instalments over a period of ten carp 
at a rate of interest of 5.5 per cent. The problem now was over the insurance cover 
provided by the ECGD and the question of whether Korean law allowed the 
customary payment default clause to be implemented. Clearly, as Ross Belch noted. 
legal interpretation was holding up the contract. as Lithgows could not start work on 
the tankers until a down payment had been received. This delay had necessitated a 
re-arrangement of Lithgows building programme with the transfer of smaller ships 
from the firm's East yard to its larger Kingston yard. However, it was later 
announced that Scott Lithgow had won the biggest order yet on the Clyde at 
£10,500,000 for six 20,000-deadweight ton bulk carriers for Kristian Jebsens Rederi 
of Bergen for delivery in 1969 and 1970, with all six vessels powered 
by Burmeister 
& Wain engines built at Kincaid. All things considered this was a sizeable boost for 
the local economy, as was the announcement that another Greenock marine 
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engineering firm, John Hastie, would provide the set of the steering gear and 
ancillary equipment for a massive 276,000-deadweight ton tanker being built at the 
IHI shipyard complex in Japan. 117 
Gas Lion 
Beforehand, Scotts' had attempted to enter a new market for liquefied petroleum gas 
carriers (LPG) with a design bought from Hawthorn Leslie on the Tyne. which had 
cost the Greenock firm £100,000. This fee covered the introduction of the contract. 
the information required to build the vessel, specifications. drawings, and guidance 
on low temperature welding techniques. The order dated 14 July 1966 had been 
taken on at a fixed price of £2,220,000 from Kristian Jebsen Rederi of Bergen and a 
consortium of Norwegian owners. The contract terms were, five per cent of contract 
price on signature of contract, five per cent when fabrication commenced, five per 
cent on launching and the remaining eighty-five per cent on delivery. Eighty per cent 
of the delivery instalment would be paid from the proceeds of a loan to the owners 
under a financial guarantee from the ECGD. A condition of the agreement with 
Hawthorn Leslie, who subsequently were incorporated into the Tv ne Group of 
companies headed by Swan Hunter in January 1968 was that Scotts' w ere precluded 
from underbidding the Tyne firm for similar LPG work up to the completion of the 
Jebsen contract. The price of £2,220,000 included £25,000 for `know ho\\' with the 
remaining £75,000 being, `the cost to the company for entering the important market 
for LPG Carriers'. 118 The resultant vessel, the 9,300 deadweight ton Gas Lion was 
launched in April 1968, and had provided a significant challenge to Scotts' 
boilermaking trades in terms of the close tolerances and new techniques needed for 
her construction. 119 At the launch, Jebsen remarked that he believed that, 'Scotts' 
would be the first firm to build such a vessel without losing any money on it' . 
120 
Despite the considerable outlay involved in entering this new and important market. 
Gas Lion proved to be the only LPG carrier that Scotts' ever built. In light of this. 
one has to question the management strategy involved in entering an important 
market and then abandoning it after a brief flirtation. 
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The Long March continued. 
SIB frustration over Scott Lithgow intransigence on merging continued with the 
former noting in April 1968 that it was still without concrete merger proposals from 
the Lower Clyde. 121 Predictably, Scott Lithgow still maintained the sanctity of 'S' 
yard status, a position that Barker of the SIB had earlier considered as, -a sorry 
one'. He could not help but feel that Scotts' `like lemmings are marching their 
company straight into the sea'. Moreover, they did not seem to realise that goodwill 
was, `declining all around them' and that they, [the SIB] were getting a little wear} 
of Mr Scott's threats'. 122 Subsequently, at a later meeting with the SIB and Mintech, 
the Lower Clyde representatives considered it vital to remain on the Navy list of 
approved contractors as the maintenance of that relationship was crucial in order to 
tender for export orders. A factor given added importance as South : \mmmerican 
countries were apparently interested in ordering five conventional submarines. 
Scotts' and Lithgows had, by this stage, slightly changed their tack by stating that on 
frigates and destroyers, as well as on submarines, that they were. 'prepared to stand 
or fall on their competitive ability'. Their grouping scheme was based on an 'S' 
naval yard, `but not one at arms length'. However, `active support' was sought from 
the SIB for Scotts' to tender for naval work. For the SIB, Joe Gormley pointed out 
that no other group had asked for `S' yard recognition as a precondition to merge. To 
this, Belch again reiterated the Lower Clyde mantra that naval yard recognition 
remained fundamental to their plans to merge, and if this were not granted then, the 
whole project would have to go back into the melting pot'. Later in the discussion, 
Sir William Lithgow then produced and unfurled a plan -some twenty feet long' of 
proposed future yard developments. A key feature, however, the re-routing of the A8 
road at Port Glasgow remained unresolved. 
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Nevertheless, on the `S' naval yard point submitted in Scott Lithgow's Interim 
Report, it was a stated intention to use Scotts' yard as a `buffer for mercantile work 
according to sales mix and volume at any given time. Clearly, as the SIB Secretariat 
noted, this would not be the separate entity envisaged by Geddes, with the 
possibility [more accurately the probability] that expensive naval practices and 
overheads might be transferred to mercantile work. 
124 Returning to the April 
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meeting, Baylis of Mintech, who later left that department to take up a position at 
the Shipbuilders and Repairers National Association (SRNA). the successor 
organisation to the Shipbuilding Conference and SEF founded in 1967. was highly- 
critical. Although he thought it wise to start examining the Lower Clyde proposals 
setting aside their `stupidity' over the `S' yard question, Baylis found their 
performance and proposals, `pretty pathetic'. The more he listened. to the questions 
put by Barker and the SIB, Baylis doubted whether this constituted a Group, 'which 
could be supported at all'. Moreover, it had reinforced his preference for a single 
Clyde Group rather than diminishing it, as he could not justify major expenditure on 
two separate areas of the same river, although the Lower Clyde had the better natural 
advantages of deep water. A position on which a judgement had to be made, but one 
given added focus by Sir Eric Yarrow's offer that the Upper Clyde would drop the 
John Brown/Rothesay Dock proposals if a merger with the Lower Clyde could be 
speeded up. 125 
In the interim, the Korean order saga remained unresolved, although in June 1968, 
Lithgows partly compensated by winning an order from Anglo Norness for a 
133,500-deadweight ton oil tanker to be built at its Kingston yard. Scheduled for 
completion by 1970, this vessel was almost twice the size of any other vessel \'et 
built by the Port Glasgow firm. As on the Korean order, Kincaid would again 
provide the engines. 126 A month later, Ross Belch, at a launch speech at the firm's 
East yard hoped that Scott Lithgow would grow and expand into, 'something really 
big in British and World shipbuilding, and to reap all the economies size can offer'. 
Belch, again peddled the now familiar Lithgow line, which contradicted the 
centralisation of buying, design, estimating, labour, management, marketing, 
production planning and specialisation needed if a large group was to be truly 
integrated along Geddes lines, by stating: 
We still intend to retain, by our philosophy of de-centralisation, short taut 
lines of communication between management and men, and a close and 
intimate relationship with our client. This we believe is essential if \\-C are to 
survive in the tough world of big business which, nevertheless, is still 
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controlled and operated in the main by ordinary decent human beings who 
appreciate the personal touch. 127 
If Belch realised that this somewhat unreal view of the world of shipping and 
shipbuilding still had any real currency, with British owners deserting the domestic 
industry en masse, then he kept his own counsel. 
Contemporaneously, Scotts' management had made public that they had informed 
their shop stewards that the question of naval work being withdrawn had been under 
discussion for almost a year. Predictably, removal from the Navy List remained, 
`quite unthinkable'. A week before, Yarrow had tendered successfully to %loD (N), 
against Scotts' and other firms for two frigates for the Royal Navy. and one for the 
Royal New Zealand Navy. 128 This public airing of perceived grievances, howw ever, 
had the effect of smoking out the preferences of the local Labour Member for 
Parliament, Jesse Dickson Mabon for a single Clyde group. Mabon made it clear that 
the Government's aim was the creation of a `super yard' on the Clyde. He did, 
however, `guarantee' that Scotts' could build naval vessels, for some time ahead'. 
and that Yarrow had won the contracts, `fairly and squarely'. 129 This was hardly 
surprising as the Scotstoun yard was specially geared towards this type of 
construction, whilst Scotts' were not. Nevertheless, Mabon. who obviously had not 
recently read the SIC Report, had insisted that the aim of Geddes was a single Clyde 
group. Predictably, and correctly. Scott Lithgow then issued a public statement that 
it was not, and an editorial in the local newspaper, the Greenock Telegraph. 
wondered why Mabon had, `all of a sudden started to recommend the unification of 
Clyde yards'? 130 
Caledonia Joinery 
As part of the Lower Clyde rationalisation programme it had been intended to 
centralise Scott Lithgow's joinery operations in the old William Hamilton 
subsidiary, the Caledonia Joinery Company. When effected in January 1968, 
Caledonia was located at Lithgoww-s Kingston yard, and the majority of Scotts' 
Cartsburn Joiners' Shop woodworking machines vvert transferred. In total. the 
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estimated cost of this centralisation was £ 10,000 with the bulk of the expenditure 
being borne by Lithgows. 131 It was not long, however, before the predictable 
question of parity of wages with the Upper Clyde was raised by the Caledonia 
workforce, and just as predictably refused by Scott Lithgow. This resulted in a strike 
involving 260 joiners, which began in late August 1968 and was not fully resolved 
until the end of the year. By 5 September, the joiners stated that they had been 
sacked by Caledonia and had been told to collect their insurance cards at the local 
Ministry of Labour office. Caledonia stated that the men had been laid off, and not 
`sacked', nevertheless the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (AS\V) insisted 
that none of their other members would work for the company, until the men' were 
reinstated and parity was complied with. In the interim, it was noted that of the '60 
men `sacked', only sixty, including forty-three apprentices were now out of work, 
with the remaining 200 being mainly absorbed into Upper Clyde firms. ^l'wwo weeks 
later an attempt to resolve the dispute was rejected, not surprisingly as the joiners 
were earning three guineas or more on a forty hour week on the Upper Clyde. The 
impasse obviously had a deleterious effect on Scott Lithgow's programme of fitting 
out, particularly as eight vessels had been launched in the year so far. lanagement 
then decided, and just what the shipping and shipbuilding world at large thought of 
this beggars belief, to tow a Jebsen vessel, Borgnes, to Bergen to fit it out there in 
order to relieve the backlog at Greenock and Port Glasgow and to comply with 
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fion was also tu%\ cd to delivery clauses. 132 Subsequently, another vessel, Cruie 
Norway to be fitted out at a total cost of £50,000.1" With the likelihood that its 
predecessor cost about the same, this was a high price to pay to retain the principle 
of not acceding to Upper Clyde wage rates. Nevertheless, it reinforces the view of 
just how averse Scott Lithgow were to concede any ground on parit\. By 20 
November, however, a Scott Lithgow offer on reinstatement did not get a single vote 
at a meeting of joiners, many of whom had taken advantage of higher wages in 
fitting out the liner Queen Eli_crbeth II at Clydebank. On the completion of this 
contract, more than half of the men did return to work at Caledonia, but it is 
testament to Scott Lithgow's bespoke linkages with Norwegian owners that Jebsen 
ordered another two vessels worth £3.5 million in December 1968. 
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Demarcation 
Just as the Caledonia strike was at last resolved, another dispute had already broken 
out at the Greenock end of the Scott Lithgow operation. This strike had its roots in 
the failure of management and unions to truly integrate working practices in the 
Cartsburn and Cartsdyke yards in the wake of the Greenock Dockyard take-over. 
Thereafter, each yard essentially maintained its demarcations and other work 
practices. However, from January 1968 negotiations began with plumbers and 
boilermakers, with the latter agreeing to allow the former to weld pipe flanges in the 
Cartsdyke yard but not in Cartsburn. Earlier it had been decided to integrate each 
yard's plumbing departments, but in doing so it was considered necessary by 
management to apply the Cartsburn demarcation to all ships built either in Cartsdyke 
or Cartsburn. Owing to the lack of agreement between the two unions concerned, the 
scheme for rationalisation of plumbing was stopped pending further negotiations. In 
a myriad of trade demarcations, this was not unusual. This essentially nonsensical 
situation was given added focus when the World Hongkong was launched in 
November 1968 from Cartsdyke and sent to the Cartsburn basin for fitting-out. The 
next day the Cartsburn sheet metal workers stopped work and remained on strike 
until the middle of January 1969. On their return to work they made it abundantly 
clear that bringing a Cartsdyke ship into Cartsburn would again result in them 
withdrawing their labour. This dispute resulted in Scott Lithgo\v removing World 
Hongkong from Cartsburn and transferring it to the Clyde Port Authority-owned 
James Watt Dock for fitting out. It was later estimated that the cost of the plumbers 
and sheet metal workers disputes was around £50,000.135 
Throughout this period the attitude of Scotts' sheet metal workers shop stewards had 
been that since Scotts' had taken over the Greenock Dockyard's Cartsdyke shipyard, 
then Cartsburn demarcation practices were `all embracing'. Clearly. negotiations on 
an overarching demarcation agreement in all the Scott Lithgow yards. given the 
enmity between individual unions, and the near certainty of strike action would be 
time consuming even if the managerial will was there, which it was not, to 
accomplish it. In this regard, one sheet metal shop steward, Owen Murphy, insisted 
that individual yard demarcation agreements must be honoured, and that an 
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overarching agreement might take five to ten years to achieve. 136 Such % vas the 
frustration with the sheet metal workers stance, that Andrew Paxton, the Scott 
Lithgow Director in charge of Cartsdyke, later lamented that the situation had 
deteriorated to such an extent that the sheet metal workers were claiming everything. 
`no mater how remotely connected with sheet metal work. It was in fact, only one 
step away from the stage when they would be opening the tins of soup in the 
canteen'. 137 It would be grossly unfair, however, to single out the sheet metal 
workers alone, all other trades were equally determined to preserve their status 
through demarcations and restrictive practices. It was all part and parcel of the 
everyday jungle of industrial relations in the shipyard, where barely a week went 
past without some dispute arising out of which particular trade had the right to do a 
particular operation and who did not. Had there been a strong personnel function 
present, then things might have been different, but there was not. Instead, senior 
management dealt with these time-consuming details both in the shipyards and 
Engine Works. With the competitive situation becoming more acute in relation to 
foreign shipyards, this was obviously detrimental to them overseeing the production 
process properly to ensure timely delivery of ships. 
The Long March endures. 
By September 1968 the long running saga of the Korean order had finally been 
resolved, with the two 133,000 deadweight tom tankers now scheduled for delivery 
in 1970 and 1971 respectively. Lithgows had hoped to start building these vessels 
almost a year earlier, however, along with the Anglo Norness tanker order, these 
three vessels were to be built one after the other. At a combined cost of £15.000,000 
these export orders contributed to an Order Book comprising twenty-one vessels 
valued at around £50,000,000.138 Meanwhile, a certain amount of agitation and 
confusion still reigned within the SIB as to the true extent of the Scott Lithgow 
`merger'. On receipt of an application from Lithgows in September 1968 for Section 
7 credit guarantees for two Sugar Line vessels. the SIB noted that the merger was 
still held up over the precondition on naval work at Scotts'. This remained the case 
despite a letter that had been sent from Mintech to Scott Lithgow informing the latter 
that without `indefinite commitment' that MoD (N) would continue to invite tenders 
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for destroyers and frigates from the Lower Clyde. In this regard the SIB wished to be 
informed over what steps had been taken, 'formally and financially' to complete the 
merger. Correctly, the SIB were still under the impression that the shipbuilding 
activities of Scotts' and Lithgows still remained separate, a fact supported by the 
Sugar Line application on behalf of Lithgows alone. This was despite the case that in 
recent press and trade paper advertisements; Scott Lithgow had been portrayed as a 
shipbuilding firm. In this light, therefore, the SIB welcomed details of the structure 
and activities of Scott Lithgow Limited. 139 
In reply, Scott Lithgow, although surprised that the SIB was not fully aware of the 
present position on the Lower Clyde, admitted that the latter had been correct in its 
assumption that the merger was yet to be financially finalised. How ever, on the 'S' 
yard situation things had moved on and a meeting on 28 October had been arranged 
with Mintech to finally clarify the situation. Nevertheless, the Board of Scott 
Lithgow thought that co-ordinated progress towards a shipbuilding group had been 
`substantial'. A common marketing and sales effort, apart from orders already 
announced, had been instituted, and the latest flexibility agreement with the 
Boilermakers Society was proceeding satisfactorily. With the aid of the Shipbuilding 
Industry Training Board, the Scott Lithgow Training Centre for apprentices had been 
established, and of the eight-vessel Jebsen order, five vessels would be built at 
Lithgows East yard, and three at Scotts' Cartsdyke yard. Moreover, the Board of 
Scott Lithgow Limited was presently acting as a co-ordinating body controlling the 
policy and activities of Scotts' and Lithgows and their associated companies. It was 
hoped that Scott Lithgow Limited would soon be able to assume its full role as a 
holding company owning the separate profit centres which it was the intention to 
operate within a Lower Clyde Group. 
140 
With the naval dimension remaining to be clarified, the Geddes vision of three yards 
producing frigates and destroyers, although favoured by Mintech and the SIB was 
clearly not sacrosanct. Two groups, one on the Tyne and one on the Upper 
Clyde 
had already been formed, and both had `S' yards capable of building warships. 
Clearly, as Scott Lithgow complied with the Geddes criteria for a group of 
shipyards, irrespective of the position of its Engine Works and the numbers 
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employed, its Cartsburn `S' yard apparently had just as much right to compete on 
warship orders as did the other two groups. By this stage, this position was just 
about on the whole accepted by Mintech, what was not, however, was Scott 
Lithgow's insistence that this right should be indefinite. Moreover. the single Clyde 
group situation was at present `impracticable', as Scott Lithgow was viable and 
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) was not. 141 Indeed, the formation of UCS had 
been allowed despite an economic assessment made to the SIB that the former 
would not be commercially viable as a Group due to serious inherited trading losses, 
and the burden of debts payable to the SIB. Moreover, the SIB was of the opinion 
that the closure of Stephens and the `phasing out' of Connells may be inevitable. 
Nevertheless, no doubt due to political realities, the SIB had in November 1967 
approved the formation of UCS. 142 This was the real beginning of «hat was in 
effect a form of outdoor relief for indigent industrialists in Clyde shipbuilding. 
By September 1968, however, the Lower Clyde firms had significantly changed 
their approach in private to a single Clyde group and now sought an assurance from 
Mintech that: 
Our present naval building status will certainly remain until such time as it 
may be agreed by everybody that the formation of one shipbuilding group on 
the River Clyde is in the best interests of all concerned. If and when such a 
situation develops, then we obviously accept that there might have to be a 
further rationalisation of naval building facilities on the river. 
143 
With John Brown, Stephen and Fairfield effectively now out of contention, any 
future naval rationalisation on Clydeside involved Scott Lithgow and Yarrow only. 
At a meeting with the SIB, Mintech, MoD (N) and the Scottish Office on 28 October 
to decide if the merged company would retain its naval status, George Hilton for 
Scotts' noted that Scott Lithgow had received an earlier letter from the Government. 
He further noted that although the letter had been helpful, it did not carry an 
indefinite commitment on warship building desired by Michael Scott. Hilton thought 
that the refusal to commit indefinitely might be linked to the future creation of a 
single Clyde group, and that Government might also use naval 
building as a threat to 
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bring this about. On UCS, Hilton could not see it being viable for at least three to 
five years, and that only when a merger was considered to be in their best interests 
of the Lower Clyde would a single Clyde group be contemplated. For Lithgo%ý s. 
Ross Belch endorsed these comments, and reinforced the need to tender for 
warships, not least to remain in the export market. For Mintech, Wedgwood Benn 
reiterated that neither he nor the SIB had powers of compulsion to enforce mergers. 
but nevertheless they could not give Scott Lithgow an indefinite commitment to be 
allowed to tender to construct warships. Equally, no such assurance could be given 
to other firms; however, the Government still welcomed a single Clyde group 
because they believed that the industry would benefit. Nevertheless. such a group 
should be viable, and Government should not contribute to the duplication of 
facilities. For MoD (N) Dr David Owen, whilst acknowledging Scotts' long 
association with the Royal Navy, could not give an indefinite commitment either. 
After further discussion, Belch stated that the position was now clearer. but that he 
still hoped to be reassured of Scotts' naval building status. To this Benn replied that 
he would be happy to restate the Government's position on this in a letter to Michael 
Scott, who was absent due to illness. 144 
Consequently, Benn wrote to Scott on 3 December and pointed out that because of 
the delay in merging, expenditure incurred after the end of 1970 (or 1971 at latest) 
would not be eligible for financial assistance. He asserted that he could go no further 
than to restate his junior ministerial colleague's position in a letter to Scott of 20 
August that MoD (N) would continue to invite Scotts' (or the merged undertaking) 
to tender for frigates, destroyers or similar types of ships without an indefinite 
commitment. 145 Clearly, by this stage, it was evident that the Government would go 
no further, and Michael Scott finally acknowledged in reply that no open-ended 
commitment could be given. Consequently, he was satisfied that decisions would be 
made on merit and would not be influenced by the question of a single Clyde group, 
and accordingly accepted the position as it stood. In this regard, Scott informed 
Benn that he had now instructed his lawyers and accountants to proceed with the 
complicated but necessary formalities to merge as quickly as possible. 
141 
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By this stage then, two of the three conditions precedent on a merger. ' S' yard status, 
and non-membership of a single Clyde group had at last been addressed. if not 
wholly satisfied, another, the implications of Section 28 (10) of the Finance Act. 
1960 remained. Subsequently, the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue did give 
clearance to the formation of a new merger company and subsidiaries. However. 
they had refused clearance in relation to later transactions whereby: The parent 
companies of Scotts' and Lithgows will seek to realise all their assets except shares 
in the merger company and, when sufficient cash is available, each of Scotts' and 
Lithgows will make a repayment of share capital to their respective shareholders'. 
Furthermore, in discussions with the Board of Inland Revenue it had been indicated 
that Section 28 was likely to be applied `when cash temporary loans to the merger 
company and perhaps other assets (except the shares in the merger company) 
reached the hands of the shareholders in Scotts' and Lithgows in a capital form'. 
Counsel's opinion was sought, and it was decided that, `it would be too dangerous 
now to take a firm decision when the time eventually arrives in two to three years 
time Scotts' and Lithgows should go into liquidation'. In his opinion, the only 
course was to continue with the merger on the expectation that, `eventually it would 
be possible to achieve the final object of liquidating the companies and distributing 
their assets without falling within Section 28'. In any event the worse case scenario 
was that shell companies would have to kept in existence, and 'if that possibility 
could be faced there was nothing to prevent the merger going ahead'. 
Accordingly, both Scott and Lithgow agreed that the conditions precedent to merge 
had been met to the best of their ability. On the contracting procedure of the new 
company, legal advice was that shipbuilding contracts should be completed 
by the 
subsidiary companies, and that all existing contracts at the date of the merger should 
be novated to the companies with the agreement of all parties concerned. 
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Accordingly, seven operating companies were formed in 1969. In Scotts' case, their 
shipbuilding assets and business was transferred to Scotts' 
Shipbuilding Company 
(1969) Limited, incorporating Cartsburn and Cartsdyke, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the parent Scotts' Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Company Limited, as were 
Scotts Engineering Company (1969) Limited and Scott and Sons (Bowling) 1969 
Limited. Lithgows incorporated four wholly owned subsidiary companies, Lith1go%% s 
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(1969) Limited, Ferguson Brothers (Port Glasgow) 1969 Limited. Caledonia Joinery 
(1969) Limited and Caledonia Fabrications (1969) Limited. Immediately following 
these transfers, the whole share capitals of Scotts" (1969) Limited and Lithgo«s 
(1969) Limited would be taken over by the already incorporated Scott Lithgow 
Limited. Contemporaneously, Scott Lithgow Limited would take into the proposed 
Group with an effective date of 31 December 1969, the share capitals of all the other 
subsidiaries engaged in shipbuilding and marine engineering. 148 
In the interim, Lithgows had in September 1968 transferred two 20,000 deadweight 
ton bulk carriers to Scotts' Cartsdyke yard, and in November. MoD (N) had 
contracted for an experimental trials vessel at a cost of £2,057.309 subject to price 
variation to be built at the Cartsburn yard. 14913y the end of the year Scott Lithgow 
topped the output table for the river, with 12 ships launched of 93,834 deadweight 
tons, in contrast the five yards of UCS had launched six ships and one frigate. It was 
also announced that Scotts' Engine Works and Kincaid planned to merge in the 
coming months, with Kincaid's managing director, Cameron Parker commenting, it 
is my regret that we cannot do it today'. Despite the plans for eventual merger in 
shipbuilding and engineering, however, 1969 opened up with another industrial 
dispute in January, when the entire electrical department at Scotts' went out on strike 
for a week over a bonus dispute. 150 
The Scott Kincaid merger 
From the outset the course of proposed engineering merger had been difficult. and 
all the more so because of Scotts' insistence on retaining its submarine capability. 
Kincaid, through the London merchant bankers, Rothschilds originally proposed in 
April/May 1968 that the engineering assets of Scotts' be sold to Kincaid in exchange 
for shares in that company amounting to eighteen per cent of their Issued Capital. 
Scotts' however, deemed this to be `unacceptable'. as they feared, inter alia, losing 
their corporate identity and naval capability. 
151 Subsequently, Scotts' stance 
changed and Michael Scott mooted a merger of their engineering assets with Kincaid 
as the dominant partner in a holding company with the existing engineering 
companies operating as subsidiaries under the title of Kincaid Scott. 
Scott 
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rationalised this by stating that he could not agree to the abolition of the name Scott. 
partly through pride and partly through history, but not least to preserve the 
important engineering connection with the Royal Navy. 152 Beforehand, the SIB 
position at February 1968 remained that Kincaid and Scotts' should not be 
encouraged to merge until it was made clear that there was no possibility of a merger 
between Kincaid and Harland & Wolff. 153 By December, how ever, the SIB 
position had changed as by this stage it had no doubt been made clear that Kincaid 
did not wish to merge with the Belfast firm, as the former's engine works would 
probably be closed down as a result. The SIB now felt able to support the Scott 
Kincaid venture, but remained concerned over the licensing position with Harland & 
Wolff. 154 This concern was not baseless. Harland & Wolff. as the principal licensee 
of Burmeister & Wain engines in the UK, had an absolute right to veto an 
assignation and therefore refused to assign Kincaid's sub licence to the proposed 
Lower Clyde engineering group as this was inimical to the Belfast's firm's interests. 
In August 1969, Harland's chairman, Mallabar, turned down an offer from Rickman 
of Kincaid to assign the licence to the Greenock firm on the payment of £0.000. He 
reiterated that he would approve of the Lower Clyde merger if Kincaid doubled its 
royalty payment to the Belfast firm, but also suggested that the firms should merge 
with Harland owning two-thirds of the proposed firm. Rickman turned down these 
offers by telephone. 155 By September, Mallabar's position had hardened. He stated 
that he considered an increase in royalty to be fair and one that Kincaid could afford. 
and that in the circumstances he would not renew the royalty on existing terms, and, 
`would oppose most strongly a direct licence'. The following month. Mallabar 
forwarded the decision of his Board that the £50,000 payment was inadequate, but 
was nonetheless prepared to accept an increased royalty plus fifty per cent (instead 
of doubling it) and promised to renew Kincaid's sub-licence when it ran out. As the 
increased royalty would cost Kincaid between £40,000 to £50,000 per year, the 
Harland offer was again turned down. 
156 Prior to this, a condition precedent to the 
Kincaid Scott merger was that SIB approval was regarded as a prerequisite (Clause 
14, first sub-clause of draft Heads of Agreement to Merge). 
157 The SIB in turn. felt 
unable to agree to this precondition as it identified them too closely with the 
commercial judgements inherent in the agreement, and also 
implied that if the SIB 
approved it then it would be prejudging the proposals 
before any application for 
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financial aid were received. 158 Negotiations nevertheless continued into 1970 on the 
legalities of assigning the licence, which, given the intransigence of \ lallabar. had 
little or no chance of being resolved. 
The long march to merger of the shipbuilding assets of Scotts' and Lithgows and the 
engineering assets of Scotts that had begun almost four years earlier seemed to have 
an end in sight. Scott Lithgow had managed to remain on the Navy List, and had 
avoided (rightly as it turned out owing to the financial state of UCS) being dragged 
into a single Clyde Group. The question of whether Mintech and the SIB had the 
powers, covert or overt to compel the Lower Clyde to do so remains moot, but their 
policy was always to encourage a single Clyde group. Taxation difficulties aside, 
although these were of fundamental importance, Scott Lithgow's decision to enter 
the giant tanker market had been publicly announced in April 1969.1 ý9 Even then the 
skilled labour needed for such a scheme was already scarce with three tankers of 
133,000 deadweight tons ordered, the firm remained restricted to building only up to 
150,000 deadweight tons due to the limitations of its present berth. Nevertheless, the 
firm had decided to go ahead and an order for a 250,000-deadweight ton tanker 
worth £8,000,000 for Anglo Norness was announced in May. 
160 With the likelihood, 
however, that the SIB would not provide the working capital needed for the newly 
merged firm in the light of the UCS experience, it would seem that Scotts' and 
Lithgows would have to do so themselves. 
Contemporaneously, a flow line production system was due to be installed in the 
Kingston yard at a cost of over £500,000 to enable the automatic assembly of large 
flat steel sections to enable the construction of tankers of 250,000 deadweight tons 
by the autumn of 1970. This, in tandem with a fundamental change in yard layout 
and cranage was required to build these vessels in two sections and 
join them up in a 
specially built cofferdam elsewhere. The whole scheme was, 
however, at heart 
dependent upon SIB capital in the form of grants and loans. There simply was not 
enough capital in the present business to adequately 
finance such a venture 
independently, given the inherent risk that a proper return on capital investment in 
an uncertain market might not accrue. 
In all this, however, one has to conclude that 
an eventual merger had been primarily undertaken 
in the light of SIB or other 
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government assistance to finance the firm's development plans. Indeed. Scott 
Lithgow had informed the SIB Secretariat by June 1969 that they wished to frame 
their development plans only after an indication had been given to them of the sums 
that they were likely to receive from the SIB by way of financial assistance. This as 
the SIB noted was the wrong approach, and as for the future Sir William Swallow 
wanted it made clear to the Lower Clyde that large sums for capital expenditure by 
way of grants were unlikely, but was informed that this had already been done. 
Moreover, Barker of the SIB believed that Scott Lithgow appeared to be sloýww, to take 
a decision on major capital expenditure, and had further indicated that they might 
find difficulty in paying interest on loans. 161 
Meanwhile, industrial relations continued to deteriorate further when over 500 
platers went on unofficial strike for ten days in September over a productivity 
scheme, followed by 700 labourers, including cranemen in October. As Ross Belch 
later remarked in November, with 1,242 employees laid off because of strikes, it 
was necessary to be completely logical and consistent at all times, and to do nothing 
which might destroy the finely balanced, very delicate shipbuilding wage structure, 
which has been built up so painstakingly on the Lower Clyde over so many years'. 
Moreover, `... the one guiding principle ... 
[was]... one's ability to pay'. Despite this, 
however, the firm continued to win orders with a five-vessel product tanker order 
worth £14,000,000 from British Petroleum, four of which were to be built at 
Cartsburn with Scott Sulzer engines announced in September. Subsequently, further 
orders for refrigerated cargo liners and bulk carriers were announced in October, 
bringing the Scott Lithgow Order Book to over the £100.000,000, mark. With the 
last of Scotts' four Australian submarines, RAN Onslow commissioned on 22 
December, however, hopes on the naval front now rested on a possible two 
submarine order from the Government of Chile. 
162 From 1939 to 1969, naval vessels 
had contributed fifty-six per cent of net profits on main contract outcomes of vessels 
built and engined or machinery installed at Scotts'. 
163 In the past four years since 
merger talks began they had allowed dividends of ten per cent at an annual cost of 
£150,000 to the Greenock firm's shareholders. It was plain that the naval dimension 
would remain vitally important to the merged firm. Scott Lithgow, if only to offset 
the likelihood of losses on mercantile contracts, which would Ines itably sho\\ on 
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Scott Lithgow's consolidated balance sheet. The long march to merge had meant 
that Scott Lithgow had only received £20,000 from the SIB for consultant's fees. In 
stark contrast, by the end of 1969 the Government had taken a forty-nine per cent 
equity stake in UCS, and had expended some £20,000,000 overall in propping up 
what had in effect been a disaster waiting to happen. 164 The future then for Scott 
Lithgow remained uncertain, not only because of the Lithgow end of the business 
development plans and inherent learning curve, but also if the preceding four years 
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Chapter VI: The road to nationalisation, 1970-1977 
By 1970, the long campaign by Scotts and Lithgoýw-s to avoid being sucked into a 
single Clyde group and also to remain on the MoD (N) list of surface warship 
builders had temporarily ended. Bearing in mind, however, that a change of 
government could have an impact, no guarantee existed that these issues had gone 
away. At the close of business on 31 December 1969. by which stage the remaining 
legal problems of novating existing shipbuilding and engineering contracts had been 
resolved, the shipbuilding and engineering assets of Scotts' and Lithgo«-s had been 
transferred to seven specially created operating (1969) companies already 
incorporated in Scotland. 1 Nevertheless, the arrangements for a merger of these 
operating companies into one holding company, Scott Lithgo« Limited. which it 
will be recalled had already been incorporated in September 1967. did not take place 
until 6 February 1970.2 Scott Lithgow Limited was, however, not the ultimate 
holding company, that honour belonged to Scotts' Shipbuilding & Engineering 
Company Limited (Scotts') who at 6 February held sixty per cent of the former's 
shares. This amounted to 500,000 Participating Preference Shares of £1 each and 
1,000,000 Ordinary Shares of £1 each, with Lithgows holding 1,000.000 Ordinary 
Shares only. In addition to the 1,500,000 shares held in Scott Lithgowv Limited, 
Scotts' retained two vessels built on their own account on bareboat charter, and their 
half share in Scott Lithgow Drydocks Limited, which did not form a part of the 
merger. 3 Scotts' from now on was in effect, primarily an investment company, as 
was similarly the case with Lithgows Limited. However, it is with Scott Lithgow 
Limited (Scott Lithgow) and to a lesser extent its operating companies that we are 
primarily concerned with from 1970 onwards. 
The underlying philosophy behind the merger had already been explained in some 
detail in the first edition of the Scott Lithgow House Magazine some nine months 
earlier by Scott Lithgow's chairman, Michael Scott, and its vice chairman, Sir 
William Lithgow. In interview, Scott was at pains to explain that the merger was 
not a `shotgun marriage', but that both he and Lithgow were only prepared to join 
forces by retaining their respective firm's individuality, expertise and names. 
Moreover, they were `most certainly not going to run ourselves as a single massive 
organisation.. . with all the 
departments under one roof and all our } ards under 
detailed control'. To support his view, Scott stated, that the men, who design and 
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build a submarine are not the people to build a tanker. so %% h\ push them together"' 
He then elaborated that the group would be run on a separate profit centre basis and 
that separate skills and techniques would be kept. 'fairly much as they are at present 
in units of handy size, say not more that 1,500 people. On the other hand, Lithgow 
held that the ideal unit should be much less, say 400 to 1.000 people in a single 
plant. That way, `management would know employees as people and, not as 
units... who's been ill, and who's had twins and who won the [football] pools last 
week. ' Lithgow saw Scott Lithgow, `as a number of interlocking specialist 
companies... [and] in general the units will make their own decisions-and quick'. He 
then repeated the by now familiar refrain that lines of communication would be kept 
short, and that there was, `nothing more soul destroying than frustrations, and that's 
what you get when everything has to find its way to some central department and 
then find its way back again'. However, some central functions %% ere desirable such 
as computerisation of accounts, and commodity buying. Nevertheless, as ww as 
pointed out by the interviewer, the SIC envisaged a central sales and marketing 
operation in every shipbuilding group, an idea that cut across the traditional way of 
selling by either the chairman or managing director. When asked ho%\ they wanted to 
sell-sales department or chief executive? Scott succinctly replied `chief executiv e", 
and Lithgow although he elaborated further, agreed that a big sales department %\ as 
not the instrument to use. Rather, a small department plus brokers could do the job 
better, but the final sale should be undertaken at managing director levvel. Thereafter, 
Scott and Lithgow when asked how the merged firm would survive when others 
were having a rough time, gave reasons such as deep water and a close knit 
community for a start. The firm also had the ability to build a wý hole range of ships, 
as well as a ship repairing facility. To this, Lithgow added strong management and 
that the firm was solvent, but on marine engine building, Scott, predictably, 
disagreed with the SIC contention that engine manufacture should be separate from 
shipbuilding. 
In all of this, no mention was made of a central production planning office with real 
powers to direct and plan the course of production and labour and material flows in 
what would be an increasingly complex group. Neither was mention made of any 
increases in middle management control or numbers despite Scott Lithgoww 's 
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expansion plans, and barring a merger with Kincaid, Scotts Engineering (1961) ) 
Limited would not be separated. What was evident long before the official merger 
had been carried out was that each shipbuilding firm intended to carry on much as 
they had done before. In this sense the merger was not so much a 'shotgun marriage 
but a marriage of convenience. Neither party fully consummated the relationship 
despite being consenting adults. Given the well-documented troubles of L. CS. 
however, it would have been something of a miracle if Scott Lithgow had avoided 
the inflationary effects of taking on mercantile contracts on credit terms at fixed 
prices. Indeed, whether the Lower Clyde group was solvent or not remained 
unknown to the public at large due to the private nature of the firms involved. From 
the outset, however, it did not require inside knowledge to predict that the success or 
failure of the newly merged firm hinged on the provision of adequate working 
capital to ensure liquidity, and on securing naval contracts to offset losses on 
mercantile work. Nevertheless, given the SIB refusal to provide working capital to 
Scott Lithgow, this capital would have to be provided by Scotts' and Lithgows alone 
probably by way of a loan. With a panel line already under construction for 
completion by the autumn of 1970 and plans afoot to enable Lithgo\\ s to enter the 
large tanker market by again expanding their facilities to cope with the tvv o 250.000 
deadweight ton vessels ordered from Anglo Eastern Bulkships, the naval dimension 
remained all-important. Accordingly, well before the last Australian submarine was 
due to be completed, Michael Scott and George Hilton (the latter had retired in 
October 1969 to be eventually replaced as sole managing director by Ross Belch) 
had visited three countries in South America to drum up business. 
6 Resulting from 
this, Scott Lithgow announced on 14 January 1970 that it had won an order for two 
Oberon class submarines worth £14,000,000 with price variation clauses from the 
Government of Chile. Just how far the naval market had sunk in the UK was 
reflected in Michael Scott's pronouncement that this news was, 'a milestone in the 
fortunes of the group... [and] firmly establishes Scott Lithgow's position among the 
leading naval builders in the UK'. 
7 By the following month, however, it had 
transpired that Scott Lithgow had been offered an unlikely route back into surface 
warship production, when Sir Eric Yarrow, as a result of an earlier discussion with 




The Yarrow bid and the general shipbuilding situation 
The Yarrow group of companies included Yarrow Shipbuilders Limited in which 
UCS held 51 per cent of the equity, Yarrow (Engineers) Limited and the Yarrow 
Admiralty Research Department (YARD). On joining UCS. Farrow had received a 
payment of £ 1,000,000 in cash, £800,000 in shares. and retained a 49 per cent 
minority equity stake in Yarrow Shipbuilders. As the 'S' yard in UCS from February 
1968, the Yarrow position reflected the Scotstoun firm's past performance. and 
perceived position as the leading frigate builder in the UK. From 1956 to 1965, 
Yarrows had spent £3,574,000 on re-equipment and modernisation, and since the 
last war had constructed more frigates for the Royal Navy than any other 
shipbuilder. 9 
By January 1970, however, UCS, already in receipt of £20,000.000 of taxpavcr 
monies in grants and loans, remained in deep trouble. If an underlying reason can be 
discerned for this government largesse short of gross incompetence on the part o 1' al l 
concerned, then it was undertaken in the belief that the Labour Government had 
sought concentration of shipbuilding interests in an attempt to avoid the 
consequences of large-scale unemployment on the Upper Clvde. 10 The e flect_ 
however, of this largesse, which had saved UCS from liquidation, was to reinforce 
the message in other shipbuilding groups, notably on the Lower Clv de, that they 
were being treated unfairly by Government. A view not lost on Ross Belch, who had 
prepared some rough notes on the UCS situation prior to an unofficial Shipbuilders 
and Repairers National Association (SRNA) meeting in January 1970 with the 
Paymaster General, Harold Lever. 11 Belch noted that Fairfield had been saved four 
times and the rest of the yards, with the exception of Yarrow two or three times, 
factors that were causing the rest of the industry in the UK, -grave concern'. The 
Government subsidy to UCS amounted to `unfair competition'. had increased labour 
costs, and had `almost completely destroyed the initiativ e and self-help attitude of 
the Upper Clyde labour force, and, moreover, was also undermining the morale of 
the entire West of Scotland labour force'. Belch did, however, admit that Scott 
Lithgoww: were desperately short of skilled labour, and due to its expansion plans 
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would ultimately require an additional 1,500 workpeople. In this light, the Lower 
Clyde and other shipbuilding areas could easily absorb labour if UCS were to 
collapse. If it were felt, however, that Government would continue to prop up t 'CS. 
then the rest of the industry would have no alternative but to request the same le\ cis 
of subsidy. 12 
Subsequently, the SRNA submission, whilst rather more emollient, mirrored much 
of the Belch concerns and concluded that the industry's view \\ as that. if the 
recently announced loans and guarantees do not create a viable shipbuilding 
undertaking on the Upper Clyde, no further assistance should be made available to 
UCS'. The shipbuilders did, however, offer their assistance in mopping up redundant 
labour. 13 At the meeting with Lever, which was not attended by t'CS, although they 
apparently knew of it and with Michael Scott and Ross Belch in attendance. the 
shipbuilders put their case. The SRNA President, Sir John Hunter. of S« an Hunter, 
stated that if State subsidised building were allowed to continue, the result \\ could be 
disastrous for the rest of the industry. Lever, inter alia, replied that he did not think 
that the Government was likely to give any further assistance to UCS. as monies had 
been given with the intention and expectation that UCS would become viable. After 
some predictable complaints from the shipbuilders over the high level of w ages at 
UCS, and fears that the latter were undercutting other builders on prices. I . ev er 
concluded that, `if UCS escaped his determination that they should of'f'er reasonable 
prices, wages and delivery dates, they would not be viable and \\ cold not last very 
long'. 14 
Plainly, the elite shipbuilders present had a number of real concerns, all employed 
substantial numbers of workpeople in areas of relatively high unemployment and 
were subject to precisely the same inflationary pressures as UCS «ithout. with the 
exception of Harland & Wolff, massive government support. The Swan Hunter 
group of shipyards on the Tyne and Tees, for example, who it will be recalled had 
already entered the giant tanker field with Harland & Wolff to build tankers for Esso 
Petroleum, had made loss provisions totalling £5.000.000 in their 1969 accounts. .A 
factor that the SIB accountant. Humphrey, regarded as being the only good aspect of 
Swan Hunter's accounts, a feature of which vas that insufficient inlbrmation %v as 
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given. Humphrey regarded the payment of a final dividend of four per cent in these 
circumstances as being, `quite unjustified. Moreover. the firm's auditors, Price 
Waterhouse, had qualified the accounts on the basis that it was virtuall\ impossible 
accurately to forecast [at this stage] the outcome of long-term fixed price contracts'. 
15 If Swan Hunter, widely regarded as the most successful British shipbuildin`T firm. 
had to make loss provisions on this scale, then by association it was likely that other 
large firms were in similar trouble. By March 1970. with internecine sectarian strife 
underway in Northern Ireland, Sir John Mallabar, who it will be recalled had been 
firmly against a Scott Kincaid merger, had resigned. With Harland & Wolff in deep 
financial trouble, Mallabar put the blame for the Belfast firm's situation entirely on 
the shoulders of its workers, as in his view. the same management had in the past 
produced much better results from the same workforce'. With his Board of Director; 
no longer behind him, and noting that he had fallen foul of the SIB. N Iallabar 
preferred to resign and to do so, `without causing embarrassment'. 16 
By this stage, however, although it was not yet made public, Cammcll Laird, who it 
will again be recalled had beaten Scotts' on the nuclear submarine front, were in 
deep trouble also. Although it had not been publicly announced until 20 February 
1969 that the Birkenhead firm would in future be left out of the nuclear stabmarine 
building programme in favour of concentrating future production at the lead yard. 
Vickers, Cammell Laird had been officially informed of this a year earlier. 17 By 
March 1970, however, the Director of the SIB, Barry Barker suggested at a meeting 
with Mintech officials that Cammell Laird could collapse. Three courses remained 
open, either to redevelop the shipyard themselves, to amalgamate -vw ith another 
company, or to sell out to a third party. Barker put the cost of reorganisation at 
around £ 11,000,000 to £ 13 3,000,000, but it transpired that the SIB approved of an 
approach to Appledore Shipbuilders on a possible take-over of Cammell Laird. An 
unlikely scenario unless Appledore could be protected against losses on current 
contracts and work in progress. On this point Barker believed that shipowners 
had 
obtained orders at Cammell Laird at ridiculously low prises, and that these might 
be 
renegotiated to avoid an expected £5,000,000 loss. Barker agreed to 
keep \lintech 
informed of developments. 18 By April. however. it was clear that the shipbuilding 
arm of the Birkenhead conglomerate was bankrupt. : Accordingly . the 
Labour 
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Government's industrial concentration vehicle, the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation (IRC), whose remit by Government was to save the %t hole of Cammell 
Laird, and not just Cammell Laird minus the shipbuilding and engineering 
subsidiary had a difficult task ahead. As Barker of the SIB noted in regard to the 
shipbuilding arm at Birkenhead, apart from skilled labour and certain berths. there 
were no other assets worth preserving. 19 
Contemporaneously, the situation at Yarrow Shipbuilders was also giving the SIB 
cause for concern as much of the shipyard's problems. alike Swan Hunter. Cammell 
Laird and Harland & Wolff, lay in the fields of management and finance. In a report 
by accountants commissioned by the SIB on Yarrow, it was noted that the latter's 
accounting systems were inadequate for the production of frequent financial 
information, `such as should keep the Board informed of current happenings'. This 
had been caused by a failure on the part of management as a whole, to appreciate 
the need to be so informed to the extent of acting to that end. Although an able 
financial director led the Yarrow accounting staffs, they were `quite inadequate in 
numbers to perform the several duties which would be regarded as necessities in 
many businesses of similar size'. 20 It was against this background that Sir Eric 
Yarrow's invitation to Scott Lithgow to take over his firm must be judged in line 
with separating Yarrow from UCS. and of the possible creation of a single Clv dc 
group. From the outset, Sir Eric did not hide his discomfort with UCH. particularly 
in the wake of the latter's first financial crisis in May 1969. By December, he had 
met the Conservative Party spokesman on shipbuilding, Nicholas Ridlc\ . the results 
of which were later to engender a great deal of controversy ov er the future course of 
shipbuilding policy. In a subsequently leaked memo, Ridley believed that the best 
long-term solution on UCS was to detach Yarrow Shipbuilders from it and allow the 
Scotstoun firm to merge with either Scott Lithgow or Vosper Thornycroft. 
21 
Nevertheless, by April 1970, the Labour Government, with the advantage of 
inspecting the accounts, concurred, and it was publicly revealed that UCS. who held 
the majority stake in Yarrow Shipbuilders was willing to let the latter go with the 
blessing of Mintech and the SIB. This revelation forced Scott Lith(Yovv to publicly 
declare its interest in Yarrow, and likewise Vosper Thorny croft did so the ncyt Llay . 
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From the outset, the lure of profitable naval work made a possible Scott Lithgow 
acquisition of Yarrow an attractive proposition. Although separated by some 
distance on opposite ends and banks of the river Clyde. the construction of the 
Erskine Bridge due to be completed in the following year obviated the need for a 
long detour through Glasgow. Moreover, this geographical proximity and similar 
culture would be politically preferable to a bid from the English group of fast patrol 
craft and frigate builders, Vosper Thornycroft. The disparity in wage rates between 
the Upper and Lower Clyde, however, whilst problematic. did not stop Scott 
Lithgow from executing a volte face on a single Clyde group. After four %-cars of 
determined opposition in public, it now appeared by February and N larch 1970 that 
Scott Lithgow believed that an acquisition of Yarrow Shipbuilders Mould be -a 
natural first step in this direction'. 23 However. Sir Eric Yarrow had earlier made it 
plain that any bid placed had to be for the Yarrow group of companies as a whole 
and not just the shipbuilding subsidiary, and that such a bid should be in cash. 24 
Given that both Scotts' and Lithgows had to inject liquidity by way of working 
capital into Scott Lithgow to satisfy the SIB of its continuing commitment to 
shipbuilding on the Lower Clyde, it was unable or unwilling to mount a bid for 
Yarrow on its own. Consequently, the London firm of H. Clarkson and Company 
was approached and eventually agreed to head a consortium to take shares in Scott 
Lithgow to enable the cash purchase of the Yarrow group. In a discussion with the 
SIB, Teddy Boyd of Lithgows thought that some £3,000,000 in capital \\ould have 
to be put into Yarrow. For this money, however, Boyd indicated that Scott Lithgoý% 
would prefer to buy the entire Yarrow group, in order to have available the assets 
and profits of the non-shipbuilding companies in offset potential losses on 
shipbuilding. Nevertheless, it now transpired that Boyd had reiterated his wish that 
SIB assistance that might be available to purchase Yarrow Shipbuilders, `would 
come in the form of equity participation in Scott Lithgow'. To this the SIB pointed 
out the risks that might attend upon Government taking an equity holding. but 
neither Boyd nor Ross Belch, who was also in attendance, were deterred as they 
preferred this to any further loans. In all this it was apparent that Belch and Boy dl did 
not believe that Yarrow's losses on shipbuilding, which by this stage had been made 
clear, had stemmed primarily from the effects of grouping, wt ith UCS. Contrary to 
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public statements, the Scott Lithgow men believed that the losses had occurred 
through Yarrow `buying the contracts for Leander class frigates at unrealistic 
prices. 26 Unfortunately, the author is unable to explain further the course of SIB 
equity participation in this regard, as the SIB Board Minutes for 1970 ha\ e been 
withheld from public scrutiny at the Public Record Office, Kew. From the Scott 
Lithgow side, however, the Yarrow bid eventually unravelled when the question of 
financial guarantees given by Yarrow Shipbuilders, jointly with UCS and severall\ , 
came to light. This largely unknown factor meant that the future position of Yarrow 
Shipbuilders could threaten the solvency of the Yarrow group of companies as a 
whole, and led to the proposed deal collapsing in May 1970.27 That month, a 
fortnight before the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced a General 
Election was to take place in June, it was publicly announced that Cammell Laird 
were ten days from liquidation. 28 It will be recalled that the Nlinistrv, of Defence 
regarded the Birkenhead firm as being better capitalised than Scotts' was to build 
nuclear submarines. With a General Election looming, the Labour Government had 
little choice but to act, and as Harold Lever remarked, `putting it bluntly we have 
29 rescued this firm from total collapse' . 
With the possibility that a change of government would entail a change in 
shipbuilding policy, Greenock's Member of Parliament for the past fourteen years, 
Jesse Dickson Mabon pledged to back Scott Lithgow's plans for a 'super yard'. With 
site preparation already started, Mabon did not have to stand against a Conservative 
and Unionist Party Opposition candidate as the Tories did not field one for the first 
time since 1950 in order to give the Liberal Party candidate a clear run. As it turned 
out, Greenock was the only one of seventy-one seats in Scotland not contested by 
the Conservatives. Moreover, before the result of the General Election was known, 
although the SIB had not drawn up a formal agreement, it seemed that permission 
had been granted for Scott Lithgow to develop its giant tanker yard at the former 
William Hamilton, Glen yard. Dickson Mabon duly retained his seat, however, the 
Conservative Party won the General Election. 30 By August 1970, although approval 
had been given for the Glen yard development. Scott Lithgovv had still not received 
any money from the SIB. 31 It is to the plans for a `super Yard that I now turn. 
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The `super yard' considered 
Clearly the earlier receipt of two super tanker orders from Anglo Eastern Bulkships 
had precipitated the need for Scott Lithgow to press ahead with its development 
plans with rather more urgency than it had displayed in merging. These \ essels 
could not be built at the Kingston yard, which was already stretched to the maximum 
in building vessels up to 150,000 deadweight tons without further extensions to 
berths and cranage. However, the genesis of a new `super yard' at Port Glasgow had 
already begun before the publication of the SIC Report, as Lithgows had 
commissioned a feasibility study by the consulting engineers. Crouch and Hogg. 
They duly reported on 13 January 1966 on two schemes to build tankers of up to 
500,000 deadweight tons covering all operations other than engine building to be 
carried out under cover in building sheds. Vessels would then be engined and tested 
in a fitting out dock before leaving the yard in a wholly completed form. With the 
estimated costs of the three schemes studied, which included a building dock. 
ranging from £24,000,000 to £31,000,000 the plans were, not surprisingly. put in 
abeyance. 32 By November 1969, however, another feasibility study had been 
commissioned on the practicality of converting a public facility, the nearby James 
Watt Dock, into a dry dock. At a cost of almost £5,500,000 this was again an 
33 expensive option. 
Beforehand, in May 1969, in discussion with Reed of the SIB, Ross Belch had 
intimated that a dilemma existed on whether or not to proceed with a much broader 
scheme of development for the group as a whole. Regarding SIB assistance, Belch 
stressed that grants would be preferable to loans, and the extent of this, ould 
determine in a very real sense the extent to which their development would proceed'. 
A full scheme would cost around £6,000,000 but Scott Lithgow w ere averse to the 
servicing of such a large amount of capital. Reed, however, indicated that although 
some grant monies would be paid, these would be limited in respect of the total sums 
involved. 34 Scott Lithgow did, nevertheless, have an ultimate plan in mind and had 
other alternatives open to them on yard development. but due to cost considerations 
an intermediate plan was eventually submitted to the SIB for 
funding. The ultimate 
plan had envisaged the construction of a huge sloping concrete mat of uniform 
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stressing. and an adjacent fabrication hall at the Glen yard both spanned by an 8O0 
ton Goliath crane capable of lifting Varying sizes of pre-assembled sections onto the 
mat. The intermediate plan, however. had been arrived at this stage in preference to 
the far more technically efficient building dock method of construction fa\ oured in 
Japan and Sweden. The intermediate option consisted of constructing super tann cri 
in two halves on a concrete mat half the size of the one envisaged in the ultimate 
plan, and with a Goliath crane of only 225 tons capacity. Scott Lithgow could not, 
however, construct vessels of 250,000 deadweight tons in one piece as the distance 
between the Clyde and the main A8 road was not great enough to accommodate a 
vessel of this size. Moreover, even if it were possible to extend the berth, it would 
not be a permanent solution to the growth in size of tankers, a factor also applicable 
to the construction of a dry dock, not to mention excessive cost. Building tankers in 
two halves was undoubtedly the cheaper option in start up costs but it remained to be 
seen whether or not this would prove to be the case in a production environment. By 
May 1970, however, Ross Belch had admitted that Scott Lithgow could only build 
one super tanker per year with their present resources and present manpo\\cr. This 
was against international competitors who could build up to five of these large 
vessels per year in one operation in building docks, rather than in two halves. Belch 
commented that if Scott Lithgow were to stay in this market then productivity had to 
be substantially increased, and that the `super yard' expansion would come to naught 
unless Scott Lithgow could find a way to increase its steel working labour force. 35 
Given this, an impartial observer may have surmised that an increase in labour could 
increase productivity but at a greater unit cost per man making a firm less 
competitive. If this were the case, then why was Scott Lithgow not working towards 
a scheme that actually saved labour and increased production through the use of 
appropriate plant and technology? After all, the idea of the new panel line to 
increase steelwork flow and to enable quicker production of prefabricated units 
coupled with the idea of one giant crane to improve handling seemed to be a proper 
course of action. It seems that the answer lay in the choice of the building mat 
method of construction in that it required more steelwork labour to join toý(ether 
large pre-assembled sections, which would be moved progressiv cly do %v n the 
sloping mat into the water. Therefore, the savings accrued from the assembly of 
ýýý 
sections undercover, would be to a large extent balanced out or c\cecLlkd by the 
increase in costs of erection by extra labour on the mat. Moreover. if as admitted 
more labour was needed, then with the present workforce two or three shift \\orkii-ig 
could not commence to make better use of the overheads employed. Indeed. it seem" 
that the SIB, who after all would be paying through grants and loans for the facility, 
were initially sceptical that the savings envisaged through improved handling and 
flow methods were not being pressed to advantage at the end of the production line. 
Regarding this, the SIB Secretariat noted that there was probably a limit on the size 
of prefabricated unit which could be built into a ship on a mat at a declivity as 
36 opposed to on the level in a building dock. 
A year later, however, it was noted that Lithgows could see no problems %%hatsoc\ er 
in the joining of the largest ships afloat. 37 Indeed, the Lithgow method vas in line 
with an already proven similar method of construction undertaken in I lollarid. 38 In 
short, Lithgows intended to complete the more complicated stern half first and then 
float it round to an outfitting quay to await the bow section. Thereafter, by means of 
a coffer dam the two halves would then be mated by welding them together, and the 
ship fitted out and made ready for trials accordingly. In all this. ho«cvcr, it as 
necessary to expand Scott Lithgow's fitting out facilities and labour force to cope 
with the increase in the size of vessels under construction. The key feature of the 
Glen yard building mat, however, was flexibility with the facility as a whole being 
supposedly less susceptible to changes in demand than would have heeii the case if a 
fixed system of berths had been maintained. 
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Two factors would now dominate the ensuing months: the financial details of SIB 
funding and the necessity to increase the Scott Lithgow labour force just to cope 
with present contracts. On the latter. Belch had sent the local Boilermakers Society 
delegate, George Thomson, twelve copies of the Scott LithgovvGroup Development 
Plan in March 1970. At that stage, Belch considered that there was a need for an 
additional 232 steelworkers. Although he considered that Scott Lithgow would he 
able to take redundant boilermakers from UCS providing they were suitable and 
willing to travel, Belch saw the need to create a much greater steelvv ork 
labour fierce 
in the local area. Belch portrayed the Glen 'super yard' development as an Lict of 
1ýi 
faith in the future, but suggested that the increase in labour could he achieved by a 
dilution scheme with adequate safeguards to protect the boilermakers' interests. 
These dilutees would arrive in groups of fifty men at a time to be trained. Wehen their 
training was completed they would then be absorbed into the steelwork labour force 
and another fifty would be trained accordingly. Belch. how evver. recognised that 
dilution alone was not a long-term solution but a large increase in the intake of 
apprentices apparently was. Again the boilermakers interests would be protected so 
as not to damage the prospects of the present workforce. 'Moreover. Scott Lithgow 
would ensure by joint consultation that the danger of too man; apprentices being 
accepted into the shipyards did not occur, or if it did it would be a question of. 
`turning off the tap' for a period of time until the situation was put right. Ultimately', 
Belch required an extra 1,700 workers to make the present and planned facilities 
40 fully competitive and economic. 
In all this it will be already recognised that by taking on orders for vessels that they 
had no experience of building before in the manner in which the\ had chosen to do 
so, and in building new facilities to accommodate this method of construction, 
effective management was crucial. There was, however, absolutely no guarantee that 
Scott Lithgow could attract labour of sufficient quality to match their ambitious 
plans, and even if they did they had to keep them from going on strike or elsewhere 
for better paid jobs. Just how desperate the firm was to attract labour was evidenced 
in May 1970, when Scott Lithgow's Personnel Manager, R. C. Abrahams wrote to a 
retired UCS boilermaker, Mr James Imrie to offer the latter a job. Abrahams had 
read of the 65-year-old Imrie's retirement in the Daily Record, however. Imrie 
replied that the distance to travel was too far especially in the cold weather and 
respectfully declined the offer. 
4' Setting aside labour problems for the moment, it is 
to financial assistance by way of grants and loans from the SIB that wt e now turn. 
By July 1970, Barker of the SIB had noted that Scott Lithgow had sought its 
agreement to £5,000,000 in bank borrowings to rank equally with the SIB security. 
However, after the SIB had stated that this was too much, it was reduced to 
£4,000,000 as Lithgows already had a borrowing facility of £ 1,500.000 and Scotts' 
were negotiating for one of £2,500,000. By the following month. the SIB decided 
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to loan Scott Lithgow, subject to Mintech approval. the sum of £2.300.000 and i 
award grants totalling £I , 
400.000. Of the loan. £ 1.900,000 was to Lithýýo s (1969) 
Limited and £400,000 to Scotts' Shipbuilding Company (1969) Limited to enable 
both to effect a reorganisation of their resources and to meet the capital expenditure 
on the intermediate Glen yard plan. The reason why the 1969 companies %\ crc 
utilised in this way was because Scott Lithgow Limited owned the shares of the 
seven operating companies, and not the assets. The loan was repayable in sixteen 
half-yearly instalments commencing in April 1972 and ý\ as secured by fixed and 
floating charges on the assets of the 1969 companies. In the course of the 
negotiations, however, `it had became necessary to modify some of the proposed 
terms and conditions of the loans and grants'. Consequently, not more that 
£1,700,000 would be advanced by the SIB until £2.000,000 had been advanced h\ 
way of a loan for working capital to the two 1969 shipbuilding companies by Scotts' 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Limited, and Lithgows Limited. f leis vv as lo 
be evidenced by an auditor's certificate, and in addition restrictions %v cr-c also placed 
on borrowing and on the creation of charges without the consent of the SIB. 
However, this prohibition did not apply to bank borrowings by the t\\o companies 
up to £4,000,000 in the aggregate and the creation of fixed or floating charýgcs to 
secure the same, such charges would rank equally with those created by the 'SIB. 
This, of course, did not affect unsecured borrowing, but as evidence of just how far 
the balance had tilted in favour of the SIB, the limit on capital expenditure on and 
one item without prior SIB approval had been agreed at £ 100,000.4- 
By this stage, however, the SIB Agreement with Scotts' and Lithgmw s 1969 
companies was in its sixth draft. Nevertheless, it had been agreed by the parent 
firms, Scotts Shipbuilding & Engineering and Lithgo vs Limited to provide Scott 
Lithgow with £2,000,000 in working capital with £1.200.000 being provided by 
Scotts' and £800,000 by Lithgows. This total sum would then be advanced to Scotts' 
Shipbuilding (1969) Limited and Lithgows (1969) Limited. with both of these firms 
being able to advance up to a maximum of £250,000 to the other subsidiaries of 
Scott Lithgow Limited. It was also noted that all existing contracts on the Order 
Book at 31 August 1970 with the exception of the naval contracts vv ci on a fiycd 
price basis. Scott Lithgow had also increased its apprentice intake as 250 youths had 
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been employed in the year, however. negotiations with the boilermakers on dilution 
were continuing. To counter this, Scott Lithgow had ad\ ertised nationally for 
steelworkers and was able to offer the inducement of a Scottish Special Housing 
Association house for incoming workers. Nonetheless, labour shortages had 
contributed to delays in the programme of ships under construction with vessels late 
at Cartsburn and Cartsdyke, and three months late at Kingston due to strikes and the 
`problems' in producing bigger ships. Sensibly, albeit rather late in the da". it was 
agreed that from now on the statement of the Order Book included in Board Papers 
should include the anticipated date of delivery of each vessel in addition to the 
contract delivery date. It was also reported that the manufacturers under licence of 
the Goliath crane needed for the Glen yard development, the Scottish firm of Sir 
William Arrol Limited were well behind schedule and that a serious delay in 
44 commissioning could arise. 
Nonetheless, the signing of this contract with Arrol had originally been conditional 
on Scott Lithgow gaining suitable SIB loans. 4 By October, it had been noted that 
the SIB Agreement had been finally executed earlier on 3 September and that loan 
drawings of f-1,699,812 at six and three-eight per cent per annum and grants of 
£613,268 had been subsequently received. 46 However, by December it had also 
been noted that the SIB might be willing to consider a request for a further loan to 
provide additional working capital. 47 Clearly. throughout these long and complex 
financial negotiations the initial parameters had been considerably changed. Due to 
the private nature of the Scott Lithgow group of companies it \\as likely that SIB 
accounting investigations into its financial structure and the future commitments of 
its 1969 operating companies were limited to the information granted to them. 
However, the extent of these investigations remains unknown. Nonetheless, if 
sufficient information was in fact granted to the SIB, then as with Swan Hunter, 
Cammell Laird, Harland & Wolff and Yarrow, it is likely that the SIB found that the 
accounting staffs, although clearly competent were too few in number to exercise 
close control over Scott Lithgow's complex finances. Moreover. it does not need a 
leap of imagination to surmise that the SIB and Mintech under close Treasury 
scrutiny must have been keen to avoid another financial debacle on the scale of 
UCS. 
"6 
With the granting of the SIB grants and loans, however, and with work proceedin, -, 
accordingly on the Glen yard development, it seemed that some sections of the 
Lithgow workforce remained suspicious. At a meeting with Cartsdyke shop 
stewards, it was noted that in response to an earlier statement by Ross Belch. Scott 
Lithgow's Order Book was full, but unprofitable. Whilst that may have been true, 
Belch was told that many of the men felt that they were not being told the truth on 
profitability. Indeed, `there was always a doubt that the Company was continuing to 
make profits because it seemed unthinkable that they should keep the business going 
if they were making losses'. Belch replied to this prescient observation b\ stating 
that if he was in the men's shoes then he would probably think the same. To which a 
shop steward, George Barrett, replied that, it was difficult to believe that [Scott 
Lithgow] stays in business just to provide jobs for people in this area'. In response. 
Belch gave a remarkably honest reply, which is worth quoting in full as he summed 
up the Lithgow position on shipbuilding in the post war period. 
After the war and right up to the [1950s] we were making profits. In 1957 it 
looked as though the good times would go indefinitely. At Lithgo\\ s we had 
an order book that went up to 1967. Owners were queuing up for ships. But 
overnight the picture changed. Suddenly, the effect of expansion in Japan 
and the building of new shipyards in various parts of the vvorld turned a 
seller's market into a buyer's market and our wonderful order book just 
disappeared. We were in a situation in the late [1950s] vvlhcrc practically any 
order we booked meant taking a loss. The best \% e could hope for was to, 
`wash our face. Over the last ten years, in fact, Lithgows have just managed 
to keep their head above water. At Scotts' the picture \\ as marginally better 
because they had a certain amount of naval work. So why go on? The simple 
answer is that, leaving aside any responsibility we feel-and we do feel it-for 
the people of this area, we must try to keep going. If «e were to go into 
liquidation and wrap everything up, the shipyards would be almost vv-orthlcss 
and there would be no possibility left of salvaging the very No investment 
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which has been put into them. 
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There could hardly be more eloquent testimony than this coming from the managing 
director of a private company, had it been a public one then shareholder pressures- 
could have been brought to bear to either to further rationalise the concern or to cut 
and run to liquidation. With losses on fixed priced contracts likely to intensify in a 
volatile market Belch, nevertheless. gave the shop stewards the opportunity of 
inspecting Scott Lithgow's books. 49 However. in tandem wt ith the poor outlook for 
British shipbuilding in general, any form of outdoor relief at that stage had to be 
preferable. 
The new Government makes it mark 
With the election of the new Conservative Government in June 1970, shipbuilding 
policy was at something of a crossroads. With the Tory Party's traditional distaste 
for state interference in industry it was likely that the life of the SIB, already 
extended by the previous Labour Government to the end of 1971 %% cold be 
extinguished. Indeed, Mintech, and with it, responsibility for the shipbuilding 
industry would be merged into a new department of state, Trade and Industry . 
h\ 
October. However, as was customary with a change of government. civil scrv ant; in 
the SIB and Mintech attempted to put their stamp on future policy. A first draft of a 
paper to Sir William Swallow at the SIB, which could be used as a basis for a 
discussion with the Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry 
(D. T. I. ), John Davies, was prepared. Titled, The New Government...: - Pragmatic 
Approach to Shipbuilding', the authors of the draft, in summary, still believed that 
the industry was operating in a growth market and was, not incurably diseased' as 
its structures, facilities and attitudes had been, `markedly improved'. However. it 
still required a further period of `nursing, which need not involve propping up,. 
Nursing meant, access to capital, maintenance of government support to owners at 
an internationally competitive level, and general pressure to improve managerial 
standards. Moreover, each major group should be analysed, and the possible use of 
expertise from outside the industry should be considered as well as the possible 
`hiving off of the Government's role in the industry from the Civil Serv ice. It was 
noted that in Scott Lithgow's case, if survival on the basis of copper-bottomed 
propositions is considered a commercial virtue, then 
Scott Lithgoww \\ ill continue to 
28 
deserve its halo. [The] group has accepted-predictably-rather late- an adequate 
amount of financial assistance from the SIB, and there is little doubt about it; 
capacity to survive' . 
50 
Subsequently, in September 1970, Sir William Swallow and his SIB colleagues met 
Nicholas Ridley MP who remained at this stage in a junior ministerial position at 
Mintech. The purpose of the meeting was ostensibly to discuss the separation of 
Yarrow from UCS, however, it began with a general discussion on %\ hat Ridley 
termed, `the deplorable state of the industry, with companies such as Harland & 
Wolff, UCS, Cammell Laird and Swan Hunter. -balanced on a knife-k2dge'. On tile 
future strategy on Harland & Wolff, which was yet again in major trouble, Ridley 
did not favour the continuation of the existing set up with the same `dud' 
management. Yarrow Shipbuilders was regarded as a -cliff hanger' and Ridley 
wanted it segregated from UCS quickly, and emphasised that the Tories would not 
want to be the cause of a Yarrow collapse. Therefore, Yarrow- should not be allo\\ cd 
to go bust, and its shareholders must have a fair deal in view of its 'shotgun merger' 
with UCS. The SIB, in Sir William Swallow's view had treated Yarrow fairl`. 'after 
all they had eliminated all warship competition on the Upper Clyde when put into 
UCS'. Sir William then mentioned that the SIB had turned down a request from 
Scott Lithgow over an extension of the interest-free period of their loan. Ridle\. in 
turn, said that Scott Lithgow, `seemed to be doing well and there %v as nothing to be 
done on this'. In this regard, Scott Lithgow had to a large extent been a victim of 
their own obstinacy on merging long after other groups had, and then asking for 
funding from a rapidly diminishing pot. Moreover, the Lower Clyde group was also 
to a large extent a victim of its own propaganda, as its cautious approach and self- 
reliance was portrayed as somehow bucking the trend of disastrous 
losses elsewhere 
in the industry. That this perception had taken root was to some extent due to the 
public persona of Ross Belch, but also mainly due to the cloak of private status that 
Scott Lithgow enjoyed. 
With most of the other large shipbuilding firms in the UK making 
losses on fixed 
priced mercantile contracts, it was 
hardly surprising that the consolidated Scott 
Lithgow accounts for the year ended 31 December 1970 shoed a 
loss on vesscis 
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delivered in that year. 52 Although. as Michael Scott later noted. the majority of 
contracts in hand at 1 January 1970 had been taken on in 1969 at fixed price; with 
some provision for inflation based on past experience and a reasonable profit, a steep 
rise in inflation had led to losses. The 'depressing result «as a loss of f400.15 3. In 
addition it was found to be necessary to make a provision for losses on uncompleted 
contracts at 31 December 1970 amounting to £1.150,000. This provision. as Scott 
acknowledged, was a deliberate departure from accepted accounting principles in 
that Scott Lithgow had deducted estimated profits from estimated losses and thereb\ 
not provided for the losses only. The rationale behind this was that profitable 
contracts had escalation clauses providing against the risk of continuing inflation. 
Consequently, `to provide for losses only would not give a true and fair v ie\\- of the 
state of the affairs at 31 December 1970'. 53 Scott Lithgow's auditors \\ cre not 
impressed with this argument, and accordingly qualified the accounts. -; ' Michael 
Scott, did, however, note that the prospects for the next two to three years for Scott 
Lithgow were going to be difficult until the fixed price contracts ere disposed of. 
In an inflationary climate Scott Lithgow's commitment to the SIB-financed 
modernisation programme to build super tankers in its Glen Yard as ev, idcntl) a 
high-risk strategy. Moreover, the loans received from the SIB had to be repaid 
before the £2,000,000 loan for working capital given by Scotts' and Lith(-)o\\-s to tile 
two 1969 shipbuilding companies. With the Glen yard modernisation programme 
coming on stream, and the Lithgow end of the company committed to the super 
tanker market, whilst retaining a degree of flexibility to build smaller v es els if 
needs be, then market projections were crucial. The SIB encouragement of Swan 
Hunter, Harland & Wolff and Scott Lithgow to enter the giant tanker market had 
obviously been undertaken in the national interest and at that stage market 
projections had been deemed to be favourable. With the Tyne and Belfast firms 
getting a head start on Scott Lithgow, however, the market had begun to change. It 
now transpired that Mintech at February 1970 had already undertaken a study on the 
super tanker market, which also confirmed recent Japanese work that the rate of 
ordering for this class of vessel was likely to fall off in the next few years. This 
made the sector increasingly vulnerable to over capacit\. a factor that Scott Lithgovv 
ýý' did not refer to in its submission on yard development to the SIB. 
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The future for Scott Lithgow then. post-1971. was anything but bright. Margins 
would inevitably be tight. naval work would be all-important to counter balance 
unprofitable mercantile work, loans would have to be eventually repaid, and a 
breakdown in industrial relations, the largely unknown factor. could seriously impair 
production. Almost on cue then the latter had occurred by February 1971, when. 
after giving three weeks notice of their intention to withdraw their labour. Scott 
Lithgow's 2,000 boilermakers officially went out on strike o% er parit\ with the 
Upper Clyde. They did so after having voted against a management offer that would 
have given them almost a thirteen per cent pay rise. an average of £3 per week. .\ 
similar offer had been made to the unskilled, semi-skilled and outfitting trades. 
however, which had been accepted. Although this offer was apparently much more 
than Scott Lithgow could afford, Belch had felt compelled to offer it the light of 
UCS and other national wage awards. 57 Two weeks later a further 1.784 men had 
been laid off, and by 5 March after failing to reach agreement on the boilermakers 
demand for £1 per hour, Scott Lithgow had offered to increase the hourly rate to 
between seventy and seventy-five pence, complete closure of the yards was 
instituted. 58 Ross Belch, who as a matter of policy dealt with all negotiations over 
wages personally, had but one tactic, not to concede until the strikers returned to 
work. However, Belch had afforded the opportunity for Dan McGarve\ . the 
Boilermakers leader to inspect Scott Lithgow's books but McGar% e\ latter dismissed 
this as, `a gimmick' and stated that, the Lower Clyde firm was trvi»g to build ships 
on the cheap at the expense of his members'. Five days later in a speech given in 
London, Michael Scott asked for state aid to be given in the present inflationary 
climate on the proviso that the shipbuilding industry's long term prospects were seen 
to be good. According to Scott, the effects of inflation on long-term fixed price 
contracts were, `utterly devastating'. Contemporaneously, with one in four of the 
adult male population of Greenock and Port Glasgow on strike, laid off or 
unemployed, the situation was serious. 
59 After seven weeks, however, the Scott 
Lithgow strike petered out when McGarvey told his brethren that if they did not 
return to work then the Union would withdraw its official backing for the strike. 
Originally. Belch had required a wage freeze of fifteen months as a condition of' his 
offer, but after the capitulation of the boilermakers, this period ww as extended to 
twenty-one months, and the sum offered remained about the same. At least this 
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period also served as a guarantee of employment for the boilermaking trades. but 
provision had been made as a result of the settlement for the immediate introduction 
of dilution. 60 Yet again, a major strike could only have one outcome, a serious delay 
in delivery of ships, with the concomitant damage to the firm's reputation at home 
and abroad. With some urgency needed to divest itself of the fixed price contract 
loss makers on its books, this hardly augured well for the future of the firm. 
By this stage, however, the separation of Yarrow Shipbuilders from UCS was closer 
as it had been publicly announced on 12 February 1971 that Yarrow were to recei\ t 
a loan of £4,500,000 from the MoD spread over the next three years. and that the 
Scotstoun firm would leave UCS. 61 In view of this largesse to Yarrow and to UCS 
in general, Michael Scott and Ross Belch met Ridley and John Davies at the D. T. I. 
five days later. There, Scott, with Scott Lithgow"s boilermakers about to strike. 
complained about the constant propping up by Government of UCS and the great 
damage it caused to the Lower Clyde, and now Yarrow seemed to be following on. 
62 Just as Harold Lever had stated before the election of June 1970. Davies and 
Ridley pointed out that this would be the last help to UCS that the present 
government would give. The two ministers prevaricated, howw ev er, and announced 
that the Yarrow situation was a matter for the Ministry of Defence. Belch. not 
unreasonably, then requested that some tangible assistance be given to the l . o\\ cr 
Clyde. Scott Lithgow might require an additional loan of three to four million 
pounds for working capital to tide the firm over the, `next three difficult years before 
returning to profit in 1974/1975'. Secondly, he would require the commitments 
already entered into with the SIB on grant money to be extended into 1972 after the 
SIB had expired, and that the Government would continue to honour the obligations 
undertaken by the SIB during its lifetime. Third, that capital repayments on the SIB 
loan should be deferred to commence at a later date. and last that its interest free 
status should be extended for a further period. Both Davies and Ridley again avoided 
this and pointed out that this was a matter for the SIB. Consequently. Scott and 
Belch met with Sir William Swallow and Joe Gormley in London on 1'7 February. 
Although the SIB generally approved of a loan for working capital, figures had to be 
tabled to justify it, and it was thought that the Government would, 'probably 
continue' to honour SIB obligations undertaken. Moreover. a revised aý(reement on 
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capital repayments might be drawn up but as to the wiping out of interest, only 
legislation could achieve this. In addition the SIB had noted that it had not received 
any quarterly reports from Scott Lithgow as required under their existing loan 
63 agreement. 
To a large extent these negotiations were typical of what had gone on before despite 
the change in government in that no real commitment was offered. Ho« ever, Scott 
and Belch met the Minister of State for Defence, Lord Balniel and a junior 
colleague, Kirk, in March. Balniel offered no suggestion that Scott Lith`go\\ could 
expect comparable treatment to Yarrow, however, he did state that the effect of the 
loan on the latter would be judged in future competitive tendering and that Scott 
Lithgow would not be competing against a subsidised concern. As \t as noted. 'It 
was not possible to ascertain what was meant by this statement'. Balniel again 
assured Scott that the Cartsburn yard was still regarded as a facility in which to build 
surface warships. Balniel's colleague, Kirk, hoped that Scott Lithgow would tender 
for the latest round of type 21 frigate orders, and voiced the opinion that competitive 
tendering, `was certainly not always going to be possible in the future'. 
Consequently, and of no surprise, it was minuted that the meeting, had been ver` 
encouraging'. 64 No doubt this was an acknowledgement that Scott Lith`go\w ww ere not 
competitive on surface warships, after all Scotts' had not completed one since 1964, 
yet the firm had nonetheless, somewhat optimistically tendered for two T pe 42 
Destroyers. It was expected, however, that the firm would soon receive an invitation 
to tender for two Oberon class submarines for Australia, two Type 21 frigates and an 
underwater research vessel for the Royal Navy. 65 
In the interim, Scott Lithgow had submitted another application to the SIB for an 
additional loan of £4,000,000 for working capital and a loan of £500.000 to cover 
extra costs in their Glen yard plans. The SIB was also asked for a revision of the 
terms of the present loan so that capital repayment would not commence until 1975. 
and cancellation of interest due under it. By 19 April 1971. accountants for the SIB 
had visited Scott Lithgow and requested a monthly cash flow statement. which was 
complied with to enable the SIB to consider it at its June meeting. 
66 Subsequently, a 
monthly cash flow statement for the next five years was also submitted in early June. 
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Armed with this information. the SIB had turned down Scott Lithgow's application 
by September. 67 However, the receipt of this bad news prompted the firm to 
resubmit its application, which was a far cry from its April proposal. Briefly. a 
secured loan of £500,000 was requested for additional capital expenditure. and the 
existing loan agreement was to be amended for capital repayment to commence on 
April 1975, rather than on April 1972 as originally agreed. Additionally . the SIB 
would grant a subordinated unsecured loan of £ 1,000.000 for repayment between 31 
December 1975 and 31 December 1978. Interest on the latter loan would be repaid 
at normal lending rates, with an additional premium between 25 and 37.5 per cent 
rising in accordance with various redemption dates. This loan ranked before Scotts' 
and Lithgows earlier unsecured loan of £2,000,000. Such was Scott Litlh, g()vv 's 
financial position that the SIB had to be satisfied that the Royal Bank and the Bank 
of Scotland would support the firm over its period of poor liquidity. Morcm-er. tile 
subordinated loan gave the SIB the right to nominate a director of Scott Lithgo%v . 
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Subsequently, the two loan agreements for the sum of £1,500,000 were executed on 
17 December 1971, and the money received six days later 69 
Therein ended Scott Lithgow's long and involved association with the SIB, which 
was dissolved as of 31 December 1971, with its rights and obligations v esting in the 
Secretary of State at the D. T. I. The Lower Clyde firm had, howwev'er, outlasted I. CS, 
which had earlier imploded in June. As a result, UCS petitioned the Court of Scssion 
for a winding-up order and an appointment of a provisional liquidator on the 
grounds that the Company was unable to pay its debts. Contemporaneously. the 
Government announced that it would allow UCS to go into liquidation. 
Subsequently, the Government appointed a three-man, later extended to four. 
advisory committee to investigate and report on the prospects for the continuance of 
mercantile shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde. By the end of July, the Government 
had accepted the conclusions of the three-page report, which lacked detailed 
analysis. The report's authors had, however, given due weight to social 
considerations, but postulated that mercantile shipbuilding should be continued at 
Govan and Linthouse only. Despite the intention of those organising the so-called 
`UCS work-in', whose policy was to maintain employment in all four divisions of 
the consortium in the event of a successor company being, found. Davies 
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commissioned Hill Samuel to further investigate and report upon the Go, an 
Linthouse option. Subsequently, Govan Shipbuilders was incorporated on 21 
September 1971, comprising the former Govan and Linthouse divisions of LCS. 
with the possibility that the Scotstoun division would also be saved. This left the 
Clydebank division apparently doomed, but the trade unions delayed the 
arrangements until a separate future for Clydebank was determined. ti e'\ ertheless. by 
28 February 1972 the Government announced that it was prepared to support Govan 
Shipbuilders with funds that could amount to £35,000.000. Of this sum £ 18.000.000 
would be allocated to cover the acquisition of the assets of Govan. Linthouse and 
Scotstoun, and up to £ 17,000,000 to cover anticipated losses in the first three to four 
years of operation. This level of funding was, however, dependent upon the passing 
of a new Industry Bill, which was introduced after the 1972 Easter recess. 
Earlier, in October 1971, production had been gradually run down at Lithos I ast 
yard to phase with the construction of a stretch of the A8 through the % and to 
straighten out the road through Port Glasgow. Accordingly the East yard had under 
construction its last ship. 7' By this stage, however, Scott Lithgow had successfull\ 
tendered for two Oberon class submarines for the Royal Australian Navy at prices of 
£5,531,637 and £5,293,814 respectively. Moreover, the firm had also concluded an 
agreement for a consideration of £80,000 with the possibility of further cash 
payments with the consultants, A&P Appledore International Limited, to undertake 
the training of staff and supply of drawings to Hyundai who \\ ci-c starting up a 
shipyard in South Korea. 72 By December. Scott Lithgow had been informed that 
under the Government's programme of accelerated naval construction, orders %%ould 
be placed for two Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Replenishment Ships and one 
Underwater Research Vessel (URV)73) ý 
Beforehand. Ross Belch had journeyed south to discuss the accelerated programme, 
which was worth around £70,000,000 and included two Guided Missile Destroyers 
and four Type 21 Frigates, one of which was apparently destined for Scott Lithgoww. 
Hardly surprisingly, as it turned out, Scott Lithgow failed to win any frigate or 
destroyer orders. Yarrow, the lead yard for the Type 21 vv on all four fri, ý atc orders. 
worth in the region of £32,000,000.74 Scotts' and then Scott Lithgove had paid the 
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price of failing to modernise its naval facilities. Nonetheless. a new fabrication hall 
at Cartsburn costing around £500,000 had virtually doubled the specialist ship 
capacity, however, and work was in hand to expand the berths at the adjoining 
Cartsdyke yard, whose steel facilities were already modern. With this probably in 
mind, Ross Belch still hoped that Scott Lithgow would be given the opportunity to 
build a frigate at Cartsburn in future, but the award of the two RF A ships and the 
URV had given the group `a welcome boost' .7 
Belch* s upbeat assessment, \\ hich 
had apparently vindicated his decision to keep the Cartsburn order book short in the 
expectation of naval contracts accruing, had to be offset against the expected losses 
on tanker construction and on other fixed price contracts. At a later meeting. Belch 
stated that Scott Lithgow was entering a period, `when practically every contract 
was a substantial loss maker'. His strategy, therefore. was to concentrate on ridding 
themselves of these loss makers as quickly as possible, and at this stage, 'ev cr\ 
penny counted', thus the co-operation of everyone involved was needed in this 
difficult period. 76 However, as a result of naval orders, and as a consequence of its 
lengthening order book, Scott Lithgow would again have to expand its workforce 
that had grown, when competitor firms' workforces had contracted, from 7.000 in 
1967 to 8,400 in December 1971.77 In all this, there was good nevv s for Scotts' 
Engine Works, which would provide Scott Sulzer engines for the t%% o RF. \ % essels. 
in addition to mercantile and submarine work. This was just as well. as hy this stage 
any Scott Kincaid merger had been effectively abandoned. 
By February 1972, however, operational problems still persisted with the 225 ton 
capacity Goliath gantry crane at the Glen yard and this had a serious effect on costs, 
as all the firm's calculations had been based on the Arrol-built crane being in full 
operation long before. In the interim, Scott Lithgow had purchased a second-hand 
40-ton crane from Arrol and were proceeding as best as they could with one part of 
one half of a super tanker. 
78 At a later meeting, although Belch claimed that during 
the past ten to twelve years, Scotts' and Lithgows had spent around El 6.000.000 in 
modernising facilities, another five to six million pounds was nevertheless needed to 
continue planned developments. 
79 This figure obviously included SIB loans and 
grants; however, with the SIB gone it remained to be seen where further money 
would come from, especially in light of what Governments 
had already spent on 
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UCS and on its successor, Govan Shipbuilders. On the latter issue. as %% as the case 
with the former. Ross Belch was rightly incensed and publicly announced that the 
case for similar treatment was, `surely unanswerable. According to Belch. Scott 
Lithgow, `management and men had worked and fought together to continue [their] 
existence by [their] own efforts in the belief that self-help [would] gain the greatest 
rewards'. With double the numbers employed at Govan Shipbuilders and with a 
sizeable amount of the population of Greenock and Port Glasgow, directly or 
indirectly affected, Belch had a point. 80 It remained to be seen, however, whether his 
plea for similar treatment to Govan would cut any ice with Glasgow-obsessed 
politicians. By March. the East yard, formerly the yard of Robert Duncan had 
launched its last ship, Brimnes for Norwegian owners. At the launch speech, Atle 
Jebsen, who had ordered twenty ships in twenty-three years from Scotts' and 
Lithgows stated that Scott Lithgow deserved a cash injection and severely criticised 
the Govan loan. 8I However, the Industry Bill was published some weeks later and 
contained proposals for short-term aid in the form of tapering grants of ten per cent 
of the contract of work carried out in 1972 and at rates of four and three per cent 
respectively for 1973 and 1974. The Scott Lithgow Board noted that in their opinion 
these grants were being given to meet losses incurred and to be incurred on fixed 
price contracts. 82 It was also acknowledged in public that this, ' would undoubtedly 
help to restore the financial strength of the group... so adversely affected by in recent 
years working out long-term fixed contracts in a period of unprecedented 
inflation'. 
83 
Just how bad the situation actually was, was reflected in the consolidated trading 
loss of Scott Lithgow of £1,441,255 for the year ended 31 
December 1971. 
Moreover, it was estimated that losses on the remaining fixed price contracts 
for 
delivery in 1972.1973 and 1974 would be around £5,000,000. As a result, however. 
of proposals for tapering grants announced in the 
Industry Bill and with the addition 
of profits on the estimated outcomes of contracts taken on with escalation clauses. 
the Board was of the opinion that this would exceed the losses on 
fixed price 
contracts in hand at 31 December 
1971. Accordingly, the Scott LithUow Board 
decided not to make a provision for future losses. Furthermore, the 
loss provision of 
£ 1,150,000 made in the previous accounts was no longer required. and was 
hroulght 
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into the credit of the Profit and Loss Account. This made the trading loss for 1971 
only f291,255 and with the adverse balance brought forward of £1.359.123 from 
thel970 accounts, gave an adverse balance carried forward of £1.850.378. This 
display of creative accounting cut no ice with the firms auditors ww ho qualified the 
accounts on two fronts, the fact that no loss provision had been made, and on the 
difficulty of accurately assessing contract outcomes on fixed priced vessels due for 
delivery up to 1974.84 
Nationally, as Hogwood noted, in two years the Conservative Government had 
moved on general industrial policy from a stance of non-intervention, *wvith some 
possible exceptions, [notably Rolls Royce] ... to setting up a 
framework for selective 
intervention'. On shipbuilding, however. the Government had moved from, 'a 
position of ambiguity about shipbuilding as an exception to the general approach, 
through a declaration that shipbuilding would not be treated as a special case, 
followed soon after by massive assistance to a number of individual yards'. And 
thereafter, to a policy, `of temporary general subsidy to all firms in the industry'. 
As John Eden MP, a Minister for Industry at the D. T. I. noted in February 1972, the 
Government intended to stabilise the UK shipbuilding industry, not only h\ the 
accelerated naval programme, but also by increasing the limit by legislation on 
Shipbuilding Industry Act Credit Guarantees to £1 billion. 86 In addition, a new 
industrial Development Executive (IDE) at the D. T. I had been set up in March and 
would take a special interest in shipbuilding. Subsequently, the INNN': commissioned 
yet another major report on the long-term prospects of the shipbuilding industry to 
be undertaken by the American management consultants. Booz-Allen and Hamilton, 
and Scott Lithgow were to be one of the firms visited by them. 
87 
With the level of anticipated losses at Scott Lithgow subject to many variables such 
as possible industrial action, an increase in the rate of inflation, a decrease in 
productivity and management failings to name but four, the die on the firm's future 
was effectively cast. Tapering grants and expected profits on vessels other than those 
taken on at fixed prices could offset losses only to a certain extent as too many 
variables existed to ultimately rely upon this method as a vv-ay of returning Scott 
Lithgow to profit. It was plain, however, that in order to effectively stem losses, 
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across the board increases in productivity levels were essential. particularly on steel 
throughput. Moreover, it was axiomatic that if Scott Lithgow were to remain in the 
super tanker market as a serious player then output had to be increased from 
potentially one vessel per year to two if the level of present ins estment was to bear 
fruit. As it stood, Scott Lithgow were effectively trying to compete in a market 
against competitors with far more resources who were geared to tanker construction. 
However, as a mixed mercantile and naval builder. an official strike of seventeen 
weeks duration by the firm's engineers in pursuit of a national wage claim. which 
ended in October 1972, must have had a deleterious effect on the firm's prospects. 
Despite this, however, Scott Lithgow's consolidated accounts for the ý car- ended 31 
December 1972, showed a surplus of £662,102. This turnaround had been achieved 
by including the estimated total of grant receivable in respect of 1972 amounting to 
£3,655,000 in the firm's reserves. Moreover, an amount of £1.425.000 had been 
transferred from reserves to the credit of the Profit and Loss Account to offset 
trading losses of £ 1,287,775. The balance of £2,230,000 was carried forward in 
reserves. The surplus for the year, however, included a non-recurring surplus of 
£524,877 arising on the sale of the East yard. Again, the Board made no loss 
provisions in the belief that grants and estimated profits on more recent contracts 
would exceed losses on fixed priced contracts. Accordingly, the firm's auditors 
again qualified the accounts. However, the extent of estimated losses on fixed priced 
contracts for ships due for delivery in 1973 and 1974 had risen to ¬7,500,000. no 
doubt partly due to the engineers' strike. 88 Clearly, without Government grants, the 
Scott Lithgow position would have been more serious still. Neither was Scott 
Lithgow's future prospects helped by the 'shocking' level of absenteeism in its 
workforce, which moved Ross Belch to comment in January 1973 that it was one of 
the biggest problems facing the firm. According to Belch, it was not uncommon for 
a quarter of a department to be absent and on Sundays it reached fifty per cent. thus 
a survey had been instituted to find the cause of the problem. 
89 With systemic 
overtime being worked, however, particularly with those who did turn up for work 
on Sundays, a culture of taking off the following Monday had taken root. This is 
known and referred to as the 'Monday Club' by all concerned. 
90 
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The Booz-Allen & Hamilton Report 
By 16 May 1973. an edited version of the Booz-Allen Report had been published 
with Scott Lithgow one of the nine firms visited in compiling the ? 63-page report. 
Unlike the SIC Report, which was essentially an exercise in confidence building. 
Booz-Allen was a polar opposite and made depressing reading. The yellow -jacketed 
Report nicknamed the -yellow peril' by shipbuilders, contained the damning 
indictment that Britain was the only shipbuilding nation in the world to register no 
growth in the past fifteen years. Moreover, management and industrial relations 
were generally bad, late delivery predominated, and equipment was out of date. 
Ominously, output was seen as remaining static, and a large decline in employment 
in yards was forecast at the current level of Government support. 91 Although Booz- 
Allen's terms of reference precluded them from making policy recommendations. 
they nevertheless made five hypothecations based on different scenarios. 
92 To take 
one example only, with massive Government support of around £250,000.000 
British shipyards could raise their output to about 2,500,000 tons per annum. 
. However, even then the labour force would shrink due to increased productivity 
More ominously still for Scott Lithgow. on warship building, Booz-Allen forecasted 
that mixed naval and mercantile yards could be phased out of naval contracts by 
1975. Currently, naval work was concentrated in three specialist naval yards. 
(Vickers, Vosper Thornycroft, Yarrow) and in three mixed mercantile and naval 
builders (Cammell Laird, Scott Lithgow. Swan Hunter). Booz-Allen, nevertheless 
recognised that naval capacity would exceed demand, and moreover, that the export 
market was unlikely to bridge the gap after 1976. Such was the 
forecast that even if 
the mixed naval and mercantile yards were removed and production concentrated 
in 
the three naval yards, no guarantee could be given that the latter would 
be wholly 
viable. 9 
Contemporaneously, the Minister for Industrial Development, Christopher Chataway 
had stated that the Government was in no way committed to accept any of the 
financial or employment implications hypothecated by Booz-Allen. 
However. 
ChatawaY did invite written observations on the Report from intcrestcdi parties to 
arrive at his Ministry before 15 June 
1973.94 Subsequently. although \lichael Scott 
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found that some of the Report's contents appeared to be helpful. 'others \\ere 
unjustifiably damaging to the Industry's reputation. particularly the indiscriminate 
criticisms of management which [were] so sweeping and general in nature as to be 
wholly inaccurate'. Moreover, Scott was profoundly disturbed that, the 
management over which [he] was proud to preside should be commented upon in 
such a totally destructive manner'. By this stage, however. the 1969 had been 
omitted from the operating companies, but Scotts' Shipbuilding & Engineering 
Company Limited (the ultimate holding company of Scott Lithgo«- Limited) had 
been deemed to be too similar in name by the Registrar of Companies to the 
operating company, Scotts' Shipbuilding Company Limited. Accordingly. the 
holding company name had been changed to Scotts' of Greenock (Estd. 1711) 
Limited. 95 
If accepted by Government, the rationalisation of the warship building sector would 
mean that Scott Lithgow would have only the export market for conventional 
submarines and RFA work to tender for in future. With no guarantee. ho\\ e\'cr, that 
further orders would accrue, this had to be particularly damaging to Scott Lithgo\\ in 
terms of offsetting future losses on mercantile construction. Not only was there a 
steep learning curve to be surmounted on super tanker construction, but substantial 
losses had already been incurred on the five BP product tankers order as the oil 
major had demanded the very highest standards and the contract had also borne the 
full brunt of inflation. 96 Beforehand, Scott Lithgow had also attempted to interest the 
Ministry of Defence to improve the Oberon submarine by either modifying it, or re- 
designing it, or by abandoning it and designing a new conventional submarine. 97 
However, the Minister of State for Defence, Ian Gilmour offered cold comfort as he 
could not hold out much hope of going beyond what Ross Belch had termed, 
`improving the Oberon'. Shockingly, the MoD did not have enough staff with 
specialist submarine knowledge and experience, even for their own programme. 
98 
Moreover, prior to the publication of Booz-Allen, even this faint glimmer of hope 
had been extinguished. Both the Director General Ships, (DGS) Sir George Raper 
and Belch had acknowledged that no hope existed of setting up a joint design team, 
or of the MoD offering even a small amount of assistance hinted at h% Gilmour. 
`'` 
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In May 1973, Ross Belch had requested Booz-Allen to submit a proposal on how it 
could help Scott Lithgow solve some of the weaknesses previously identified by the 
consultants in their visit to the Lower Clyde yards. The most important of which 
were obtaining company-wide standard financial information and the control of 
rising costs. At present both Scotts' and Lithgows retained separate accounting 
organizations and little integration had been achieved to date. 'Moreover. progress in 
the development of long-range planning had been limited. Overheads had risen at 
over ten per cent per year between 1967 and 1971, maintenance had jumped by 
eighty-six per cent, general overheads sixty-three per cent and indirect labour by- 
fifty-three per cent. It was noted that if the upward trend continued unabated then it 
would have a severe effect on the firm's future profitability. and that by the end of 
1973, total overheads could exceed £4,600,000. Accordingly. Booz-Allen proposed 
to rationalise Scott Lithgow's accounting systems by the installation of a uniform 
budgetary control system, and to develop a cost control and cost reduction 
programme in both operating and overhead cost areas. The former would take 
around one year to take effect, but the latter could have a more immediate effect. not 
least by stimulating cost consciousness. It was also noted that Scott Lithgow's prime 
objective was to earn sufficient profit to allow it to meet its essential obligations to 
the people of Greenock and Port Glasgow, and that in long-term support of these 
objectives the company had spent millions of pounds on modernisation. 100 This was 
in and of itself incredible-a public company's foremost obligation \% Lis to its 
shareholders, a sentiment equally appropriate to non-charitable private companies 
like Scott Lithgow. In addition, however, to Governments paying vast sums to 
indigent industrialists, we now had a similar system of outdoor relief where some of 
that money was apparently being used just to keep people in employment on the 
Lower Clyde. Setting this aside, it can be seen therefore, that if the whole basis of 
Scott Lithgow's future profitability assumptions had been made on what appeared to 
be subjective and partial information, in what after all was a period of unprofitable 
trading, then the firm was in real trouble. In this scenario then, the retention of 
profitable naval work was absolutely crucial. A factor that was to become the 
leitmotif of Scott Lithgow's relationship with Governments for the rest of the decade 
and beyond, and which was underpinned by the potential effects on future 
employment. 
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The fight to retain naval contracts 
From now on in there began a series of correspondence and meetings between Scott 
Lithgow and MoD (N) that would become increasingly strained. but did ser\ e to 
define the respective positions. Indeed, the ongoing debate would also encapsulate 
much of the arguments over the placing of naval work that had raged unresolved 
since the SIC Report. It will be recalled that Christopher Chataw av had written and 
spoken about the Government not having made up its mind either way on Booz- 
Allen and that it would invite written representations up to a month after publication. 
The day before the publication of the Report, however, Admiral Sir Anthony Griffin 
had written to Michael Scott enclosing a memorandum for further discussion, which 
set out MoD (N) policy on future warship procurement. 101 Hardly surprisingly, the 
memorandum's conclusions exactly mirrored those of Chatawwwav some t\\ o months 
later. Noting that the current six warship building firms were the result of a process 
of natural selection, which had reduced the number of such firms from a total of 
fourteen at the end of the Second World War, it was also noted that present capacity 
substantially exceeded likely demand. Moreover, the accelerated programme in 1971 
was untypical. In future, the Ministry concluded, `with regret', that it would 
concentrate warship orders in those firms, who between them: could provide 
sufficient production capacity to meet likely defence demand, and possessed a full 
range of lead yard and design capability on which MoD (N) 'must increasingly 
depend... [and who could].. . take the 
fullest advantage of future opportunities of 
warship export business'. And with no hint of irony, the three firms chosen were 
exactly those that the SIC had recommended to do the same work in 1966, Vickers. 
Vosper Thornycroft and Yarrow. All three firms were almost wholly dependent on 
warship orders, and the Ministry had already reached the stage where first of class 
orders were done by allocation, thus the scope for competitive tendering, so long 
aspired to, would remain limited. 
102 It seemed, therefore, that the previously 
declared policy of over a decade by MoD (N) of value for money in naval 
procurement, the self same policy that had thwarted Scott Lithgow 's attempt to 
tender for frigate orders, had now been abandoned. However. it \\ as noted that S'cott 
Lithgow's future would depend on their success in the export market lbr submarine. 
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Again, as MoD (N) was unable to provide technical assistance to improve the 
Oberon class this must also have also been cold comfort indeed. 
A fortnight later, however, Scott and Belch met Griffin and Raper to discuss the 
implications of the memorandum. Scott, predictably, was extremely disturbed on the 
implications of the Ministry's proposal as his firm carried substantial naval 
overheads and the loss of naval work could have profound implications for 
employment at Cartsburn where 3,000 to 3,500 men might well be unemployed as a 
result. Scott then revealed for the first time that it was their engagement in Oberon 
work that, had prevented them from developing a surface warship capacity and that 
there was no other reason why they could not build frigates cheaply . 
Belch then 
changed tack and requested that RFA work should be allocated to Cartsburn to 
preserve jobs and to retain a naval capability. Griffin, in summing up stated that he 
would be prepared to examine the case for allocating the more specialised RFA 
vessels, but that these orders would be few and far between and could not constitute 
a base load for Cartsburn. Moreover, the defence budget could not be used to 
alleviate unemployment, and Scott Lithgow could not even rely on refit %\ ork, ýv 111ch 
10, as a matter of policy was the preserve of the Royal Dockyards. ' Nev erthele s, by 
June, Scott Lithgow had admitted that it was out of the frigate market, but still hoped 
that research vessels and RFA ships might be allocated to it. 4 By Jul", however, 
Griffin had rejected Michael Scott's plea to be allocated a base load of RFA w\ ork. 
Other firms in assisted areas were quite capable of carrying out this %ý ork. and he 
could not find any reason that MoD (N) could possibly give to justify excluding 
them from competition for these ships. 105 Throughout the process. Scott Lithgow's 
argument was deceptively simple, if the Government could discriminate in favour of 
three warship builders. then why could they not discriminate in favour of RFA 
builders? This argument was, however, apparently flawed in that competitive 
tendering was established for these types of vessels, and future orders for this type of 
ship were the weakest part of the Defence Vote. Indeed, the difference in skills and 
design capability between these types of ships and modern warships \\ as immense. 
Although these arguments were consistently deployed by MoD (N) they did not get 
to the heart of Scott Lithgow's real concern that the three preferred warship ý ards in 
lean times would advantageously bid for RFA contracts from accumulated re scr\ es 
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built on naval profits. Griffin did, however. recomnise that this could occur. 
Moreover, Sir Michael Cary the Chief of the Procurement Executi% e conceded that 
in future it might be necessary to allocate RFA work to the three specialist yards. 
who must remain the first care of the Ministry', because of the Ministry's 
dependence on them for warships'. Accordingly. no undertaking was given to 
exclude the specialist naval firms from tendering for RFA work. 106 
By this stage, Scott Lithgow had also sought and had been given the active 
encouragement and support of its workforce to lobby Government ministers. In what 
was a rather heated atmosphere the potential for misunderstanding's and 
recrimination was legion and the spectre of the w ithdraww al of naval \\ o rk from 
Cartsburn and resultant civil unrest hovered over the discussions. In response to this. 
however, Sir George Raper had become increasingly frustrated at the Scott Lithgoww 
stance. Raper believed that the reputation of MoD (N) had been seriously impu`nned, 
as Scott Lithgow needed, `a whipping boy'. Accordingly, in a written defence, he 
demolished the Lower Clyde firm's arguments. Raper confirmed that the central 
weakness of the Scott Lithgow case was that it would still be dependent on the Mol) 
whether RFA orders were allocated or not. He bridled over the arrogance of- IZo 
Belch who he alleged had stated to him on a recent visit to the yard that naval \\ork 
was essential for Cartsburn and that, *Consultants have been suggested. but no one 
else can judge what we need'. Raper regarded this as being risible, and suggested 
that management and workforce should get together and work out a strategy to 
replace the firm's dependence on naval work. He realised, as did Scott Lithgow that 
redundancies would no doubt occur in any event when the export market for Oberon 
submarines ended. With no other design of submarine to sell, he argued that Scott 
Lithgow should tender for RFA contracts on the same basis as before. Moreover. 
Raper acknowledged that he had only been allowed to go this far because the Roy al 
Navy faced an extremely serious situation in the new construction programme. 
Hovw-ever, although Scott Lithgow management had never openly declared that civil 
disobedience could occur as a result of MoD policy, nonetheless, the imputation \\&s 
there. Raper concluded by predicting that if Scott Lithgo\\ maintained its stance on 
allocation of RFA work then this would lead nowhere. but to misery for us all, and 
- lu; in the long run for Scott Lithgow more than and one els . 
275 
On receipt of this missive, Scott Lithgow could have been left in no doubt 
whatsoever of the strength of MoD feeling. Accordingly. at a meeting with the 
Secretary of Defence.. Lord Carrington. Ross Belch accepted a formula that if Scott 
Lithgow remained competitive then it could expect a fair share of RFA orders. The 
firm was content to rely on an assurance, which Carrington confirmed that if the 
current policy changed, or if expectations were unfulfilled, then discussions would 
ensue at the highest level. Scott Lithgow, were, on this basis. prepared to wait and 
see. 108 Realistically, any other strategy, apart from liquidation. would ha" e been 
superfluous, particularly as fixed priced mercantile contracts were likely to prove 
disastrous. 
Contemporaneously, as the argument on RFA work raged, Scott I, ithgo\\ was 
finalising plans for a scheme to double its tanker output, a scheme %\ hick inevitably 
rested on substantial government monies being granted on the basis of employment 
considerations. At a meeting with Jack Rampton at the D. T. I. Belch and Boyd put 
the cost of reconstruction at around £15,000,000 and that it would request this sum 
in the form of grants and loans. To this obvious gambit, Rampton replied that his 
department would normally require fifty per cent of the cost to be met from Scott 
Lithgow's own resources, to which Boyd with tongue in cheek stated that, ,N ou cant 
take the breeks [trousers] off a Highlandman'. 109 When Scott Lithgoww got around to 
publicly announcing its expansion plans it revealed that the rationale behind the 
scheme was to meet the challenge of Japanese and Swedish builders by doubling 
steel output. However, Ross Belch reiterated that with its present facilities Scott 
Lithgow was only able to produce one large tanker per year, and accordingly, the 
firm could not, `live on that'. 110 Scott Lithgow had in mind the creation of a ne\\ 
sub assembly shop across the road from the newly re-aligned A8, a new panel line 
and fabrication facilities, and a new crane able to handle 300-ton sections. By this 
stage grandiose plans to create a new shipyard centred on the James Watt Dock, at a 
cost of £40,000,000 had not surprisingly been shelved. It followed from Belch's mw 11 
admission that if the new scheme was not undertaken then the optimum use of the 
present facilities was fundamental. With four giant tankers now on order, Maritime 
Fruit Carriers had ordered another two by September 1973, improvements in 
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productivity were essential. However, by initially undertaking what in effect was an 
intermediate option in the Glen yard re-development, Scott Lithgoww's horizons in 
the giant tanker market had been limited from the outset. Although the firm did haN c 
an ultimate plan in mind, realistically this had always depended on substantial 
Government aid. Moreover. any private funding. whether from Scotts' or Lithgows. 
given Scott Lithgow's trading losses. or by a combination of banks was highly 
unlikely, and the future was even more uncertain if the Labour Party was to be 
returned to power. 
Nationally, at a meeting in June 1973, between Chris Chata« av and the SRNA 
including Ross Belch, the shipbuilders put their case for further capital assistance. : 
case that the Minister recognised in that more generous terms than those applicable 
under the Industry Act had been asked for, rested on the employment argument. 
Why else, in Chataway's words, `should shipbuilding be treated any differently from 
any other industry'? Of the possible forms of investment discussed it wwas confirmed 
that under the Industry Act regional grants of twenty-two per cent available in 
Development Areas (such as Greenock and Port Glasgow) were included in the 
normal maximum of fifty-five per cent of the cost of any project in which assistance 
could be provided. The SRNA, however, wanted an additional grant of ten pcr cent 
or an improvement in the duration and terms of loans and stressed the need for a 
three-year moratorium on repayments. Furthermore, the threat of nationalisation if 
the Labour Party came to power was also mentioned, thus it was stressed that 
assistance should be given in a format that would support private investors at the 
present time. In conclusion, Chataway welcomed the frank exchange of views, but in 
effect promised little more than to make a statement to the House of Commons in 
due course. IIIA week later on the day after Scott Lithgow made its expansion plans 
public; the Labour Party announced that if returned at the next General Election, it 
would nationalise the shipbuilding industry under a centralised National 
Shipbuilding Corporation. 112 
In the interim, however, shortages of steelworkers had held up progress on the bo\\ 
section of the first super tanker under constriction, _V /ess 
SCOt. S1juill, later to be 
renamed 1Voi'dic Clansman, leading to a launch date some two months 
later than 
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expected. This hardly augured well for the future tanker programme. %vhikh had been 
further augmented by an order in December 1973 from a Greek owner. 
Angelicoussis for two 135,000 deadweight ton crude oil tankers to be built at the 
Kingston yard. With almost all of Scott Lithgow's vessels badly delayed. Ross Belch 
had earlier informed the local Boilermakers delegate that the acute shortage of 
steelworkers in the firm had now become critical. Prior to this Belch had to take men 
from one production unit to another to prioritise construction with the result that he 
was in effect continuously `robbing Peter to pay Paul'. Moreover. in respect of new 
development, Belch also recognised that it would be crazy to do this if the firm 
could not even man the facilities that it had at the present. On the other hand. 
however, if they did not build new facilities then Scott Lithgoýý would be unable to 
compete internationally. 113 In short, this was the essential paradox that faced Scott 
Lithgow. Shortly afterwards, in a typically paternalistic gesture, Scott I ithgo« 
provided a loan of £25,000 at a rate of interest of five per cent per annum ov cr se\ cn 
years for the Boilermakers Society to purchase a social club for its members in 
Greenock. 114 
With the OPEC price hike, when the oil states first trebled then quadrupled the price 
of crude oil by January 1974, demand collapsed precipitating falling freight rates. 
cancellations, and a freefall in the tanker market. Combined with supply restrictions 
and the termination of the Bretton Woods system that had underpinned much of the 
postwar monetary consensus during the Long Boom, the international outlook for 
tankers in particular was decidedly bad. In tandem with an increasing incidence of 
strikes in Britain in the midst of an energy crisis the imposition of a three-day 
working week by Government was not far off. For Scott Lithgow, the decision to 
enter the giant tanker market already had profound implications for the future of the 
company in terms of losses. and in this light the pressure on delivery dates to get 
loss making orders off the books as quickly as possible would be even more intense. 
In this gloomy climate, Scott Lithgow's consolidated accounts for the year ended 31 
December 1973 showed a deficit for the year of £ 1,809,132 which added to the 
adverse balance brought forward from the previous year of £8,438.276 gave an 
adverse balance to be carried for\% and of £ 10,047,408. Ho\\ ev er. in an about turn, the 
firm did decide to make provision for future losses amounting to £9,361.000 on 
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outstanding loss making contracts likely to be delivered in the next nine months. Of 
this figure, £2,1 11,000 was reflected in the deficit for the year. t2.250.000 in the 
restated deficit for 1972, and £5.000.000 in the restated adverse balance brought 
forward from 1971. The Directors were. however. still of the opinion that the 1974 
grants and estimated profits on more recent contracts would substantiall\ exceed 
future losses. Accordingly, with a return to more standard accounting practice. the 
firm's auditors for the first time did not qualify its accounts. 15 Given the magnitude 
of the loss provisions, however, it is likely that discussions \\ ith the auditors must 
have been intense. 
In the interim, the position on the naval front had changed alarmingly owing to a 
successful United States of America-backed illegal military coup against the 
democratically elected government of Chile. which it will be recalled had two 
Oberon submarines under construction at Scott Lithgow. A coup that the 
Conservative government of Ted Heath accepted with indecent haste. whilst at the 
same time the military junta tortured and murdered thousands of its opponents in 
Chile. ' 16 With one submarine, O'Brien fitting out, and the other, Hiatt due to be 
launched in September 1973, the position on payment was obviously fluid, as as 
the question on eventual delivery. With Hyatt launched in the presence of a Chilean 
rear admiral and his wife, who had been taken in by a side entrance to avoid 
demonstrators, it later transpired that the quality of product offered in O'Brien 
deficient in many respects. Among a raft of justified complaints the vessel had failed 
its first run with main generators, and had also failed torpedo equipment trial and 
sonar tests. This had occurred despite repeated warnings from the Royal N avvoverseers 
on the failure of Scott Lithgow to introduce an adequate Dockside Test 
Organisation and to strengthen its middle management. 
117 Faced with manpower 
shortages, deficient planning structures and huge loss making contracts. Scott 
Lithgow's future was in the balance. However, the General Election of February 
1974, called by, Ted Heath on the question of who ran the country. the Government 
or Trades Unions, eventually produced a minority Labour Government pledged to 
nationalise the shipbuilding industry. 
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Scott Lithgow moves into oil-related work. 
With the OPEC hike in the price of crude oil. Britain's North Sea oilfields %\ ere by 
now a more attractive proposition than hitherto. However. the response of the 
shipbuilding industry for much of the previous decade to the oil related market had 
by and large been a disappointing one with only ten rigs completed. half of which 
were relatively unsophisticated jack up rigs built by one shipyard, John Brown .18 
By 1972, however, the consultants, IMEG had reported to the D. T. I. on future 
prospects for British involvement in the North Sea. Although the portents for the 
offshore market appeared to be good, it was nevertheless imperativ e that 
Government should encourage firms to enter the market as time was running out to 
establish a realistic British presence in the sector. IMEG. however, x\ ere not at all 
confident that the shipbuilding industry could rise to the challenge as prey ions 
experience had shown that offshore oil related work was a high risk business and 
was not really compatible with building ships in the same establishment. The report 
concluded that no British shipyard would voluntarily enter the offshore market, and 
that in consequence Government should take the lead and encourage the creation of 
a single establishment by giving it financial support, and that the selected yard, 
which would complement Marathon at Clydebank, should be indemnified against 
initial losses. 119 This, of course, presupposed that a Government alrcadv with its 
finger badly burnt in shipbuilding would be keen to back a speculativ c Venture and 
risk losing its arm. 
Clearly, IMEG had not envisaged that Scott Lithgow, which it had visited, would of 
all the major shipbuilding groups in Britain go it alone and develop a clear offshore 
strategy by attempting to diversify its product base away from loss-making tanker 
contracts. Scott Lithgow duly entered the offshore market by winning orders worth 
£3,600,000 from the Aberdeen based Seaforth Marine for two Offshore Supply 
Vessels (OSV) for its Ferguson Brothers Newark yard. 120 Although the move into 
offshore work had been contemplated for some time, the OSV orders prompted Ross 
Belch to publicly declare that Scott Lithgow hoped to make a tvv o-pronged entry into 
the potentially lucrative offshore market with the building of the most sophisticated 
oil rigs and the vessels to serve them. 
1`1 Howwwever, given the difficulties that Scott 
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Lithgow had already encountered in constructing giant tankers. and in light of 
admitted shortages of labour, it seemed that it would be prudent for Belch to hold 
fire on sophisticated oil rig platforms until the firm was properly geared to construct 
them in future. Moreover, the contracts were in all likelihood taken on at keen price 
to establish a foothold in the market, and Ferguson Brothers had not et built a 
vessel of the OSV type. Accordingly, it was likely that the initial learning curve 
would be steep. As the second small shipyard of Scott Lithgow. alike its smaller 
brother at Bowling, Fergusons, which had around 480 employees in 1972 kept a 
short order book, which in turn enabled a greater turn around at the berths. and to 
some extent kept the effects of inflation tolerable. Nevertheless, alike the parent 
company, Scott Lithgow, trading conditions had been difficult and the Newark 
yard's accounts showed a loss for the year ended 31 December 1971 of £ 178, ' 9 5. 
however, by the following year end a profit of £32.076 had been posted. This %\ as 
indicative of an upward trend in the Ferguson performance aided by construction 
grants, and by 1974, the firm had wiped out an adverse balance carried forward from 
the previous years of £201,777.122 
If Scott Lithgow was to enter the offshore structures market in a meaningful way at a 
later date, however, then Marathon, the Successor Company to UCS at Clydebank. 
provided a salutary lesson. In its first year of operation the Clydebank firm had built 
a relatively straightforward jack-up rig. but had posted a loss of £1.250,000. 
However, on the back of the OSV orders, Scott Lithgow's major entry into the 
offshore market was not long delayed as it was announced in March 1974 that it won 
an order worth £ 16,000,000 drill ship to a Dutch design from a partnership of the 
Ben Line of Leith and Odeco of New Orleans (Ben-Odeco). This sophisticated 
vessel would be dynamically positioned by means of lateral thrusters and two 
propellers to maintain position without recourse to anchors or seabed moorings. 
Again Belch went public and stated that the Scott Lithgow strategy was to establish 
series production of these sophisticated vessels, and that the Scott end of the 
operation would build them. 
12' Unfortunately. Scotts' Lithgovv s and Scott Lithgow 
Board Minutes are unavailable for the five-year period from 1973 to 1977, with the 
exception of one Board Meeting of Scott Lithgow in May 1973,1975 and 1977. As 
previously stated, however, these Board Minutes were deliberately sparse in any 
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event, and it is possible to discern the firm's strategy from other sources. Clearly . 
with the two OSV orders and the drill ship. Scott Lithgow intended to initially 
concentrate on offshore shipshape vessels rather than on platforms. By this stage, 
however, the firm's first giant tanker, and loss maker. Nordic Clansmen had been 
successfully joined up and named by Lady Inchcape, who had asked for an 
aluminium horsebox for her gift rather than the traditional piece of jewellery. After 
her trials, the tanker made for Lisbon to dry dock, as no facilities were big enough to 
accommodate her in Britain. 124 
After the previous Conservative Government's disgraceful attitude to the Chilean 
military dictatorship, the new Labour Government soon announced that all aid 
would be suspended to Chile, as would new armaments licences. However, 
somewhat pragmatically, it did decide to go ahead with the sale of mo warships and 
the two Scott Lithgow submarines, Hyatt and O'Brien. Although the engineers union 
the AEU had ordered its members to boycott work on Chilean contracts, Scott 
Lithgow engineers refused as they felt that if they did, no other work would be 
available for them. The submarine, O'Brien was finally handed over to the Chileans 
on 24 July 1974, but remained at Greenock. Nevertheless. with a diversified order 
book, the firm still remained desperately short of labour with 1,000 jobs available, 
and in this light Ross Belch had earlier bemoaned the tactics of firms engaged in 
offshore work in attracting skilled labour as, `little less than sheer piracy'. The firm 
had already lost 300 steelworkers in the previous year, and another 130 had left in 
the first five months of 1974. By September, after a two-hour meeting with the 
Conservative Party leader, Ted Heath, Sir William Lithgow accepted the former 's 
invitation to become his industrial adviser in Scotland. However. with Labour again 
going to the country in October, the first time that two General Elections had been 
held in the same year since 1910, the situation with nationalisation remained fluid. 
Just days before the election, Scott Lithgow announced that it won an order worth 
£50,000,000 for two dynamically positioned drill ships from Pacific Norse Shipping 
a company registered in Bermuda and headed by an old established customer.: -\tle 
Jebsen of Bergen. 
12 5 Clearly, bespoke linkages were an important factor in winning 
this order. Again, this order was for a sophisticated vessel was probably taken on at 
a very keen price that would leave little margin for error. 
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Disaster strikes 
Beforehand, however, a potentially disastrous situation had arisen o% el- the Chilean 
submarine, O'Brien, when it was discovered that insulation on pressure tight cables 
manufactured by BICC Limited to the Director General Ships specification 213 and 
installed in a Brazilian Oberon submarine by Vickers had failed. Arising from this. 
Scott Lithgow engineers examined the same pressure tight cables on O'Brien and 
found them to be similarly faulty. Scott Lithgow were then ordered to strip out all of 
the suspect cables and replace it. This would have entailed the removal of the 
majority of the submarine's equipment and its replacement at a cost of around 
£1,400,000 after all the cables had been installed. As this would have taken a\ ear or 
so to accomplish, Scott Lithgow sought an agreement with the Chileans \ herch\ the 
former would be released from their obligation to strip out and replace the cables by 
repairing them at a cost of £469,528. The firm would also supply a new set of 
replacement cables at a cost of £52,961, and pay to the Chileans, £500,000 in 
compensation and also provide them with technical assistance up to a cost limit of 
£25,000. Similarly, the pressure tight cables were also stripped out of Hiatt. which 
was at an advanced stage of construction at a cost of around £947,000. Similar 
remedial action had also to be undertaken in respect of the Australian submarine, 
RAN Orion, which at September 1974 was partly built at an estimated cost of 
around £221,005 and resulted in a substantial delay in construction and in payment. 
Fortunately, in respect of RAN Otama, the last of the four submarines in various 
stages of construction at Scott Lithgow. although the pressure tight cables 
had been 
delivered they had not been installed. Nevertheless, replacement costs «giere 
estimated at around £80,000 and would again result in a substantial 
delay. 126 Each 
submarine had around five and a half miles of electrical cable. 
All this. coming at a 
stage when estimated profits on submarines had been 
banked upon to offset losses 
elsewhere in Scott Lithgow, had a severe effect on the 
firm. Not only in the 
disruption to its programme at Cartsburn, but also on the inflationary effects of a 
substantial delay in a period of rising costs and consequent 
disruption to the two 
RFA vessels and the Underwater Research Vessel. Despite the 
fact that these cables 
were MoD (N) approved 
items, the buck effectively stopped with Scott Lithgow. 
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Litigation against the manufacturer was the only option open to recover the 
substantial sums spent on obtaining replacement cable from another manutacturer 
and refitting it, in addition to seeking damages against BICC for the subsequent 
disruption to the building programme. 
Following on from the difficult trading conditions in a year of continuing high 
inflation where twenty-eight working days had been lost as a result of the imposition 
of a three-day working week by the Conservative Government. the financial position 
offered little respite. Scott Lithgow's consolidated accounts for the year ended 31 
December 1974, although the firm made a tiny profit of £136,069, showed v et more 
loss provisions. Provision had been made in the 1973 accounts for estimated future 
losses on outstanding contracts amounting to £9,361,000 of which E3.881,000 had 
been credited to profit and loss account to offset losses on completed contracts for 
1974, leaving a balance of £5,480,000. The Directors, however. \t ere of the opinion 
that a provision of £8,205,000 was required in the 1974 accounts to cover 
anticipated losses on contracts still outstanding and therefore a further provision of 
£2,725,000 was made. This left an adverse balance to be carried forward of to the 
1975 accounts of £9,911,339.127 It will be recalled that tapering construction grants 
had only been made available for the three years from 1972 to 1974. Given this then. 
the former strategy that estimated future profits and construction grants would 
eventually outweigh losses on fixed price contracts had not proven to be correct. 
Clearly, labour shortages, which by this stage had become serious, and the lack of 
any real centralised production planning department with complete power over 
production had combined with high inflation to place the firm in a perilous situation. 
From now on it was extremely doubtful in the extreme that profitable contracts 
would outweigh the debilitating effects of ongoing losses as a result of unprofitable 
contracts taken on at fixed prices. 
Meanwhile, Scott Lithgow's labour problems \vere put into sharp focus as a Public 
Inquiry had been opened into the siting of a John Laing oil platform production 
complex, which had already been given planning permission by Dunbartonshire 
County Council across the Clyde at Portkil, near Kilgreggan. Scott Lithýgovv. as a 
matter of course strongly opposed this, as the probability vas that evcn more skilled 
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labour would be lost if the site were approved. In evidence. Ross Belch stated that 
the potential damage to the company's labour force of a high \z age complex in eas\ 
reach, would be irreparable, and in support he informed that half of his fir111's sheet 
metal workforce had already been attracted to the new Hunterston B nuclear power 
station. His colleague. Frank Grant pointed out that in 1973. a total of £3,760 had 
been spent on advertising by Scot Lithgow to attract more labour with the result that 
only fifty-eight men were recruited. The following year £5.000 had been spent to 
recruit even fewer employees as the firm took on only thirty-eight lmmeni. In the event, 
the Portkil proposal was eventually rejected and permission to build accordingl; 
refused, which was just as well given the proximity of the proposed site to Scott 
Lithgow by boat. 128 
By March 1975, however, Wedgwood Benn had announced, somc«hat prematurely 
as it turned out owing to the strength of Conservative Oppositions pathological 
hatred of nationalisation in both Houses of Parliament, which had the support of the 
industry, that shipbuilding would be brought under public control in the next \ car. 129 
A week later, Benn stated that the industry had to be led in a different wti ay by people 
who were committed to the success of the industry within the public sector. Even at 
this stage, this vision was fatally flawed, as it would be precisely the same people in 
situ under public control that had brought the industry to nationalisation in the birst 
place. Benns solution to this was that trade unions should sink their historical 
differences and work together with management under public control. Consequently, 
`industrial democracy' would bring a new and harmonious relationship between 
workers and management at Board level in an industry that had hitherto been the 
antithesis of such a scenario. Benn, did, however, recognise that if this did not take 
place on a practicable basis, `then the industry [would] remain as it is-a mirror image 
of private ownership with little changing except the ownership of the capital assets 
concerned'. "0 
Meanwhile. the crisis in the tanker market had continued vrirtually unabated, and by 
June had led the Greek owner, Angelicoussis, to unilaterally cancel the mo14.000 
deadweight ton tankers on order from the Kingston yard. The tankers \v ere in an\ 
event at the end of the Scott Lithgovvv order book and vtiere due to be delivered in late 
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1977 and 1978. Given the dire performance thus far on the mo super tankers this 
was in all probability a blessing in disguise. In June, Lithgows celebrated with a 
100th anniversary party to commemorate the launching of its first vessel. 
Commonwealth with its oldest serving employee in attendance. a se% enty -four year 
old plater, Thomas Moore, who had been employed by the firm for sixt% years. That 
month, Scott Lithgow Drydocks had won an order to convert a former Ne« Zealand 
merchant vessel, Monowai into a hydrographic survey ship for the Royal New 
Zealand Navy at a reported cost of £7,000,000, and the Underwater Research Vessel. 
Newton had been launched at the Cartsburn yard. 131 By, this stage however. the first 
OSV Seaforth Jarl, had been launched at Fergusons but had proven to be ý et another 
loss maker. Loss provisions had been made in the Ferguson 1974 accounts 
amounting to £335,000 and by September, Belch had enquired whether the senior 
staff at Fergusons had been strengthened to cope adequately with complex 'one-off 
vessels? In response, the changes made in recent months in technical and 
administrative management were outlined. Although it was not always practical 
given the yard's short order book to carry out tank tests, Belch nevertheless 
requested that this should be undertaken whenever untried hull or propulsion 
features arose. This admonition was in all probability in reference to a research 
vessel, Scotia, for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, which was later taken 
out of service due to excessive vibration. Moreover, Belch stated that the loss on 
Seafbrth Jail would be `substantial'. 132 
A month earlier, the cable disaster had been finally made public %\ hen the Australian 
Minister of Defence, Bill Morrison had stated that owing to a two-year delay in 
construction of the submarines RAN Orion and Otama that he would never again 
place an order with that, `Goddamn shipyard. "" By this stage, however, a year later 
on from the discovery of the faulty cables, Scott Lithgow had only received 
replacement cables for the two Chilean submarines, and were still a« aiting cables 
for the two Australian craft. Michael Scott, nevertheless, remained ' incensed ' at 
Morrison's remarks, and `utterly heart sick to find [Scott Lithgow]-an innocent 
party- in the middle of an affair which so adversely effects the RAN'. Scott, 
however, turned down an Australian offer to supply replacement cable. His reason 
was that as the second Chilean submarine, Hiatt came before R. 4, \' Orion and Otaina 
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in the building programme, it therefore had to be rewired before similar work on the 
latter two submarines commenced. The building programme at Scott' and the 
labour situation would not allow work to commence in parallel: therefore the oiler to 
replace the cable would not bring delivery forward, and had already been discussed 
in various meetings between the parties at Australia House and at Cartsburn. 134 
Nevertheless, the resultant publicity had impacted negatively on Scott Lithgow's 
reputation as a builder of conventional submarines. and in all probability had holed 
the firm's future export potential below the water line. 
Concurrently, due to the economic climate, Ross Belch had announced that Scott 
Lithgow would cut its summer intake of apprentices by half, and later confessed that 
only half of the apprentices recruited for training in 1970 still worked in the firm's 
shipyards. Nevertheless, Belch was able to recruit another one hundred bo\ s t'rorn 
September 1975 due to cash aid from the Shipbuilding Industry Training Board and 
a further fifty at the firm's own expense. In the interim, however, upriver at the 
nationalised Govan Shipbuilders, Government largesse continued with a further 
injection of taxpayers monies, this time to the tune of £17.200,000 and the limit for 
support was also extended for another two and a half years to the end of 1979. This 
brought the total expended on Govan to £54,400,000 since it had been formed from 
the wreckage of UCS in 1972. To compound this it had earlier been announced that 
the second drill ship order from Pacific Norse was in the balance. Ross Belch. who 
had been elected President of the SRNA, a year earlier, now pleaded in this capacity 
in October 1975 for a speedy resolution by Government to help the industry. With 
the industry in effect in limbo as the nationalisation process lumbered on, Belch 
stated that unless the matter was quickly resolved then there would soon be little or 
no shipbuilding left in the country with vast implications for unemployment in 
shipbuilding areas. Against a background where orders placed in British shipyards in 
the first two quarters of the year totalled a meagre 33,000 gross registered tons set 
against an annual output of 1,000,000 gross registered tons, Belch's concern was 
evident. By November, however, the second super tanker. Nordic Clansman had 
been named and work was underway on the third, and in December, Princess Anne 
launched RAN Otamna, the last of the six Oberon class submarines- built for the Ro\ al 
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As for 1974, Scott Lithgow's consolidated accounts for the year ended 1 December 
1975 showed a profit, this time of £220.729. which left an ad,, eise balance to be 
carried forward of £9,690,610. Of loss provision made in the previous accounts of 
£8,205,000 of which £6,003,000 had been credited to profit and loss account to 
offset losses on contracts completed in 1975, a balance of £2.202,000 was left. The 
Directors were, however, of the opinion that a provision of £2.644.000 was required 
to cover anticipated losses on contracts still outstanding, and in this regard a further 
net provision of £442,000 was made. Credit had been taken. however, in the 
accounts for the balance of instalments received on two cancelled contracts for 
Angelicoussis after deducting costs incurred and estimated sub contractors claims 
arising for an amount of £1,500,000 being the estimated surplus arisinu on the 
cancellation. A provision of £ 1,000,000 was also made against possible losses 
arising on the cancellation of suspended contracts. Understandably, the firm's 
auditors were unable to express an opinion owing to the uncertainty relating to the 
final outcome of these contracts, and made their reservation known. 13(i 
Just how bad the situation was for British shipbuilding, however, was confirmed 
when the SRNA figures for orders received in 1975 totalled a barely believable lo« 
of 67,000 gross registered tons, and of this total, only eleven per cent \v as from 
British owners. By February 1976, Scott Lithgow's first drillship, Ben Ocean Lancer 
had been launched at Cartsdyke after its initial launch date had been postponed due 
to high winds, leaving PacNorse I under construction. With the future of the third 
drillship still in doubt. however, and just before Ross Belch departed for India to 
attend the opening ceremony of the Kochin shipyard that Scott Lithgow had helped 
to build and develop, it was announced that Maritime Fruit Carriers were in default 
of loans. '7 It will be recalled that the two remaining super tanker orders at Scott 
Lithgow were for MFC with one under construction and the steel ordered for the 
other. With Nvork well advanced on the first, Scott Lithgow decided to carry on 
building, however, the dire situation in British shipbuilding continued, with the 
industry winning under two per cent of world orders for the first quarter of 1976. To 
compound this, almost ninety-four per cent of all mercantile orders placed by British 
shipowners in the quarter went to Japan. 
ý'S The extent, howw evver. of the tiIFC debacle 
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was that thirty-five per cent of all British orders. although some of these 's ere for 
options to build, were for the troubled firm. 139 
By June, however, it had finally dawned on the Government in the person of the 
Industry Minister, Eric Varley who told trade unionists that the shipbuilding industry 
was witnessing a major structural change in demand. which could last for y cars. 
Consequently, the prospect for future orders was bleak, and Varlev admitted that. 
`shipbuilding was the greatest industrial problem facing Britain today'. 1 The grave 
situation facing the mercantile builders, at last smoked out the cosseted warship 
builders led by Sir Eric Yarrow who put forward three alternatives to avoid 
nationalisation, which at this stage was being fought tooth and nail by the 
Conservatives in Parliament. First, the Government should drop the Bill, but use its 
powers under the Industry Acts to reorganise and rationalise the mercantile sector. 
Second, the Government could redraft the Bill, by excluding the warship builders 
and some ship repairers from its provisions. And third, the industrial Darwinisin 
option of rejecting nationalisation and letting firms sink or swim on an individual 
basis. In the interim, Scott Lithgow continued its discussions with Government to try 
to secure the third drillship order, but the process had again stalled when it was 
revealed that the Offshore Supplies Office had confirmed that a consortium who had 
been prepared to take it on had decided against a financial package involv ing a 
Government grant. 141 
By August 1976, Hyatt had been commissioned at a private ceremonv. six %cars 
after it had been ordered and two years later than promised for delivery,. O'Brien had 
finally left the Clyde a month earlier, but Hyatt would remain for some time to 
come. In the interim negotiations had been progressing with the MoD over a 
£20,000,000 order for a specialist seabed operations vessel (SOV), and Fergusons 
was in the process of completing its last firm order. a small bulk carrier. Bespoke 
linkages, however, again saved the day when Jebsen (UK) Limited ordered two mini 
bulk carriers with an option for another two to service the company's operations 
in 
the North Sea. In November in a launch speech of the bulk carrier. Julahivar. the 
sixteenth vessel built for the Indian Company, Scindia over 
half a ccntury . Sir 
William Lithgow railed against nationalisation. He stated, 'what a poor dead 
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substitute is all the phoney paternalism of the giant corporation. What hypocrisy will 
next be perpetrated in the name of public accountability? The public interest is 
merely the sum of individual interests. There is no substitute for being personally 
accountable to each other'. Sir William then observed that this would probably be 
the last time that he would preside over a launch from what had been for over one 
hundred years a family shipyard. A week later his mood had not lightened when he 
accused Britain as being, `a nation of intellectual bankrupts' and Scotland as being, 
`the homeland of hypocrisy'. In this regard, he called for nothing less than a Cultural 
Revolution to save Britain. Clearly, the dire situation of the shipbuilding industry 
and of Scott Lithgow, which had to contend with soaring inflation over the past three 
years, had made its imprint on Sir William. A situation confirmed by the Chief 
Executive Designate of the proposed British Shipbuilding Corporation, Graham 
Day, who had stated in a speech at Glasgow that his first priority in taking over the 
industry in the next year would simply be survival. In a damning indictment of the 
Labour Government and the Civil Service, Day stated that it had no overall policy 
for shipbuilding before it was due to be taken over, thus local crises would be 
tackled by the Department of Industry on an individual basis. With 3,000 tons of 
steel lying unused at Scott Lithgow, the situation over the third MFC tanker and the 
third drill ship remained unresolved, however, the first RFA vessel. Fort George 
was named in December, with another RFA vessel, Fort Austin still under 
construction. Before the end of the year, however, the first MFC super tanker, \\ hich 
in effect had been built speculatively, but stage payments had been made by the 
Bank of Scotland as guarantor, had been sold to the Greek shipowner, Niarchos for a 
reported price of £20,000,000.142 
After two years of modest trading profits, given what had occurred during the year it 
was hardly surprising that Scott Lithgow's consolidated accounts for the year ended 
31 December 1976 showed a trading loss of £883.243. Provision had been made in 
the 1975 accounts for estimated future losses on outstanding contracts amounting to 
£2,644,000 of which £540,000 had been credited to profit and loss account to offset 
losses on contracts completed in 1976 leaving a balance of £2,104,000. The 
Directors made a further provision of £6,132,000 to cover anticipated losses on 
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outstanding contracts including those taken on during the year. Accordingly. a 
further net provision of £4,028,000 was made. 143 
With the future of the industry still undecided with the process of nationalisation 
dragging on after three years, in February 1977. the Government announced a 
Shipbuilding Intervention Scheme worth £65,000.000. This Scheme. in effect. 
hinged on a firm having a concrete prospect of an order, but only when that order 
required a lower tender than could be met by the firm's own resources. 
Consequently, in March 1977 Scott Lithgow obtained a grant under the Scheme of 
£5,000,000 to complete the second MFC super tanker for another Niarchos offshoot. 
Dexter Shipping Company for the purchase of the tanker as an export contract 
payable in cash, not credit. In all this it was likely that Scott Lithgo« had to put up a 
considerable sum of money on this deal, but just how much remains unclear. By 
March 1977, however, the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill had finally been given the 
Royal Assent, with vesting day for the new State Corporation, British Shipbuilders. 
earmarked for 1 July 1977. Scott Lithgow's troubles continued, however, %% hen the 
first drill ship, Ben Ocean Lancer had been rejected in April by her charterers 
Chevron, as it was already three months late in delivery. Belch put the delaa\ down to 
design changes and other matters outwith Scott Lithgow's control. again the matter 
was likely to take months to be resolved. With the second, and ultimately last, drill 
ship, PacNorse I also launched in that month, Belch stated that Scott Lithgo\\ had 
proved beyond doubt that it had the skills and technology to build these 
sophisticated vessels. And, moreover, that in this light it could build the proposed 
Seabed Operations Vessel as no other yard in Britain could do it. In June, Scott 
Lithgow duly obtained a design and development contract for the SOV, which if 
successful could lead to an order worth £20,000,000. Meanwhile, Oraya, a general 
cargo vessel for Furness Withy became the last ship launched at Scott Lithgow 
before nationalisation. 144 
Given the long road to merger and nationalisation, labour shortages. the lack of 
capitalisation and a truly integrated approach to production planning, Scott Lithgoww 
had done remarkably well to surv'iv'e thus far. The move into giant tanker 
construction on which most of the losses and loss provisions were made 
had 
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promised much, but had delivered little and had prompted the firm to enter an 
offshore market that would become increasingly sophisticated. With the likelihood 
that inherited losses could drag the firm further down into a spiral of losses. the 
future for the nationalised undertaking was anything but rosy. With the last 
submarine on order nearing completion. the warship situation had been compounded 
by the cabling disaster, and had left the Scott end of the firm in a highly vulnerable 
situation. Moreover, with the Oberon getting decidedly long in the tooth, and with 
no real prospect at this stage of another craft of newer design and capability on the 
horizon, warship orders could no longer be relied upon. It seemed that the firm's last 
real hope would be to make a real go of the offshore market and to `'ear its 
production towards it. With the situation as it was, given the likelihood of increased 
losses, there is little doubt that nationalisation had saved Scott Lithgo v by 
prolonging its life. It remained to be seen, as British Shipbuilders assumed 
responsibility for the Lower Clyde group, just what the real extent of the firm's 
financial situation was of what had remained since 1711 in the case of Scotts' and 
1874 in the case of Lithgows, family enterprises. That the component companies had 
survived at all to Vesting Day as Scott Lithgow, despite the fact that the individual 
firms had to a large extent ploughed their own particular furrows was also an 
achievement in itself. Indeed, Scott Lithgow had survived albeit with on the %N hole 
little Government support compared with the millions of pounds expended by the 
State on four large shipbuilding establishments, Cammell Laird, Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders and its successor, Govan Shipbuilders, and the money pit of Harland & 
Wolff at Belfast. 
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Chapter VII: Nationalisation to Privatisation, 1977-1984 
By Vesting Day on 1 July 1977, in addition to Scotts Engine Works, Cartsburn. 
Cartsdyke and Bowling shipyards, and Lithgows Glen. Kingston and Ferguson 
Brothers Newark yards, Scott Lithgow's shiprepairing arm. Scott Lithgow Drydocks 
was also nationalised. This was on the basis that it formed an integral part of Scott 
Lithgow's operations, as did Caledonia Joinery, Caledonia Fabrications, and two 
other recently formed small companies, Newark Ferguson Limited. and Coati al 
Engineering. The temporarily London-based State Corporation, British Shipbuilders 
(BS), was now responsible for all the major shipbuilders, a sizeable amount of ship 
repairers and marine engineering firms in the country. 
During the seemingly interminable march to nationalisation it had been decided as a 
matter of policy not to over-centralise the functions of BS in its formative stage. ' 
Accordingly, all the larger firms had a degree of autonomy, 'in line with the general 
policy on decentralisation and free competition', which in any case was enshrined in 
Section 5 of the Act. 3 From the outset a number of Chief Executive's of individual 
firms, including Ross Belch, had a place on the Board of BS. as did, in the name of 
industrial democracy, a trade unionist, Ken Griffin. Belch's view, however. was that 
there was `no great enthusiasm on either side for a rigid form of industrial 
democracy'. On pay, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, had informed 
the BS Chairman, Admiral Griffin that he would expect that BS (whose overall 
responsibility for industrial relations was enshrined in the Act) would strictly adhere 
to Government pay policy with the exception of self-financing productivity schemes 
and possible pension improvements. 4 Given the parlous state of the industry. 
however, centralisation in BS had surely to increase, as little foresight was required 
to see that inherited losses could seriously undermine any attempt at profitability. 
Commercial prudence would also dictate that BS would naturally wish to investigate 
the basis of financial forecasts, particularly the extent of loss provisions in its 
constituent firms. Furthermore, different rates of pay in these firms were all but 
guaranteed to be a source of considerable friction, particularly with Scott Lithoo%\ 
employees over the long-running sore of pay parity with their Upper Clyde 
counterparts. Indeed, it was difficult to contemplate how Scott Lithgo%% could 
continue for any length of time to justify a pay gap 
in a nationalised setting. In the 
short-term, however, the firm could certainly offload responsibility 
for this to BS 
Soo 
and rely on Government-inspired pay restraint policy to effectivel\ dampen 
expectations. 
During the initial period of nationalisation, Michael Scott and Sir William L, ithgm\ 
remained on the Board of Scott Lithgow as they awaited compensation for 
nationalisation on the basis of 1974 values of individual firms. By, 19 July 1977. 
however, it had been announced that Scott Lithgow's former ultimate holding 
company, Scotts' of Greenock (1711) Limited was to be , wN holly taken over by the 
London-based John Swire & Sons, who prior to nationalisation already owned a 
third of its ordinary shares. The consideration would be determined hý the amount of 
compensation received from the Government by Scotts' as an unlisted holding 
company, which formerly held the majority of shares in Scott [ithgow. ' Py :, \ugust. 
the second half of the third super tanker to be built at the Glen yard, ITorld Scorc', 
for the Niarchos offshoot, Dolman Shipping had been launched. This left the fourth, 
and ultimately last super tanker to be built at the Glen yard, World . Scholar for 
another Niarchos company, Dexter Shipping. By this stage, however, it had been 
noted that Scott Lithgow was in competition with five other UK firms to construct 
an Emergency Support Vessel (ESV) for BP. Indeed, Mike Anketell-Jones for the oil 
major had indicated that `various pressures were already building up on BP to ensure 
that the vessel was built in the UK'. In this regard, Anketell-Jones had mentioned 
that in passing that the Shipbuilding Intervention Fund (SIF) might be used to bridge 
the gap between UK and Japanese prices, but Belch found this unlikely. 
Nevertheless, Anketell-Jones indicated that BP would ultimately hold the chosen 
yard totally responsible for the performance of the ESV. but also admitted that 
nothing like it had yet been built. Although the ESV was a `complicated animal' 
Belch believed that it was a very real project that Scott Lithgow must try to win. 
BP, however, had in mind delivery in 1979, but Belch believed this was `totally 
impossible', in view of lead time for equipment and to the complicated nature of the 
vessel. Indeed, at this stage Belch thought that the earliest delivery date would be the 
6 
second half of 1980, but that this would have to be carefully assessed. 
By September 1977, Belch had been informed that three financial experts from BS, 
Reg Arnell, Philip Hares and Bob Hutchinson vVou1d be visiting Scott I. ithgo%v 
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shortly to look at forecast outcome predictions on vessels under construction. 
Moreover, a large order from Poland for BS as a «hole was in the pipeline. with the 
emphasis being placed on strict delivery date compliance. In this light. Belch «as 
hopeful that some orders for Polish mini bulk carriers might be allocated to 
Fergusons. Contemporaneously, the initial emphasis on decentralisation was already 
under threat as BS had informed its constituent firms that owing to Treasury 
pressure, no individual yard wage offers could be made without the positive 
authorisation of Government. Predictably. as Admiral Griffin noted in October, the 
operation of this procedure was having a seriously damaging effect within the 
industry. Again, this was entirely foreseeable due to the myriad number of separate 
bargaining units, wage structures and demarcations within constituent shipyards. In 
short, timely approval from Government was proving to be impossible. Employ e 
frustration with local management was mounting, as was employer frustration that 
their hands were effectively tied in negotiating, as they now had no power to settle 
claims. Accordingly, Griffin again noted that the provisions for decentralisation of 
management and decision making in Section 5 of the Act were in danger of 
becoming an empty formula. 7 
The naval situation 
As with the first Chilean submarine, O'Brien, Scott Lithgoyv's problems continued 
with the second, Hyatt, when the MoD (N) representative, Euan Haig, unilaterally' 
sent a list of complaints on the firm's performance to his superiors at Bath. Although 
overall basic functions of quality assurance had been executed in accordance with 
the Quality Plan for Hyatt, it was noted that quality assurance was only as good as 
the coverage undertaken, and in Scotts' case this was, `often inadequate'. Somewhat 
bizarrely, expensive items of equipment such as periscopes and masts were left 
unprotected and unexamined after installation. Moreover, Haig alleged that Scotts' 
had on numerous occasions failed to reassure the Chileans of the quality of build and 
fittings on the submarine, but nevertheless had the gall to criticise the customer 
for 
failing to be reassured. There was also a disturbing tendency in the programme of 
construction to let major and minor events slip, although 
11i, (at was completed 
within a few days of the set date before the cable 
disaster had been disco\ Bred. I laig 
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also noted that, `there was (and is) an underlying habit of leaving too many defects 
undone and this was indeed the cause of failures. Clearly. according to Haig. Scotts' 
quality assurance function was undermanned. and the firm's professional standards 
were not high enough. Furthermore, Scotts' practice was to work in conditions that 
were often `dirty and cluttered', with little formal planning. Nevertheless, Hv utt \`-as 
completed to a satisfactory material standard and finish but these approaches to 
submarine work in Haig's view, did not produce consistent results. Haig evidenced. 
RAN Orion, which in the last six months of her programme had slipped many weeks 
due to failed inspections and trials. Scotts' approach to planning w\ as also deficient 
in the sense that the tendency was to fix unrealistic dates to keep up the pressure to 
produce. The virtual absence of short-term planning was, however, `almost w. holly 
offset' by sound professional knowledge and judgement built up on previous 
experience. Nonetheless, the firm's weaknesses lay in `longer-term manpower and in 
investment in production facilities rather than in technical or shipbuilding expertise'. 
Concurrently, though, Scotts' were now more aware than before of the need to 
improve on cleanliness, which Haig hoped would result in less damage to 
equipment, such as scoring on the attack periscope on RAN Orion. Similarly, 
cleanliness on the two fleet replenishment vessels, RFA Fort Austin and RF A Fore 
Grange had improved. Scotts' had also began to produce detailed short-term plans 
leading to major events such as the basin dive on RAN Otama. This had led to a 
marked improvement even though it was a bit late in the day, but the firm had also 
accepted that the rate of clearing defects was too slow. 8 
The majority of Haig's observations, apart from not notifying Scott Lithgow of his 
intentions to criticise the firm to his superiors, were on the whole. constructive 
criticisms. Nevertheless, Ross Belch took great exception to them and wrote to the 
Principal Naval Overseer (Clyde), Bill Sanders to express his disapproval. Belch 
stated that unless the continual criticism of Scotts' stopped, then, far from the 
relationship between the firm and MoD (N) improving. the opposite will be the 
effect'. Belch refuted most of Haig' s assertions, and noted that RAN Orion was 
delivered, `within three weeks of the date given tvV-o years previously'. Neither did 
he accept that Scotts' worked in an environment any less sordid than in other UK 
yards. On cleanliness, Belch stressed that the two RFA vessels \\ cre being built to 
101 
commercial standards only, and did not reach the standard required on naval 
warships. On a more conciliatory note, however. Belch hoped the Scotts' staff would 
be encouraged rather than continually criticised, but sent a copy of his reply to \loI) 
(N) at Bath. 9 In reply, Sanders wrote that there was little point in letting all this get 
out of hand, and he had spoken accordingly to the senior figures at Bath explaining 
that Haig's comments were not meant to, 'indicate any new circumstances'. 10 
Consequently, at a later meeting to discuss the episode. Scotts agreed on the need to 
appoint a single co-ordinator for each project responsible for day-to-day activities. 
However, it was stated that the failure of a Ministry vessel to achieve the required 
standard at Acceptance, `must not occur again at Scotts'. This entire episode, 
although views on such issues as cleanliness were in all probability subjective. 
served to highlight the inherent lack of appreciation of properly supervised 
production planning at Scott Lithgow in general. Moreover, in respect of the RFA 
vessels, building to `commercial standards' covered up a multitude of sins. This 'ý as, 
however, by no means exclusive to Scott Lithgow, as there was a general tendency 
in the industry to do just enough and no more on commercial contracts. Furthermore. 
all of this served to stress the vulnerability of the future naval programme at the 
Cartsburn yard, particularly on submarine work. Due to the rundown on this work. 
and a changing sales mix with less engineering content, particularly at Ferguson, and 
at Scott of Bowling, Belch had informed a union representative. Bolton that a 
surplus of fifty fitters had arisen and that discussion on redundancies would ensue. 
Moreover, Scott Lithgow Dry Docks, was now `virtually out of work'. Therefore, 
unless some submarine refit work was won some 150 redundancies would occur b` 
the following spring. 12 Although the focus of this thesis had been on shipbuilding 
and to a lesser extent, marine engineering activities of the two Lower Clyde firms. 
their performance in ship repairing and conversion was hardly sparkling either. In 
converting the Monowai to a hydrographic survey vessel, Scott Lithgow Dry Docks 
had lost £1,650,000 on the contract. 13 
By late October, at a meeting of the shipyard chief executives with Mike Casey and 
other senior members of BS in London, the question of consultation with trade 
unions was discussed at length. It was emphasised that in some yards the unions 
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were still `euphoric in their expectations of obtaining a co-operative form of 
management at all levels without fully understanding the financial commitments and 
problems involved'. The move toward increased centralisation was given a further 
boost when it was generally agreed that BS, and not the constituent firms, was 
responsible for the production of a Corporate Plan to Government, and with the 
major consultations with relevant unions. BS could not. however, produce a 
Corporate Plan of its own before individual profit centres such as Scott Lithgowti 
could produce their own corporate plans and send them to BS by the end of \larch 
1978. This would leave BS some leeway to finalise its Corporate Plan for the 
industry as a whole and present it to the Department of Industry by the end of May 
1978. In all probability recognising that planning on this scale was nov. e1, BS did. 
however, offer to train relevant personnel in profit centres at planning workshops. 
Accordingly, the purpose of these workshops was that by January 1979. BS should 
have `an entirely clear idea what the EEC/Government really want, and thus «hat 
BS wants from the profit centres'. By this stage, the profit forecast for BS for the 
nine months to 31 March 1978 had been completed in draft and showed a 
satisfactory profit. In a far more realistic mode, however, it was noted that this profit 
might be subject to a downward revision when the profit taking rules for the warship 
builders had been finally agreed. 14 
Astoundingly, even at this stage, there was no mention of a loss on the mercantile 
side of the industry, that given inherited losses, which were almost certain to accrue 
on fixed priced contracts taken before the advent of cost escalation insurance, and 
Intervention Fund assistance. On pay, the BS Chairman, Admiral Griffin had met the 
Industry Minister, Eric Varley in December with the object of obtaining a delegation 
of pay authority to the latter's department, which in turn could then delegate that 
authority to BS to achieve pay settlements. Griffin's view was that if this was not 
done and soon then BS would continue to suffer from severe delays and inevitable 
disruptions in industrial relations. Griffin's plea was however. not acted upon. and 
later several of the assembled executives from the individual yards stated that the 
Government had made their negotiating position, 'hopeless'. Nevertheless, it was 
also noted that BS was dependent on Government for further financial support. For 
BS, Mike Casey insisted that it was absolutely- necessary that within the constituent 
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firms there should be no `accidental' breaches of pay policy. neither should 
executives think that BS was unique as all other nationalised industries were 
subjected to the same pay restraints. By this stage, however. the profit forecast had 
been revised by the BS Finance Director, Maurice Elderfield. who reported that it 
was not a healthy one and that BS was just not competitive. In this light, it was 
necessary to have `a renewed hard look at both capital expenditure and investment, 
for which there are no guidelines or yardstick'. Current projects in train would have 
to carry on, but an urgent examination was needed of all proposals to see what 
pruning was possible. The hard fact was that BS was running out of money rapidly. 
In the ensuing discussion, it was, again somewhat belatedly noted that the - 
shipbuilding industry had not really been run on strictly commercial lines. By this 
stage, however, Ferguson Brothers had been awarded two of the Polish mini bulk 
carriers. It was also noted that Ross Belch would head a BS delegation that would 
attempt to drum up business by visiting the Indian Government in Delhi, and then 
proceed to Bombay for a week before embarking for Calcutta to visit other 
shipyards. 15 
By January 1978, however, Belch had stated that survival was now the name of the 
game, and with seventy fitters already made redundant, it was announced that the 
Cartsburn yard had secured an order to refit an Oberon class submarine. MIS 
Oracle to be undertaken during the summer. In addition, Scott at Bowling had \v on 
an order worth £1,000,000 for two tug boats to be delivered in the summer of 1979, 
and Ferguson had topped this with an order worth £ 3,500,000 from MoD (N) to 
design and build a trials and experimental sonar vessel. By the end of the month. 
however, Sir William Lithgow publicly announced that no compensation for 
nationalisation had yet been received, and also revealed that a big American offshore 
company had wanted to buy into Scott Lithgow prior to Vesting Day. Nevertheless, 
the firm's future position on wages provisions was likely to be affected by the nc\\ 
that at a Central Arbitration Committee meeting in Glasgow, Scott Lithgow workers 
had made a claim for another £ 10 per week to give them parity with 
Govan 
Shipbuilders under the 1948 Fair Wage resolution. 
16 
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Contemporaneously, Scott Lithgow's general position on prior shipbuilding and 
offshore contracts had continued to deteriorate, and by March. Belch had warned his 
colleagues not to let situations develop on contracts where they had not lodged 
suitable force majeure claims until it was too late. '7 Talks with BP on the possible 
ESV order had continued and the oil major had indicated that it would place the 
order in June 1978. To this, Belch again reiterated that the winning of this order was 
of critical importance, otherwise large-scale redundancies would ensue. 18 The Scott 
Lithgow management also noted that the hourly paid workforce had received a Fair 
Wages award that was higher than anticipated. Ominously. this award would worsen 
the Scott Lithgow position by a further loss provision of £2.000.000 even though 
wage parity with Govan Shipbuilders had still not been obtained. Furthermore. 
regarding the ESV, it was noted that the project management required would be to 
offshore industry standards, and that this would exceed even the na\ al standards that 
Scotts' were used to. On the naval front, the last of the Australian submarines, R11: \' 
Otama was due to be commissioned on 27 April, however, delivery Would be 
possibly delayed on RFA Fort Grange due to the failure of GEC not having ` 
commissioned one of the lifts on the ship. On the mercantile side, on the three-ship 
order for Ocean Transport and Trading, it was noted that Cartsdvke was almost up to 
speed again after a serious dip prior to obtaining the Ocean contract. Problems, 
however, still persisted with the third super tanker, World Score. The tanker had 
suffered a speed deficiency in her first trials, and had now sailed to Rotterdam to 
undergo bottom cleaning, which it was hoped would correct her speed problem 
when she returned to the Clyde for further trials. Nevertheless, her owner, Dolman 
Shipping was `seeking perfection', and the vessel had been on trials since December 
1977.19 Meanwhile, the position at Scotts' Engine Works had deteriorated and by the 
end of March 1978 the Scott Lithgow Board had expressed concerns over the lack of 
orders for main engines and noted that this work employed a quarter of the total 
workforce there. World Score had returned from Rotterdam, but had again failed her 
speed trials, this time in very poor weather conditions. However, it was considered 
that when the weather improved the vessel would easily meet her contract speed, 
20 
with delivery pencilled in for April. 
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In the interim, the naval outlook continued to look far from promising. In `Iav. 
Belch wrote to the Director General Ships. R. J. Daniel. to reassure him that after a 
recent discussion that he had taken the necessary steps at Scotts' to ensure a suitable 
organisation and management structure was in place to meet ti-IoD (N. ) future 
requirements. This was obviously necessary given the submarine situation and the 
fact that Scott Lithgow had placed such importance on the retention of RFA work to 
maintain employment at Cartsburn. Given this, Belch was evidently pleased that 
Daniel had agreed to meet him to establish the main reason why RFA Fort Grange 
had been delivered so late. Nevertheless, in mitigation, Belch bizarrely stated that 
apart from the submarine cable disaster, there were other reasons outwith Scott 
Lithgow's control, such as when the order was placed in 1971, his firm had 
anticipated taking around one thousand redundant men from UCS. but that this had 
not materialised . 
21 By this stage, however, Belch's earlier admonition on timeous 
application of force majeure claims was brought into sharp focus, as he had earlier 
informed Peter Milne of BS that there might be difficulty on this account with 
Dolman Shipping over the third super tanker, World Score. 22 All things considered 
then, problems for Scott Lithgow were mounting by the day, and «ere about to get 
worse as BS had sent in a team of consultants from Touche Ross to investigate and 
report on certain aspects of the Lower Clyde firm's performance. In the event, the 
Touche Ross conclusions spread over forty pages were seismic, and are worth 
considering in greater detail as in many respects the report encapsulated the 
fundamental problems that the firm had faced and were to experience in the 
following years. 
Touche Ross Report 
On BS instructions the consultants, Touche Ross ,v ere commissioned over a three- 
week period in May-June 1978 to report on Scott Lithgow on the following terms of 
reference: 
1. To establish the reasons for the unacceptable fluctuations in profit and loss 
forecasts given for the year 1977-1978. 
2. To determine whether or not the losses incurred reflected inaccurate 
estimating/costin`g practices and procedures, or whether they had arisen as a 
108 
consequence of unrealistic assessment of selling prices made in order to secure 
orders. 
3. To assess, depending on the outcome of 2 above, whether nerv quotations 
recently provided (for vessels not yet under construction) may give rise to 
similar losses. 
4. To report to a Board member of BS, Maurice Elderfield on: 
a) The reasons for the escalating losses being experienced, the unreliability of 
financial forecasting information, and the apparent lack of financial and cost 
accounting control. 
b) Recommendations on how management controls might be improved 
c) Recommendations on the principles and practices to be employed in cost 
estimating and sales pricing methods. 23 
Given the complexity of the companies within Scott Lithgow and the short time 
allotted to examine the firm in detail, Touche Ross faced a difficult task. In respect 
of putting into context the fluctuating forecasts made in the nine months after 
nationalisation ended 31 March 1978, Touche Ross believed it necessary to look at 
the trading patterns of the major component companies of Scott Lithgow for over 
four years preceding nationalisation. Accordingly, in the four and a half \. Cars before 
June 1977, they found that Scotts' Shipbuilding had in total. lost £2.700,000. As 
accounting policy provided for losses to be taken as soon as they had been 
recognised as such, then effectively Scotts' had been operating at an average loss of 
£600,000 a year. However, Scotts' Engine Works had operated at a profit of 
£ 1,400,000 over the same period. As both the shipbuilding and engineering 
companies were almost wholly integrated, Touche Ross thought it more helpful to 
see them both as losing £1,300,000 giving a combined loss of some £300.000 a year. 
24 
Lithgows, in stark contrast, lost £8.500,000 over the period at a rate of almost 
£2,000,000 a year. However, the two smaller specialist yards, Ferguson at Ne« ark 
and Scott of Bowling made good profits of £1,800,000 and £1.200,000 respecti\ el`'. 
As the other companies in Scott Lithgow were comparatively insignificant to the 
study, Touche Ross did not examine them 
in any detail. but did note that Cows al 
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Engineering was a consistent loss maker and that steps were being taken to rectify its 
position. It was abundantly clear, therefore, that prior to nationalisation, losses on 
tanker construction at Lithgows accounted for Scott Lithgow' s main problems on 
profitability and that the huge loss of £8,500,000 there turned a small profit for the 
other firms combined, into a £7,400,000 loss. 25 Touche Ross also noted that 
excluding Lithgows, losses were contained in a period of excessive inflation, and 
that this reflected some credit on the management of firms concerned. Scotts' had 
been obviously aided by having price escalation clauses in many of their contracts. 
but not in all. Ferguson Brothers and Scott at Bowling, both on short order books 
were not so subject to the damaging effects of inflation. Howw-ever, at Lithgows the 
effects of fixed priced contracts had mercilessly exposed the firm to the worst effects 
of inflation. Indeed, the bulk of the losses had been incurred on twti o super tankers, 
Nordic Commander and Nordic Clansman taken on at fixed prices in 1969. and 
which were not delivered until 1974 and 1976 respectively. These tankers had been 
at first delayed by the late delivery of the 225-ton gantry crane from Arrol, which 
was deemed essential for their construction. Crucially, Touche Ross further noted 
that during construction it was found that both vessels were, 'seriously 
underestimated in terms of man hours owing to the lack of prior experience in 
building ships of this size'. In addition to the increased costs accrued due to these 
factors, the completion of these vessels was unfortunately undertaken in a period of 
unprecedented inflation, which exacerbated the losses. 26 This analysis. particularly 
the observation that an underestimation of man-hours contributed to losses on both 
vessels, seems unduly reliant on the Scott Lithgow historical viewpoint. Why. for 
instance, did management get the man-hours wrong on both vessels" lt seems that 
the answer could be that man-hour costs were not properly recorded owing to the 
late delivery of the crane. Thus, on the construction of the second vessel the previous 
estimates were incorrect as a result. However, it may also have occurred because 
labour savings resulting from the use of the gantry crane were over-estimated, or on 
account of labour shortages. particularly in the steelwork trades, or indeed a 
combination of both. 
Nevertheless, Touche Ross in respect of the factors comprising the budget variations 
dealt comprehensively with the main causes of the fluctuating profit and loss 
M 
forecasts. By June, the consultants also noted that a further loss provision of 
£1,400,000 had been made in the final accounts for the first nine months of trading 
as part of BS, and that the adjusted increase in man-hours per ton on the fourth super 
tanker, World Scholar would be £400,000. Moreover. the revised total of factors 
contributing to overall losses within the direct responsibility of management 
amounted to £6,600,000 whilst further losses of £10,800,000 remained outwith their 
control. Touche Ross further noted that Scott Lithgow had a total order book of 
around £225,000,000 over the period under consideration for delivery over 
approximately three years. Consequently, cost increases such as the Fair Wages 
award or other costs caused by new legislation had to be extended forward over the 
period of each contract to establish adequate provisions for losses. Clearly, a shorter 
order book would have resulted in less loss provisions, however, the original budget 
forecast of September 1977 with a forecast profit, 'must have been optimistic in the 
light of past history and the uncertainty that shrouded many significant contracts'. 
Even though this combined with past unreliability of inflation provisions and the 
short order book at Lithgows, Touche Ross accepted that the original budget «-as 
treated as a target, rather than, `a considered view of probable trading results'. In the 
February 1978 reassessment, however, further factors could have been quantified, 
but the downward revision in March of £6,000,000 was a result of a more 
conservative viewpoint. These reassessments arose from the determination of BS to 
anticipate all future losses; the results of the first comprehensive review of contract 
outcomes at Scotts' since June 1977; the full recognition of the effects of the Fair 
Wages award and BS HQ charges; and credit not be taken for various outstanding 
claims where results were uncertain. Taken together, the increased loss of 
£6,600,000 deemed to be within the control of Scott Lithgow management, `would 
still have been sufficient to cast doubts on the Group's survival without 
nationalisation'. A factor given further focus by the probable results for the year 
1978-1979, where loss provisions needed to take into account that the full utilisation 
of the Lithgow end of the operation depended on winning the ESV order in 
competition with Harland & Wolff if under recovery of overheads was not to ensue. 
27 
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The fact that forecasts had gone, `so radically wrong in the past year'. «-as in the 
Touche Ross view due to a number of factors. First, the lack of experience of Scott 
Lithgow directors in a large group of companies. and secondly. the relative 
inexperience in budgeting and forecasting techniques. It was also noted that the 
Scott Lithgow systems were moving towards budgetary control, but as vet were 
underdeveloped, and that some of the losses consequent upon nationalisation had 
been outwith management control. Nevertheless. other factors certainly- were within 
the control of the firm. Given the general trading conditions pertainin-in the 
industry, `taking fixed priced contracts in a period of high inflation [would] lead to 
disaster whenever contracts are likely to be spread over a number of \'ears'. 
Furthermore, incorporating untried equipment and new technology- and \\ here 
contract outcomes were dependent on delivery of equipment by sub-contractors 
exacerbated the situation. Touche Ross further commented that in relation to 
Lithgows, it was unable to find a single vessel that had been delivered before or on 
time within the past five years, a factor that inevitably contributed to losses through 
penalty clauses in contracts. 28 
As a wake-up call to possible problems if the BP ESV order was won, the buche 
Ross assessment could not have been starker. Even though the consultants had wund 
the Lithgow line management, `dedicated and resourceful' they believed that tvvo 
main and related problems faced the company which could lead Scott Lithgmý as a 
whole into serious difficulty. The Lithgow yard had developed into a single contract 
business, where each contract would occupy the greater part of the firm's resources 
over a period of two years or more. Plainly, the firm was vulnerable to market 
fluctuations and if mistakes were made as on the super tankers, single contracts 
taken on at any price formed too large a proportion of the firm's business and 
subsequent losses had a bigger effect. On super tankers, Lithgows had entered a 
business with which it was not familiar and had to learn by its own mistakes. 
However, as Touche Ross starkly noted, Lithgows was proposing to do the same 
again with the ESV contract, and in future when it hoped to build an oil production 
platform. In the interim the ESV contract exemplified the Lithgow dilemma, and 
Touche Ross noted the problems and risks that the compan\ could v\ ell face in the 
coming years. First, the contract had already been tendered for a fixed price without 
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profit margins or adequate contingency provisions. Second. the technology involved 
was new to Lithgows and could result in delays in completion. Third, the contract 
had been accepted on a tight delivery schedule that was dependent on things going 
well. Fourth, the start of the contract depended on whether the last tanker, II -orld 
Scholar was completed on time and on suitable civil engineering work to strengthen 
the berth being undertaken on schedule. Last, it was also noted that there was a 
number of nominated sub contractors who were new to the field, and who \w-ere not 
under Lithgow control. Therefore, their performance would affect the timing and the 
cost of the contract. Given this combination of factors, Touche Ross considered that 
they were not capable of assessment, and in this regard, Ross Belch's vvietiv of the 
contract as costing, ' plus or minus £5,000,000 on the tender price might ww el l he an 
underestimate, particularly on the downside of risk'. In conclusion, Touche Ross 
considered that measures should be undertaken to improý'e the financial and cost 
control procedures of Scott Lithgow, and that estimates should as far as possible 
conform as closely as was practicable to actual cost outcomes on each contract. In 
addition, the firm had to provide an integrated cost control system encompassing 
labour, material and overhead expenditure based upon labour targets. material 
estimates and overhead expenditure budgets. Fundamentally. a management control 
system had to be designed that incorporated the above, and which crucially was 
capable of reconciliation with the financial accounts. Plainly, Touche Ross did not 
think that Scott Lithgow could achieve this of its own volition, after all, the evidence 
they had provided supported this view. Accordingly, the consultants considered that 
outside assistance (Touche Ross) would be needed in the application of this work. 29 
To his credit, in reply to what was a frankly devastating report, Ross Belch's first 
reaction to it was that it was generally fair. Nevertheless. he attempted to qualify 
certain points, and pointed out that labour shortages when building vessels with such 
a large steel content had contributed to losses, as did the need to continually 
introduce crash training programmes for apprentices and dilutees. Belch did, 
however, admit, with breathtaking understatement, that there was no doubt that the 
move into giant tanker construction, `[had) not proved to have been an outstandin`. 1 
success'. He again tried to qualify this by stating that the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board had supported the move into this type of construction in 1969, as had market 
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projections. Belch then noted that there was little hope of keeping Lithgows going 
with normal merchant ships, there was at the moment no market for tankers or bulk 
carriers, and it would be difficult to find three or four cargo liners each v-ear. %\-filch 
was needed to keep production viable. Although there was a large element of risk in 
building the ESV, Belch believed that the firm had made the right decision in the 
early 1970s to move away from Lithgows traditional shipbuilding market towards 
the offshore structures market. He was also satisfied that if the firm were awarded 
the ESV, then it would have been as a result of quoting a lo«- price. Moreover, even 
if a substantial loss were made, then it would have been probably less than the 
amount needed from the intervention Fund if normal merchant ships had been built 
in its place. 30 This argument was at best disingenuous and at worst, complacent. 
Given the dire market situation, Scott Lithgow could in no circumstances rely on 
winning any mercantile work in any event, and its naval strateg}y on submarines was 
now entirely restricted to refits until it could possibly bid for a ne« `generation of 
conventional submarines sometime in the future. Again, given the clearly 
documented past failures of Scott Lithgow management by Touche Ross, and with a 
BS representative on the Scott Lithgow Board, one must conclude that employment 
considerations were paramount, and that this was particularly the case in respect of 
Lithgows operations at Port Glasgow. 
By July 1978, however, Michael Scott and Sir William Lithgow had resigned from 
the Board of Scott Lithgow thus ending the last vestige of family involvement in the 
firm. Ross Belch now became Chairman, with Alan McNeilage becoming Finance 
Director. In the following month it was publicly announced that Scott Lithgow had 
won the BP ESV order. This column stabilised semi submersible represented the 
largest contract at a price of £60,000,000 ever placed in a British mercantile yard. 
The ESV would be seventy-five per cent owned by BP and twenty-five per cent by- 
the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) and when built would be based in BPs 
Forties field in the North Sea for emergency fire fighting and lifesaving duties. Its 
two pontoon hulls would house machinery, propulsion units and thrusters, and 
would be dynamically positioned by computer, with further buoyancy being given 
by six columns supporting the deck. 
31 It remained to seen, however, whether 
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Lithgows, in light of demanding offshore standards, could limit its losses to an 
acceptable level on this contract. 
In the interim, work on the last super tanker. World Scholar «-as progressing, but 
Dolman Shipping had refused to accept World Score. which had been dogged by, 
problems since undergoing trials from 1 December 1977. The completion of H orld 
Score had been beset by engineering problems, including the condenser, main 
engine exhaust lines, cargo pump exhaust lines, cargo pumps and Danish 
manufactured Aalborg boilers. However, there were other areas of dispute with the 
owners on technical and specification grounds, which meant that Dolman had 
adopted a policy of reviewing the entire construction of the vessel along with the 
original specification. Even though subsequent modifications had been agreed, and 
in most cases represented improvements, Belch noted that the owners wert seeking 
to reject the vessel, but that Scott Lithgow, nevertheless had to sort out the boilers 
and meet the revised delivery date of 4 November 1978 in Greece. 3-1 
By this stage, however, Scott Lithgow had attempted a Corporate Plan, which had 
been subsequently revised into preferred and contingency plans. Under the preferred 
plan, Scotts' Cartsburn and Cartsdyke yards would continue in full production. but 
mainly on naval work, with facilities to be rationalised. Scotts' Engine Works 
would continue on the basis of two main engines per year, and Lithgows ww ould enter 
full production on the ESV, with Ferguson and Scott at Bowling continuing as thev 
were. Under the Contingency Plan, however, Cartsburn would continue mainly on 
naval work, but the labour force equivalent to the Cartsdyke numbers would be 
made redundant. Main engine building would be terminated at Scotts'. Lithgows 
would continue with the ESV and possible orders for Tension Leg Platforms, but 
Bowling would close and its work would be transferred to Ferguson. In light of the 
Touche Ross report, however, Belch noted that investigations were proceeding 
satisfactorily and that regular progress meetings were being held with the hope that 
substantial benefit would accrue from the exercise. Belch nevertheless stressed that 
it was essential that management in the individual companies hold regular monthly 
meetings to review all current matters including accounts and outcomes to be 
submitted to BS. In all of this, however, no mention was made of establishing a 
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dedicated project management team with overall control of the ESV. and with real 
responsibility for planning and budgetary control throughout the construction period. 
33 
In November, Belch welcomed Philip Hares, the Managing Director of Finance at 
BS onto the Scott Lithgow Board as a non-executive Director. Hares would be 
empowered to act for the firm in all matters including its banking facilities. Alike 
RFA Fort Grange, RFA Fort Austin had been delayed due to alterations on the 
former being duplicated on the latter. The drill ship, Pacnorse I would be delivered 
in January 1979, but the three cargo liners for Ocean had been delayed by the late 
delivery of the stern frames and by a strike at a sub contractor, Navire, who were to 
supply the hatch covers. However, a new line of work had been agreed with Vickers 
for the manufacture of rings for the pressure hulls of nuclear submarines, ww hich 
would provide work for 100 men for a period of at least five years. Belch stated that 
this contract had been accepted at a price that should prove to be break-even after 
the initial learning curve had been surmounted. Controversy continued. however. 
over the placing of the HMS Oracle submarine refit, with the decision to be made by 
the Secretary of State for Defence. Belch stated that this would be made on political 
grounds, as the Scott Lithgow estimate was still higher than a comparable bid from a 
Naval Dockyard. It was nevertheless essential that this refit be won to retain 
submarine skills in the firm until a new generation of non-nuclear submarines was 
introduced probably in 1982-1983. On future prospects for engine building, with the 
last main engine from Scotts' due to be completed early in 1979. Belch stated that 
there must be a recognition that the Engine Works were unlikely to obtain orders for 
two main engines per year. As a quarter of the workforce there were engaged in this 
activity, other employment had to be sought as a matter of utmost priority, The 
alternative was redundancy and consequent under recovery of overheads. However, 
World Score had finally been accepted by her Greek owners after a settlement of 
their claims amounting to £3,450,000 had been reached, of which Kincaid had paid 
£ 1,000,000. To achieve the delivery date, Lithgows had removed parts from l1 'orld 
Scholar, in this light they had to be replaced before December 1978. otherwise a 
further penalty of £250,000 would be invoked. 
3' The eventual settlement on 11 "orld 
Score had resulted from a long series of meetings and legal opinions, ww hich had to 
316 
include the Bank of Scotland as signatories to the original NIFC contract for the 
vessel. 35 On the ESV front the initial design prepared by BP was in the process of 
being appraised by Scott Lithgow's technical team and the Dutch consultants. Gusto. 
Due to delays in clarifying specifications, it was anticipated that the delivery date 
would be extended until May or June 1981. In light of this. consideration «-ould 
have to be given to increasing technical and administrative support for the project. 
Moreover, a five-week strike by Boilermakers at Ferguson Brothers over parity of 
allowances with Govan Shipbuilders for working on Polish ships had ended with no 
concession, but had cost the company £100,000 in under recover\ of overheads. 
Added to the loss for the six months to 29 September 1978 and the forecast for the 
year ended 31 March 1979, a loss of £7,000,000 was anticipated. 36 
Towards the end of 1978 the gloomy situation continued for Scott Lithgow, with 
Ocean still refusing to pay instalments amounting to £3,600,000 on the basis that the 
vessels were not being built in the agreed sequence, and that the instalments %v, crc 
not due before the indication dates in the building schedule. Howev'e1-. the IHL\ 1,, ' 
Oracle submarine refit had been `won', but BS had made the decision that in future 
no further main engine building would be carried out at Scotts'. In this light, Belch 
noted that the future of the company lay in co-operation with Kincaid, with 
consultants already drawing up a report due in January or February 1979 on this 
point. At Lithgows, a director, Hugh Currie reported that both cargo liners built for 
Furness Withy, Oroya and Orapesa had experienced engineering problems due to 
the propeller failing to attain the desired revolutions. In view of the effect of the 
protracted Ocean dispute on working capital, Belch advised that the contract for the 
ESV would be signed shortly, and that Lithgows had obtained a favourable 
instalment that would help the cash flow position considerably. The BS Director. 
Philip Hares, nevertheless noted that the budget forecast for 1979-1980 showed a 
loss before interest of £8,000,000 and that the firm contracts for 1979 only absorbed 
forty-four per cent of the available labour and overheads. Even after the assumed 
contracts, there still remained sixteen per cent of labour and overheads under 
recovered. This was after a reduction of nearly 800 employees 
due to redundancy 
and retirement of employees over sixty-five. Accordingly. 
Hares felt that there 
should be a further review undertaken of the numbers employed 
by the firm, but he 
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did indicate that BS had approved the necessary capital expenditure in order to build 
the ESV. 37 Clearly, given the inherent risks of the ESV contract, and the likelihood 
that if the performance on the giant tankers was anything to go by. it would in all 
probability result in a financial loss. Again, BS obviously had emplo\ ment 
considerations primarily in mind. Nevertheless, the first full year of nationalisation 
had proven to be one of increased centralised scrutiny by BS of Scott Lithgow's 
activities. There was, however, absolutely no guarantee that the hard won lessons on 
financial scrutiny and control would be carried out with virtually the same team of 
directors that had been at the helm of the firm prior to nationalisation. Scott 
Lithgow, primarily, remained a collection of individual firms at heart. Of these, the 
closure of the ship repair arm, Scott Lithgow Dry Docks, which had been 
extensively used for new building work, had been announced in October-. and the 
future of the Engine Works was far from certain. 
For BS, charged with saving an industry that apart from the designated warship 
builders seemed to be in terminal decline, the situation remained critical in the worst 
commercial climate the industry had known since the interwar period. By I Januar\ 
1979, however, an agreement between BS and the Confederation of Shipbuilding & 
Engineering Unions had come into operation, which established a radically ne%\ 
wages and salaries structure, together with a single negotiating date. This was a 
crucial breakthrough as it had replaced a system whereby 186 separate negotiations 
took place in the industry in any one-year. 38 This apart, alluding to the contemporary 
general situation in shipbuilding, Ross Belch stated that if there was any consolation 
in the present position. `then things cannot get any worse'. 
39 His vie%\ was at least 
understandable given that Scott Lithgow had made a pre-tax loss in the first nine 
months of nationalised trading on its consolidated accounts, again qualified by the 
firm's auditors, amounting to £23,809,000.40 
These losses were clearly unsustainable, and were obviously foreseeable before 
nationalisation. As an academic, Dr. R. A. Bryer later noted, at Vesting Day on 1 
July 1977, Scott Lithgow claimed to have assets amounting to £40,400,000 (fixed 
assets plus current assets) and the firm's shareholders claimed to o%\ n E5,21 70.000 of 
them (share capital plus reserves) the creditors had claims to the rest. However. in 
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the 1978 accounts, £39.800,000 of these `assets were written-off. and the firm was 
left on balance owing £28,750,000. Therefore, the liabilities exceeded the assets. As 
a nationalised company, Scott Lithgow at this stage was neither technically' bankrupt 
nor insolvent. Bryer further noted that the big write-offs in 1978 included one of 
asset `revaluations' by the directors in 1973 of £12,500.000. , which kept their equity 
interest `positive'. A jump in the assessed provisions for both current and future 
provisions and a relatively large, with no explanation, provision for losses in 
subsidiary companies of £7,300,000. Bryer's opinion was that, it was too incredible 
to believe that these changes, causing this level of asset write-offs after 
nationalisation came as a surprise to the directors'. Accordingly. an inference could 
be made that prior to nationalisation the accounts did not reflect the true position of 
the company. 41 Given, however, that for most of the pre-nationalisation period. the 
accounting strategy at Scott Lithgow, (although significantly derailed by a period of 
unprecedented inflation) rested on profits on certain vessels and government grants 
eventually outweighing losses, and that the asset revaluation in 1973 reflected the 
modernisation of facilities, the Bryer view has some force. This is so not only in 
terms of eventual compensation for shareholders, but when it is considered that assct 
revaluations are subjective and are often made on the basis of a going concern, and 
therefore in a bankruptcy situation are almost worthless. Taken in conjunction %\ ith 
the Touche Ross report, therefore, there is absolutely no doubt that nationalisation 
saved Scott Lithgow. Moreover, any revisionist views such as those given to the 
author in unattributable interviews that the firm's troubles began with nationalisation 
are nonsensical. 
Scott Lithgow had, nevertheless, for the year ended 31 March 1979 on the back of 
over a threefold increase in turnover, reduced its loss for the year before tax on 
consolidated accounts. which were again qualified in certain respects, to 
£12,473,000. On an analysis of trading results, Scotts' Shipbuilding and Engine 
Works lost £4,494,000 and £ 1,153,000 respectively. Lithgows Limited topped this 
with a loss of £6,421,000. Bowling lost £451,000, and Cowal Engineering lost 
£264,000. In contrast. Fergusons made a profit of £97,000, Caledonia Joinery a 
profit of £167,000, Newark Ferguson a profit of £28.000 and Caledonia Fabrications 
a profit of £18,000.42 Clearly, by this stage, it was already apparent that 
Scott 
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Lithgow's future would increasingly stand and fall on the success or failure of its 
entry into the large offshore structures market. By, March 1979. however. delays on 
the ESV had already been experienced caused bý Scott Lithgow's inability to 
finalise sub-contractors contracts due to the delay in signing the main contract. 
Belch, nevertheless, had informed the Board that he had submitted a final tender to 
Shell for a Multi -purpose Support Vessel (MSV) at a price of £69.500.000. 
Echoing the Touche Ross line, Belch also informed that in his opinion, -a substantial 
proportion of recent losses had been due to the rationalisation of Lithgo« into a 
single project company'. Moreover, `similar costs were anticipated in the closure of 
the Cartsdyke yard at Scotts' and the cessation of main engine building at Scotts' 
Engineering'. This was a clear indication that Cartsdyke had been already earmarked 
for closure and that its operations would be integrated into the Cartsburn facilit\. 
Scotts' Engineering Director, J. F. Robb noted that the P-E Consulting Group had 
completed their review on the rationalisation of marine engineering on the Lower 
Clyde. However, the P-E recommendations were based on the rather optimistic v'ie\\ 
that there would be a requirement for nine main engines per year and on the even 
more optimistic view that work would continue on building conventional submarinc-s 
at Scotts'. According to Robb, a more realistic figure was four main engines per y car 
and submarine refit work rather than new construction. However. a substantial 
proportion of Scotts' Engineering premises would be vacated and could be made 
available for the storage of heavy equipment. 43 Meanwhile. H11. ß' Oracle had arrived 
early in March at Cartsburn for her refit. And, in April it was announced before the 
General Election that the contract to build the Seabed Operations Vcsscl (SOV) that 
Scott Lithgow had spent two years in designing would be formally placed in the next 
few months. Contemporaneously, the launch from the Cartsburn } and of the first of 
the Ocean cargo liners, Maron had taken place. 
44 
In April, the Scott Lithgow Board had also decided, in line with the P-E report to 
recommend to BS that main engine building should be concentrated at Kincaid, and 
that part of Scotts' engineering works south of the railway would close to be used 
for heavy storage. However, it was likely that work in the heavy machine shop 
would soon run out some two months before BS were due to make a decision on the 
future of the works. It was also noted that a tender had been submitted for support 
. 3? 
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tankers to MoD (N) but that Scott Lithgow had quoted the highest price. "; 
Meanwhile, the award of the Shell MSV contract had been delayed until after the 
General Election in May, which resulted in the Conservative Party beine elected to 
govern the country. By June, however. the MSV had been awarded to the Finnish 
company, Rauma Repola at a price that was a fantastical £30.000.000 below the 
Scott Lithgow tender. According to Shell, the Finnish tender was not only the lowest 
but also offered one of the shortest delivery periods. The local NIP. Dick Nlabon who 
had a series of meetings with the new Industry Secretary. Sir Keith Joseph about the 
MSV called the decision to award the contract to Finland, 'despicable' and alleged 
that the Government had done a deal with the Finns to build aircraft in Britain. 40 
By August, however, the Cartsdyke yard, formerly the Greenock Dockyard 
Company had launched its last ship, the second Ocean cargo liner, : tlcntor. This 
prompted an announcement from BS that 500 redundancies would accrue in 
Greenock, 300 of which would take place at Cartsdyke. Cowal k: ngineering «as also 
to close, as would part of the Engine Works, and over the next eighteen months, 
Scott at Bowling would also be closed. This news provoked a one-day token strike 
in protest by Scott Lithgow employees and precipitated a ban on overtime, launches 
and trials. With the ESV order dependent on the completion of the last super tanker. 
World Scholar by the end of December, any ban on overtime was potentially 
disastrous, and despite the employees of Ferguson Brothers banning the launch ol'a 
Polish ship, the ban was eventually lifted in early September. 
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This sensible decision was followed two weeks later by an announcement that Mol) 
(N) had finally awarded the contract to build the SOV to Scott Lithgow, a contract 
that promised three years work to around a thousand employees. Indeed. the good 
news on employment continued in October, when it was announced that Lithgows 
had been awarded in conjunction with the lead yard for design and build, Swan 
Hunter, one of two 109,000 tonne segregated ballast oil tankers from BP. With 
Kincaid providing the engines, these two tankers were the first ordered by the oil 
major since the shipping recession of 1973. Clearly, with 
foreign shipbuilders also 
tendering, the SIF had played its part to allow BS to put together an appropriate 
financial package on price and credit to secure the two-vessel order at a price of over 
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£40,000,000. However. the precise cost remained difficult to quantify. as the price 
formed only a part of the overall financial package. As John Parker. for BS. 
commented the contracts provided a valuable contribution to the workload required 
ensuring the future of core yards. Although, in relation to BS as a whole he admitted 
that, `it would be overstating the case to say that the tide had turned' . 
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Meanwhile, with the mercantile market subject to increasingly fierce competition. 
naval profits remained crucial both for Scott Lithgow and BS. In this light, any move 
by the MoD Procurement Executive (MoD (PE). to insist on fixed price contracts 
had to be resisted. At present the requirement arising from an agreement with the 
Organising Committee prior to nationalisation by MoD (PE) that BS ww arship 
building subsidiaries should not liaise with one another on prices in the manner of 
the Warship Group had proven to be nothing more than a `pure fiction'. The two 
main problems of fixed prices appeared to be MoD knowledge of individual yard 
man hours, costs and overheads gleaned from historical accounting control. and the 
fact that constant design changes to keep up with rapidly changing technolo`g\ made 
the imposition of fixed prices difficult. In the latter case it was the experience of' 
some yards that MoD tended to drop fixed price requirements when asked for a fixed 
specification. BS, had, however, informed the MoD that it wished to protect itself 
and that it had instructed some of its constituent yards to declare that on BS 
instructions they had advised BS of their price. Clearly, by liaising together. but 
negotiating separately on other than fixed price contracts with the Mot). the warship 
yards in total could maximise BS profits, particularly when other subsidiaries acted 
as sub contractors. Accordingly it was felt that in light of numerous factors that a 
standing committee should be formed within BS as a forum for liaison but not policy 
making. 49 This was in effect an addition to the regular meetings already carried out 
with warship and mixed shipbuilders chief executives that basically fulfilled the 
function of the old Warship Group of private builders. 
On mercantile and mixed naval and mercantile construction it remained axiomatic 
that to secure orders and to obtain the maximum benefit from the SIF that costs ol' 
construction had to be reduced by increases in productivity. Nloreovcr, if BS taructs 
were to be met its employees had to be made aware of the serious situation in 
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shipbuilding, and it was decided to do so through the medium of an audio visual 
presentation. Subsequently it was agreed that two presentations would be made at 
Scott Lithgow with all shop stewards, managers and directors present on 21 
November 1979.50 By this stage, however, it was also evident that many of the 
constituent companies of BS balance sheets did not provide a proper basis to 
measure a return on capital employed. In this regard it is worth quoting the 
following in full, as it provided the basis of BS plans for capital restructuring in the 
future. 
Some [balance sheets] show an insolvent situation and, as a result of past 
years' losses, some adverse current accounts are so large that the burden o i' 
paying interest to BS is likely to ensure that the subsidiaries concerned could 
not make an adequate return even in a good market environment.... Since 
nationalisation merchant shipbuilding has operated in a price insensitive 
market, and if the capital restructuring had taken effect from I July 1977 the 
subsequent losses would, in many cases, have resulted again in unusable 
balance sheets. 51 
To counter this, BS proposed as 1980/81 was the first year of its five-year Corporate 
Plan based on, `market and productivity predictions designed to make the industry 
viable', then in order to put constituent yards on an equal footing, capital 
restructuring should be undertaken at 1 April 1980. It was proposed that an equity' 
value of firms would be established equal to the value of the fixed assets and stock, 
`on the premise that this was the basic facility required to undertake the business'. 
Working capital would be regarded as `nil' and would therefore provide an incentive 
to firms to try to finance their current assets less stock (work-in-progress. debtors 
etc., ) from creditors and instalments. Any imbalance would be reflected in the BS 
current account, and those constituent firms successful in achieving positive cash 
flows on working capital would receive interest. By contrast, those firms with 
negative flows would pay interest. 
52 When re-stated in December 1979. the basic 
principles behind capital restructuring were, to establish a reasonable capital account 
based on Fixed Assets and Stock. To encourage firms to balance w\ orking capital 
requirements by not letting debtors exceed creditors or work 
in progress exceed 
instalments and to put firms on an equal footing at 1 April 1980 for interest 
receivable/payable purposes by eliminating previous profits 
losses from the BS 
)7 ) 
Current Account Balance. This would also take into account the need to account for 
and adjust over/under estimates of creditors for capital expenditure. over under 
estimates of stock, over/under estimates of loss provisions and delayed payments o 
credit balances. 53 
By January 1980, however, Scott Lithgow's problems with delays in its building 
programme had continued with the three Ocean ships slipping back. However. 
Dexter Shipping had finally accepted the last super tanker. World Scholar after a 
payment of £4,000,000 by Lithgows Limited. 54 In addition, shortages of technical 
staff, and labour unrest as a result of attempting to claim an oil-related claim to work 
on the ESV, had also contributed to slippage as had a number of skilled workers 
leaving for better paid employment elsewhere. Moreover, although Yarrow wt as in a 
position to help with electrical work, the old problem of pay parity had intervened. 
To this, Peter Milne of BS naturally expressed concern, particularly on the 1 b: S V, and 
also suggested that a production director responsible for the overall shipbuilding 
programme and the resources to meet it should be appointed. 56 Ross Belch had by 
this stage, after many years at the helm of Scott Lithgow, already intimated to BS his 
intention to retire. In February. Belch pointed out in a launch speech for the third 
Ocean vessel, Myrmidon that during the past year that Scott Lithgowv had closed 
Cartsdyke and Bowling, and that from 1975 when Scott Lithgo\\ employed 9,000 
men, the workforce had been subsequently reduced by, a third to 6,000.: Although the 
direct labour force had contracted, overheads did not do so on a corresponding level 
due to the move into oil related work where owners required a high level of modern 
plant and equipment, and that technical departments be kept at full strength. 
'? 
Against a background where it was already apparent that British mercantile 
shipbuilding was no longer internationally competitive languishing 
in eleventh place 
in the world and in danger of being overtaken by Taiwan, Belch's admonition that 
there would be no more launches in Greenock in 1980 was particularly apt. 
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Belch's observation on diminishing manpower was brought into sharper 
focus in the 
following month over BS insistence that a further 895 jobs had to go at Scott 
Lithgow. Although he well understood the difficulty of obtaining new orders. Belch 
was of the opinion that Scott Lithgow as presently organised vv ats 
becoming 'totally 
3? 4 
unviable' and could no longer sustain the overheads required to maintain a presence 
in the naval and offshore fields. Accordingly. the most positive solution ad% anced by 
Belch was for BS to load the yards with work and increase the direct labour force. 
Moreover, the current situation regarding employment was having a serious effect 
on morale throughout Scott Lithgow, and restructuring had entailed substantial 
losses resulting in the firm becoming less competitive. Furthermore, if the 89-5 men 
were made redundant in the coming months then according to Belch, Scott Lithgow 
would be unable to meet even its present contractual commitments. i9 
In the interim BS had asked John Peach, of Fergusons to undertake a stud\ on the 
reorganisation of small shipyards on the Clyde. 60 Accordingly, on the completion of 
the Peach report, BS had decided to operate Ferguson Brothers as a direct subsidiar\ 
and therefore to separate the Newark yard where Peach would be chairman and chief 
executive from Scott Lithgow. Moreover, Ferguson would no\\ have a more direct 
relationship with another BS small shipyard. Ailsa at Troon, where Peach would also 
become chairman. This was necessary as it was planned to construct on a joint basis 
a liquid gas carrier. 61 This order, from Gibson Brothers of Leith, a subsidiary of the 
Anchor Line, with Ferguson constructing the fore section and Ailsa the aft as the 
total length of 105 metres was too long for each yard to construct individually, \v L1, 
subsequently won in May, at a price of £9,000,000. Thereafter, Ferguson and Ailsa 
formerly merged in November 1980 under the title Ferguson Ailsa 62 
Clearly, as Belch had earlier noted in light of the now much reduced manpower 
requirements of what was left of Scott Lithgow, a major restructuring of its 
constituent companies was necessary to reduce overheads and to also reflect the 
reduced workload. It was likely that Scott Lithgow would now be reformed into one 
operating company, however, the position of the Engine Works still required 
clarification. Nevertheless, the composition of the Board would reflect functional 
managerial responsibilities rather than the operating units, and would thus cut out a 
great deal of duplication. As a first stage toward the overall concept, it \\ as agreed 
that Caledonia Joinery and Caledonia Fabrications vv ould be brought back into the 
fold and would therefore cease to operate as separate companies. ý" Subsequently, in 
1981, the employees, assets, contracts and businesses of the constituent comhanics 
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were transferred to Scott Lithgow Limited, which became the sole trading company . 
By April 1980, however, Ross Belch's successor as Scott Lithgow chief executive. 
Cameron Parker. formerly of Kincaid, had been appointed a Director. And in the 
following month it had been reported that Ocean had accepted the first of their three 
cargo liners, but only after a settlement for liquidated damages for late delivery of 
£950,000 had been negotiated. As to the remaining two, loss provisions had been 
made amounting to £2,000,000. However. the Cartsburn end of the operation had 
received another submarine refit, HMS Orpheus. which was of considerable help to 
the firm. 64 
By July, Ross Belch duly retired, and Scott Lithgow had posted a record loss after 
tax of £41,761,000 for the year ended 31 March 1980. This accounted for more than 
a third of the overall losses of BS, and was nothing short of disastrous, ww ith 
accumulated losses now standing at £96,561,000.65 However, these accounts, wtiwhich 
were not qualified, also heralded a change in accounting policy. Until 1980, as 1)r. 
Bryer again noted, the sales recorded were of the value of work that had been 
delivered during the year. In 1980 this was reported, as was the value of work 
completed during the year. Because the latter method (the percentage of completion 
method) allows the anticipation of profits and losses, it produced, quite different 
results'. That year, the sales value of deliveries was £105,300,000 the sales value cal 
work done was only £63,300.000.66 Uneven production, closures, under rccovcr\ of 
overheads, penalties for late delivery, interest payments on internal borrowing from 
BS, and substantial loss provisions had all contributed to this sad state of affairs. Up 
to this stage, Scott Lithgow had been committed to pay large amounts of internal 
interest on monies borrowed from BS, a situation, which if it persisted was likely to 
ensure that the firm could not return to profitability. To encourage Scott Lithgow. 
and other constituent firms to strive for viability, part of the monies borrowed 
from 
BS had been converted into non-interest bearing loans sufficient to support the fixed 
67 
assets and stocks at 1 April 1980. 
Clearly, restructuring and re-organisation of Scott Lithgow were absolutely 
necessary. This was also true of BS, where a new chairman. Robert 
Atkinson, had 
assumed his responsibilities in July 1980 and had to announce a trading 
loss for the 
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corporation of just under £110,000,000. By this stage, BS had closed Austin and 
Pickersgill's South Dock Yard. Smith's Dock Haverton Hill Yard. Sunderland 
Shipbuilders North Sands Yard, and Govan Shipbuilders Scotstoun Yard. At Swan 
Hunter, BS had placed the Walker yard on a care and maintenance basis, closed the 
building berths at Redheads, and integrated a berth at Hebburn u-ith Hebburn Dock. 
This, in addition to shipbuilding at Bowling and Cartsdyke ceasing. in tandem with 
redundancies had resulted in BS mercantile workforce. which at Vesting Day 
amounted to 39,000 being reduced to 20,500 by March 1980. Slow speed main 
diesel production had ceased in the previous year at Barclay Curle. and had by this 
stage ceased at Scotts'. Cowal Engineering had been transferred to Kincaid, and the 
Greenock firm had now become the centre of BS engine building in Scotland. 68 
By August 1980, however, industrial unrest had returned to Scott I. ithoo\\ with 
members of the Boilermakers Society walking off the job for a period of nine days 
after a confrontation with management over allowances for dangerous work on the 
BP ESV, now named Iolair. 69 On 7 October, after only three months in the job, a 
clearly exasperated BS chairman, Robert Atkinson delivered a lengthy and ww ide- 
ranging statement to the chief executives of constituent firms at a shipbuilding 
seminar held in Newcastle, which is worth considering in detail. During his first 
three months in charge Atkinson had noticed that a poorly defined organisational 
structure existed at BS HQ and throughout the corporation. Muddled thinking \\ as 
rampant, and there were insufficient numbers of experienced shipbuilders and 
engineers in charge of key areas of BS business. Moreover, extravagance was rife, 
and financial control systems were poor across the corporation, as was productivity. 
All things considered, Atkinson believed that a lack of will and determination to 
succeed existed. On the other hand, however, there remained a number of talented 
individuals at HQ and in individual yards, and there were excellent facilities in the 
core yards. Since Vesting Day, BS had also been subjected to a continuous process 
of adjustment and restructuring. Atkinson's brief was essentially to limit losses and 
in the longer-term to provide an adequate return on capital employed. Nonetheless. 
he found this to be too negative and preferred the task of making, BS viable. In this 
respect the route to profitability lay in a policy of applied centralised financial 
control and decentralised operational and management control through a divisional 
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organisational structure. Atkinson believed that BS hardly needed to be told that its 
financial performance had been 'appalling'. Given this, however, BS could not and 
would not be allowed to continue. and yards should be put on notice that full 
overhead recovery was now a sine qua non. Atkinson then addressed each and C% e ry 
member of BS present in the following terms: 
a. There are companies, which made profits before nationalisation but have not 
done since. 
b. There are companies where the decline is even more recent. 
c. There are companies, which are making consistent losses and have done so for a 
long time. 
d. We cannot tolerate this since cash limits will not allow it. The majority are being 
endangered by the minority. 
e. Where there is no prospect of a reasonably clear return to profitability then the 
future of that entity will be questioned, 
f. Where an entity consistently fails to achieve budget then a question mark must 
be similarly raised concerning the suitability of management. 
g. Those who cannot face that style of administration may be wise to consider 
employment outwith the Corporation. 70 
There could be no more damning indictment of some of the BS constituent firms 
than this. Atkinson did not spare the BS HQ culture from criticism, however, as he 
remained deeply concerned over extravagance and costs. Accordingly, he had 
decided to relocate to Benton House in Newcastle and therefore vacate most of the 
Knightsbridge building in London, and also to sell the BS aeroplane to significantly 
cut costs. However, even greater savings would accrue in reductions in motor 
vehicles, canteens, travel and hotels and in staff numbers. With identical cargo liners 
taking six months to build in Japan and twenty months in a BS yard, and a products 
carrier that took twenty-two months to build in Britain being completed some nine 
months earlier in a continental yard the shipbuilding situation was serious. Atkinson 
therefore proposed to create five new divisions in BS comprising a ship repair, 
warship building, merchant shipbuilding, engineering, and an offshore division. On 
the latter, Atkinson believed that BS should become more committed. Ominousl\ for 
Scott Lithgow, however, offshore status would preclude the firm from seeking SIF 
328 
assistance. Nonetheless, all of the chief executives present including, Cameron 
Parker could have been left in absolutely no doubt that Atkinson meant \\ hat he had 
said. The Conservative Government of June 1979 had given the industry two years 
to sort itself out, and as Atkinson noted that deadline expired in eight months time. 
Everyone present was well aware of the intransigence of the Thatcher led 
government on matters of economic policy, and it was therefore up to management 
to provide solutions to improve performance and come up with early results. What 
was essentially needed as Atkinson further stressed, was 'a new attitude of mind'. I 
Contemporaneously, the possibility of the Scotts' end of the firm becoming a future 
contender to build nuclear submarines was discussed at Scott Litlh(-, o%% Board level. 
It will be recalled that Scotts' were considered to be too small when the MoD chose 
Cammell Laird in 1963 as the follow on builder to Vickers on the Polaris 
programme. Parker then asked for a paper to be prepared outlining the cost 
implications. After discussion with BS Operations Department it as estimated that 
Scott Lithgow would require some £83,000,000 spent on facilities whereas Cammell 
Laird who already had a covered berth and floating dock, which Scotts' did not, 
would require £28,000,000. Parker. whilst questioning whether a floating dock was 
necessary, concluded that it was not worth proceeding with the project. 
72 Quite who 
had raised the question in the first instance, BS or Scott Lithgow remains unclear. 
but any attempt to do so would require a great deal oi'capital expenditure, which hv 
that stage was conspicuously absent in any, event. 
Scott Lithgow and the Offshore Division 
Two days on from the Newcastle meeting it had been publicly announced that Scott 
Lithgow would be at the centre of the BS Offshore Division. Atkinson, however. 
had admitted that the shipbuilding industry in general had 
lost fifteen years of 
opportunity in an area of activity that was a natural 
for BS. According to Cameron 
Parker, the decision to place Scott Lithgow in the division reflected a desire to 
attract more orders from offshore oil related 
firms. Furthermore, Parker also stated 
that the Lower Clyde firm had the resources to build t\\o oil rigs or 
floating platform 
7: facilities in a year. Although the lack of demand for drillship production had 
i 29) 
already foiled Scott Lithgow's plans to build these ships in series, the construction of 
two of these vessels, Ben Ocean Lancer and Pacnorse 1 had at least introduced the 
firm to building to offshore standards. The ESV, Iolair. (Gaelic for Eagle) host ever. 
was another step up altogether, and more so were semi submersible platforms. which 
the firm also had in mind to build. In this regard, Scott Lithgow had agreed in 
principle in February 1975 with the French firm. CFEM who were de% eloping a 
suitable design for a steel gravity based production platform. This agreement -sw-as 
formalised in September of that year and two joint companies were formed to 
design, market and construct this platform. Although £1,000,000 was spent on this 
project by both firms, the venture was ultimately unsuccessful, despite extensive 
marketing efforts. 74 Another venture, Scott Lithgow (Offshore) Limited was formed 
in January 1977 to co-ordinate the firm's oil related interests. And. in April an 
agreement was signed with Deep Oil Technology of Long Beach. California 
whereby Scott Lithgow gained exclusive rights to market the American company's 
tension leg production platform in the UK. 7 Given their experience in offshore- 
related activity then, Scott Lithgow's inclusion in the Offshore Division could not be 
derided as an aberration. Nevertheless, it also allowed BS to divest itself of its 
largest loss maker on the mercantile side, and as the move precluded Scott Lithgo\v 
from SIF assistance, it left those firms remaining in the new Merchant Ship Division 
with a better chance to access it. Moreover, with Scott Lithgo«v's appalling record of 
losses, the switch in emphasis did at least give a guarantee of' continuing 
employment to the remaining workforce. 
By November 1980, Cameron Parker, who had a successful record in managing 
Kincaid, but who had agreed to take the reins at Scott Lithgow in the most difficult 
of circumstances, had also been appointed Head of the BS Offshore Division. At this 
stage the Division comprised Scott Lithgow and Vickers Offshore (Design and 
Development) and the BS Offshore Marketing Department based at Knightsbridge. 
This prompted an admission that for the moment Scott Lithgow were no longer 
tendering for merchant ship [no SIF assistance] orders, but that the firm was sti 11 
tendering for naval work and were hopeful of obtaining another submarine refit 
contract in the following summer. With the future of the 
firm now primarily' in the 
offshore sector it was announced on 17 November that 
Scott Lithgo« had won a 
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£50,000,000 order for a semi submersible platform for BP to a Sedco design. which 
would follow on after the construction of the ESV. lolair, It later transpired. 
however, that the South Koreans had quoted a substantially lower price some 
$30,000,000 less than Scott Lithgow had. Nonetheless, according to a spokesman. 
BP had apparently negotiated a separate tax and financial package with the British 
Government; in all probability involving substantial tax write offs on :ý orth Sea 
work, but had refused to give details. Cameron Parker. in another sense. was more 
forthcoming when he admitted that the BP platform order would not be very 
profitable, `at least under current levels of productivity*. Moreover. despite thirty 
high value semi submersible orders being placed worldwide in the past two years, 
Parker acknowledged that the international market was. nevertheless very difficult. 
Indeed, the main impact of the order was as Parker admitted. to provide continuity 
of employment for nearly everyone in the group for about a year. and give us a 
76 period of stability in which to improve our performance' . 
Just how the BP order had apparently been won in the face of intense international 
competition needs clarification. It would seem that to gain the order, the aid of the 
Ship Mortgage Finance Corporation had been enlisted on the basis that eighty -five 
per cent of the price would be repayable by half-yearly instalments over a period of 
8.5 years from delivery. The first repayment would be due six months afterwards. 
with interest at eight per cent per annum. A price at 28 October 1980 
had been set at 
£34,560,000 and the commercial cost of funds had been assumed to be fifteen per 
cent per annum, therefore the subsidy element would 
be equal to seven per cent per 
annum. In addition a discount rate of fifteen per cent per annum pertained. 
The 
calculation had been generalised on the basis of 
£1.000,000 of price, and then 
multiplied by the relevant price factor. This showed, 'a gross cost 
to Scott Lithgo\\ 
over 10.5 years of £4,100,000 and a value 
discounted to delivery at fifteen per cent 
per annum of £1,900,000'. Obviously this was subject to a 
further trimming in the 
price to obtain the order. It transpired, 
however, that the subsidy would give rise to a 
loss for BS if it was dealt with in same way as the BP segregated 
ballast tanker 
orders now building at Swan Hunter and 
Scott Lithgo\t. Indeed, as \v as noted, this 
would be in contravention of 
Robert Atkinson's statements on loss contracts for 
offshore work. 
77 Two days later, however, Atkinson wrote to the Department of 
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Industry regarding the Offshore Division and stressed that this diversification from 
mercantile work, particularly at Scott Lithgow and for Cammell Laird (the first time 
the Birkenhead firm had been mentioned in this light) was crucial to future 
employment prospects. The cornerstone of BS policy had been to secure t\v o orders 
from BP, however, with one already gone to South Korea, another had to be secured 
by November, `without fail'. Indeed, if this order was not secured. then in the 
current economic climate, particularly with the strength of sterling, the prospects 
were bleak. Atkinson then looked at ways to bridge the price gap between the UK 
and Japanese tender for the current order, which stood at S)1,000.000. The Atkinson 
calculations included a credit package and a possible additional foreign exchange 
cost to BP of contracting in Yen or in US Dollars. All in all this brought the gap 
down to $6,000,000 and excluded other potentially favourable benefits to BP that 
might arise from Petroleum Revenue Tax and Corporation Tax. Ho« ever, this still 
left an apparent gap in the order of between $6-16.000.000 depending on the view 
taken on currency risk. Atkinson then admitted that having reduced the price to BI' 
on two separate occasions, he could no longer do so without running into loss in the 
corporation's current financial position. In other words he could not bridge the price 
gap, and the loss would seriously impact upon the future strategy already discussed 
for the industry, with the only alternative, redundancies and yard closures. 
Moreover, the loss of the order could prevent the Offshore Division from getting 
under way altogether. 78 Clearly then the Government intervened to secure the order: 
however, the precise details remain unknown, but probably involved a promise of 
tax concessions to entice BP to order in Britain. 
By this stage, however, Cameron Parker had attempted to correct Scott Lithgo'. 's 
past failings by announcing internally that a project management team would 
be set 
up to ensure that the BP semi submersible would be built to specification, 
deliver\ 
and price. This would necessarily entail the full support of the 
firm's technical, 
production and commercial departments, and marked a 
belated acceptance that 
modern methods of production and planning control were a sine qua non 
for major 
projects. 79 Nevertheless, only in 1981 were the planning 
departments of Scotts' and 
Lithgows combined to provide a centralised production planning function. Despite 
this however, the department would continue to have a poor image. kN als gossly 
'i 
overloaded with work, was short of numbers and was located miles away from the 
two main production centres. 80 Furthermore. any serious mote into «hat % vas a 
highly technical field by its nature had implications for increased capital 
expenditure, and an increasingly cash starved BS would need convincing that this 
was justified. Although just how BS expected otherwise is a my stew; nevertheless, 
Parker had informed his Board in January 1981 that BS had expressed concern at the 
increasing capital expenditure needs at Scott Lithgow. Indeed, the firm had been 
instructed not to tender for future contracts requiring major capital expenditure 
without first approaching the BS Capital Expenditure Committee. On the BP semi 
submersible, subsequently named Sea Explorer, to be built at Cartsburn it had 
already become apparent that a shortage of planners existed, and a loss provision of 
£1,600,000 had already been allocated with a further provision of £ 1,500,000 toi 
cover the net present value of the finance package granted to BP. However. a 
transfer of £1,000,000 from the contingency reserve had offset this. \lcan\ hile the 
firm had received an offer of £300,000 for the Cowal Engineering premises and 
Bowling had also been put up for sale. 81 
By February, however, BS had apparently authorised Scott Lithgow to spend 
£1,400,000 on capital expenditure to enable it to build Sea Explor¬>r". 
82 Nonetheless, 
by this stage the Admiralty had expressed its disquiet at the shortage of planners 
capable of handling the HMS Orpheus refit. 
83 Planning shortages \% crc obviously 
crucial, and in the following month, Parker had enquired how progress was assessed 
on the BP tanker, as he understood that the buche Ross system of labour control 
was not being applied to this vessel. Parker also informed his Board that 
BS had 
asked the firm to remove the contingency of £4,000,000 
from its budget. This was 
an obviously of concern as it made the firm vulnerable 
in the pricing of future 
orders, as it had been assumed that this contingency would 
be in line with estimated 
costs. Moreover, market trends made it unlikely that 
Scott Lithgow could achieve 
this. 94 
, ý, >» 
The overall situation 
At March 1981, Scott Lithgow was still primarily a mixed naval and mercantile N arLd 
in outlook, even though its status had been irrevocably changed on entering the BS 
Offshore Division. This split personality was in many senses a distraction from 
concentrating solely on its offshore contracts where the penalties for late delivery 
were far more severe than on naval work. The firm had by this stage divested itself 
of the three Ocean Cargo Liners, but only after on the basis of a fifty-seven per cent 
basis of settlement of £2,975,000 had been paid to the owners for liquidated 
damages for late delivery. 85 This left the Scotts' end of the operation with Sea 
Explorer, the SOV HMS Challenger, refits for HMS Oracle. which had been 
returned to Scotts' for minor rectification, and HMS Orpheus and another refit of a 
Shock Test Vehicle (STV) originally built at Cartsburn for the NIoD. The Lithgow 
end of the operation, in contrast, was left with the ESV lolair, to be launched in 
April at the Glen yard and outfitted at Inchgreen quay, and the segregated ballast 
tanker, subsequently named British Spirit at Kingston. It remained axiomatic, 
however, that naval work was needed to balance out potential losses elsewhere in the 
firm. On Iolair, Scott Lithgow had already lodged Force Majeiire claims of ovvcr- 160 
days, of itself an issue that BP was likely to challenge. 86 
By June, however, the extent of Scott Lithgow's losses for the year ended 31 March 
1981 were known with a pre tax loss of £ 17,083,000 being posted. The net loss for 
the year was £12,358,000 after charging extraordinary items of £894,000 and 
crediting £5,619,000 in respect of tax losses surrendered to other BS companies. The 
Finance Director, Alan McNeilage then advised the Board that he thought it 
essential that the basis of forecasting labour loading on contracts should be common 
to both finance and planning, and suggested that the Boeing forecasting model 
should be adopted. Another Director, Ellis. thought that it remained desirable 
for 
separate financial and construction targets to be set and indicated that 
he preferred a 
system of physical measurement of progress rather than one 
based on a finite 
package. Parker then asked Ellis to recommend the system 
he intended to use on Seca 
Explorer. 87 
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By August, the final loss for the year ending 31 March 1981 showed a pre tax loss of 
£17,444,000 although the figure in BS published accounts was £ 14.444.000. The 
difference of £3,000,000 was explained as a consolidation adjustment in respect of a 
loss provision made in the BS accounts of 1979-1980.88 By this stage. however. it 
had been decided to only report the sales value of work completed and not the sales 
value of vessels delivered. Accordingly the firm's auditors qualified the accounts. 
this may have been done as there was some doubt that either Scott Lithgow w\ ould 
complete or could in fact not complete the vessels on order. That Scott Lithgow had 
reduced its loss by two-thirds from the previous year had been in part due to BS 
capital and organisational restructuring, which meant that the firm now operated as a 
single unit. Indeed, only seven constituent firms of BS had avoided restructuring. the 
three preferred warship firms, Vickers, Yarrow and Vosper Thorny croft. t%% o other 
smaller patrol craft builders, Hall Russell and Brooke Marine, Swan Hunter Training 
& Safety and Yarrow Training. 89 
Bad news followed bad, as it had already been announced that an order from 
Occidental for its Claymore field in the North Sea on which Scott Lithgo\v had 
expended a great deal of money, time, and effort to win had failed to materialise due 
to changes in taxation announced in April 1981. These changes prompted the BP 
managing director, Roger Bexom to comment that his company had E300,000,000 
less to spend that it had three months before. Parker viewed the tax changes vv itll 
grave disquietude; but worse news was to follow. 90 That month, the naval 
dimension of Scott Lithgow's strategy had been dealt a seemingly mortal wound as a 
result of the Defence Secretary, John Nott's Defence Review. Nott emphasised in 
the White Paper that too much of the defence budget was taken up on ships. aircraft 
and tanks, that is, weapon platforms, and not enough on the weapons and sensors 
they needed to carry. 91 As a result of the Review, Vickers who already had a 
monopoly on nuclear submarine construction would now build all submarines, 
conventional and nuclear for the Royal Navy. If this was not enough the late Ross 
Belch had always insisted that Scott Lithgow had an `understanding that it would be 
the follow-on builder to Vickers for a new conventional patrol submarine. N lore bad 
news followed when in a linked announcement it «-as noted that all submarine refit 
work would now be undertaken at the Government run 
Royal Docke ards. This 
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meant that a submarine refit for the Scotts' built. fP fS Opportune. apparently 
promised to Scott Lithgow would now be transferred. To further compound matters. 
it was announced in June that Cammell Laird, who had ran up trading losses of 
£ 10,099,000 in the two years to March 1981. had won an order worth £60.000M(M) 
from Dome Petroleum of Canada for a semi submersible platform. This prompted 
Cameron Parker, in his capacity as Head of the Offshore Division, of which 
Cammell Laird did not yet belong, to state that Scott Lithgow were still trying to get 
naval orders, but were not in the Warship Division. Parker emphasised that he would 
not like to make it a rule that yards should stick to their divisions as this would mean 
Scott Lithgow giving up naval work, which, was not part of the plan'. On the other 
hand, Robert Atkinson stated that the Dome Petroleum order was. 'a major step in 
consolidating... [British Shipbuilders] 
... 
involvement in the vast potential offshore 
market'. 92 Cammell Laird was accordingly placed in the Offshore Di\ ision: thus 
another major loss making yard had been expunged from mercantile building. and S 
IF funding. 
The move to gear Scott Lithgow primarily to offshore construction was strengthened 
when it was announced in November 1981 that the firm had won an order apparentl\ 
worth £80,000,000 from Ben Odeco/British National Oil Corporation (later, Britoil 
for a semi submersible platform to an Odeco supervised design to be built at the 
Glen yard. 93 Alike Sea Explorer, this order, subsequently named Ocean. -llliancc 
was likely to show a substantial loss as an assumption of improved productivity. 
something which had been sadly lacking at Scott Lithgo\\, w, had been built in order to 
just to break even. 94 In the interim, however, Scott Lithgow had finally won a 
settlement from BICC over the submarine cable disaster amounting to £5,250,000, 
of which £ 1,357,000 had been paid by the firm to Chilean underwriters. After legal 
fees the net settlement of £3,843,000 had been credited to trading profit-loss. 
Contemporaneously, work on Sea Explorer was eight weeks behind schedule, 
problems with coppersmiths, sub contract electricians and plumbers persisted on 
other contracts, and in general the entire programme seemed to slipping back 
alarmingly. 9' By December 1981, however, Cameron Parker had noted that the 
firm was already failing to operate within the level of the previous v ear's loss 
provisions by providing additional sums of £6,250.000 in 1981-19821 and, that this 
>; 6 
level of financial performance could no longer be tolerated'. 96 This gloomy 
prognosis implicitly recognised that the state of the art Ocean. -llliancc-. which was 
capable of drilling in 4,500 feet of water in the harshest of ocean en% ironments. was 
one of the largest and most technically difficult column stabilised. dynarnicall\ 
positioned semi submersible yet built, and could make or break Scott LithgoN, \ . 
Things could always get worse, however, and with lolair about to go on trials. Scott 
Lithgow's record on industrial relations, which had resulted in fifteen unofficial 
disputes in the past year hit rock bottom when on 11 January 1982 a number of men 
walked out in a dispute over frozen toilets. Subsequently, the strike escalated with 
2,000 men not at work before a settlement was reached on 3 February. With Prime 
Minister Thatcher's son, Mark, being found after six days lost in the Algerian desert 
three days later, this action had began against a background of absenteeism rates 
which were twice the national average for BS, low productivity, and according to 
Cameron Parker, the worst industrial relations in the corporation. 97 Clearly the 
problems of management systems, productivity, and industrial relations at the firm 
were interrelated, but with heavy penalties accruing by the day for late delivery' this 
type of industrial action was suicidal. BS had at least sanctioned a further tranche of 
capital expenditure in February amounting to £2,972,000 in respect of essential civil 
engineering work to enable Ocean Alliance to be built. By March the score gated 
ballast tanker, British Spirit had been finally launched and by the following month 
302 employees had been given written warnings on absenteeism. with a further 
thirty-eight receiving final warnings. 98 
As the major employer in Greenock and Port Glasgow, Scott Lithgow had at least 
given some hope to school leavers in the district. By July 1982. however, Careers 
Offices in both towns had 1,200 jobless teenagers on their books with not a single 
unfilled vacancy to offer them. Moreover, twenty-two per cent in Greenock and 
forty-five per cent in Port Glasgow had been unemployed for a year. 
99 Neither were 
the long term prospects of those employed in Scott Lithgow enhanced when it %\ as 
announced that the firm had made a loss of nearly £ 15,000,000 for the year ended 31 
March 1982, just over half of BS losses as a %\, hole. 
100 Once again, the trading loss 
of £14,950,000 was dominated by a net increase in provision 
for losses of 
3 ) 
£21,800,000.101 Scott Lithgow's performance sparked a comment from Robert 
Atkinson that BS did not intend to put up with further losses. Atkinson' s threat i il 
turn spurred the shop stewards convenor, Duncan McNeil to comment that Atkinson 
should get off the workforce's back as they had made real improvements in 
industrial relations, productivity and flexibility in a period of transition from 
mercantile to offshore work. Furthermore, McNeil stated that the workforce had not 
been on strike since January and absenteeism had improved. Indeed, by the end of 
July it seemed that industrial relations had turned when the Scott Lithgo\v 
management and unions signed a joint agreement aimed at preventing unofficial 
strikes in future. 102 
This was but a false dawn, however, as Scott Lithgow was hit by another classic 
unofficial strike on 21 September, which led to one shop steward being suspended 
and another, Pat Clark being sacked. The strike by the firms platers, which ended 
on 11 October was ostensibly caused by the completion of a Financial Times 
crossword puzzle by the two stewards in working time at the welding school during 
a break in power, and over a refusal to stop when requested to do so by management. 
This dispute gained notoriety as the `Crossword Strike', particularly in the London- 
based Financial Times with its extensive international business readership and 
brought further unwelcome publicity elsewhere. 103 Crucially, the dispute further- held 
up work on the last tanker to be built at Scott Lithgow, British Spirit, which with 
delivery over a year late was eventually named in December. This. in turn. prompted 
the Industry Secretary. Patrick Jenkin, whose wife named the vessel to comment that 
Scott Lithgow would have no future if it continued to deliver vessels this late. 
However, it was also reported that BS had already agreed to pay BP a sum in excess 
off 10,000,000 in penalties for late delivery of British Spirit and of her sister ship 
being built at the lead yard, Swan Hunter, which, incredibly was even later in 
delivery. In response to the Jenkin observation, Cameron Parker commented that this 
was the last tanker likely to be built at Scott Lithgow. and the firm was now 
determined to make its living on the offshore scene. 
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Parker's comment should be seen in the context of the firm having completed its last 
two submarine refits to a satisfactory standard on MIS Oracle earlier 
in \ lay. vv hich 
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had taken twenty-seven months to refit. and HIS' Orpheus later in the ear. This 
left the firm with no apparent chance due to Government policy of receiving any 
further orders to keep its submarine team going. With the Shock Test Vehicle refit 
also completed in June to a good standard, Scott Lithgow's one remaining naval 
order, the SOV HMS Challenger was already well behind schedule. and had suffered 
from a shortage of quality assurance personnel. 106 With the ESV Jolair eventually 
launched from the Glen yard, and partially delivered to BP some 408 days late on I-' 
August, penalties for late delivery on this vessel ran at £20,000 per dad, up to a 
ceiling of £6,000,000. Moreover, from the August date interest payments thereon ran 
at two per cent above the Base Rate of National Westminster Bank until Iolair was 
finally delivered in March 1983.107 The lolair contract as the Touche Ross Report 
had already flagged up in 1978 had proven to be yet another substantial loss maker. 
However, the eventual amount of liquidated damages due to BP from Scott I, ithgo%\ 
would have to go through a lengthy period of arbitration owing to, force majeurc' 
claims by the builders with the intent to limit damages, which began in May 1983- 
108 Clearly, Scott Lithgow was in a substantial learning curve situation on lolair. 
although a great deal of time and effort had been expended on the design of the 
structure, proper production and project planning were not second nature to the firm. 
Moreover, in the early months of the contract the lack of efficient planning vas 
crucial. Owing to shortages of draughtsmen, and delays in design approval of 
prototype items from BP, slippage had occurred. Indeed, it was later noted that Scott 
Lithgow was to a large extent still wedded to their custom o l' somc\v hat i «formal 
client-builder relationships on contractual and financial matters. Again, in a 
prototype vessel of this complexity there was an obvious difficulty in properly 
estimating the extensive pipework and quality and quantity of welding required. 
During the construction period, however, Scott Lithgow did secure extra 
draughtsmen on secondment from other BS yards. and as well as overtime, the firm 
instituted a nightshift and sub contracted work to other yards. Nevertheless, lolair 
had provided a salutary lesson over the control of prime sub contractors working on 
the vessel, and in the timeous rectification of defects. 
1 09 
It has to be emphasised that although Scott Lithgow had the desire to comply with 
the contract, nevertheless, the 408-day delay spoke volumes. BP vv ould het a state of 
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the art vessel; capable of spraying a blazing platform with up to 50.000 gallons of 
water a minute in the event of a blow out or offshore explosion. and probably obtain 
substantial liquidated damages. Scott Lithgow's reputation, in contrast, would again 
suffer. The lessons then for the two substantive semi submersible contracts, Sea 
Explorer and the much more complex Ocean Alliance, were clear. The firm's 
already tarnished reputation would plummet still further if an adequate grip on 
production and project planning, labour loading, sub contractors costs and quality, 
assurance especially on electrical, pipework and welding were not properly 
addressed. 
The gloomy situation persisted and by March 1983, BS had announced the loss of 
nearly 9,000 jobs with some 2,150 to go at Scott Lithgow over the next year, 
although the Scott Lithgow workforce had in line with national union policy already 
voted to oppose compulsory redundancies. In light of this, a Convenor of Shop 
Stewards, Duncan McNeil (now a Member of the Scottish Parliament for Greenock) 
stated that, `we are going to work on the basis that they want to close Scott Lithgo«- 
down' 
. 
By April, Cameron Parker had revealed that the firm would be allowed to 
tender for the new class of conventional patrol submarine, but with Vickers as the 
lead yard for design and build, no order would be forthcoming until 1985 at the 
earliest. Before the BS annual report was published in July, however, Parker. ýv ho it 
will be recalled had taken over in difficult circumstances had resigned and \\ as 
eventually replaced by Dr. Peter Milne. 
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Alike Parker, Milne faced an uphill task to restore the confidence of BP and Britoil- 
Ben/Odeco, to improve morale and to resolve the firm's internal problems. The scale 
of the task facing management was revealed in the BS Annual Report, where Robert 
Atkinson revealed that, `unprecedented difficulties' with three major contracts had 
caused losses through penalties and loss provisions amounting to just under 
£67,000,000, over half the losses of BS. 
111 Again, Scott Lithgow's auditors had 
severely qualified its accounts, in respect of the three contracts in 
hand at March 
1983; these were now estimated to be substantially in excess of provisions at that 
date. Furthermore, owing to a continuing shortage of profitable %v ork. there %v as 
uncertainty as to whether the extent to \v-hich the net 
book value of the f \cd assets 
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would be recoverable over their remaining useful lives. Accordingly. the auditors 
were unable to gauge whether the accounts gave a true and fair view of the state of 
affairs of the firm, particularly as to the extent of loss provisions. ' 12 
By this stage, however, a clearly incensed Robert Atkinson had publicly condemned 
Scott Lithgow and advised that the firm, `was on its last chance. had x. 000 deaf men. 
a history of losses and late deliveries, high absenteeism and poor industrial 
relations'. If this were not enough, apart from the insult to the deaf. Atkinson 
pronounced from on high that the firm had let down BS, the nation and themselves'. 
113 This astonishing public criticism by the head of a nationalised entity could have 
only one outcome, that of effectively scuppering any chance that Scott Lithgow had, 
as presently constituted, of gaining any future orders for offshore work. Moreover. 
cumulative losses of this magnitude meant that the firm faced almost certain closure 
unless a buyer could be found. 
With Sea Explorer already well behind schedule, the Britoil-Ben Odeco (hereafter 
Britoil) semi submersible, Ocean Alliance was proving to be even more difficult to 
keep to time and budget. The Ocean Alliance contract, due to be completed by 
March 1984, which by this stage was wishful thinking indeed, gave the Odeco 
representative, an American, Dr. Terry Petty the final say on many of its aspects. 114 
Scott Lithgow had, nevertheless, experienced a great deal of delay in obtaining 
approved technical drawings from New Orleans. Moreover, the platform was 
subjected to continual modifications that were aimed at avoiding another tragedy of 
the magnitude of the sinking of an Odeco owned and Japanese built semi 
submersible, Ocean Ranger which had sank with substantial loss of life of the coast 
of Newfoundland. As a result, Odeco were heavily criticised in a subsequent inquiry 
by the US National Board of Transportation. 115 
Currently, as Milne had admitted on his elevation to managing director. Scott 
Lithgow's problems were mainly internal. What he had omitted to mention was that 
shipyard standards of work, and not just at Scott Lithgow, on mercantile 
construction as opposed to naval had always been to do just enough and no more. 
This was plainly not good enough on demanding offshore contracts ý\ Tiere project 
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management including rigid control over material flows, sub contractors, re-training 
of the workforce and adherence to strict sub assembly completion dates was a sins 
qua non. Since nationalisation, Scott Lithgow's cumulative losses had already 
reached £ 160,000,000 and had finally forced the firm into considering a Survival 
Plan, which was subsequently revised and mooted to the , -orkforce in July and 
August 1983. This, including a video entitled, We Can Make If [which presumably 
referred to survival], was put to the workforce, and which emphasised cutting costs, 
boosting productivity and delivering on time. In the notes prior to the dissemination 
of the revised Plan to employees, 2,150 redundancies from the 5.000 strong 
workforce were anticipated and a call [all too late] for interchangeability of trades 
was included. 116 The latter had remained the Holy Grail for shipyard management 
for most of the postwar period. And, realistically, any movement on the part of the 
demarcation obsessed trade unions towards this end would only come about when 
the threat of losing jobs was uppermost in the minds, that is, when closure was the 
only other alternative. 
Given that it had already been announced that all future submarine refit work ww ould 
be undertaken in Royal Dockyards, it was therefore richly ironic that Scott Lithgovv 
gained a three-week refit of HMS Ocelot, because three Royal Dockv-ards we ere too 
busy to repair it. The firm also gained another two port refit and sea trial Support 
contracts on the submarines, HMSSealion and HMS Walrus. 
' 17 By : august, the BS 
Director, Philip Hares had resigned from the Board of Scott Lithgo\\ . no doubt 
owing to the pressures at BS headquarters at Newcastle; Hares had been absent from 
far more Board meetings than he had attended. However, W. Kooymans, vvho had 
substantial offshore experience elsewhere, had been appointed as the firm's 
Manufacturing Director. Clearly, Kooymans had a difficult task ahead of him, and as 
a result of an ongoing management review it was also reported that a 
further eight 
managers were receiving counselling for redundancy and two others 
had been 
moved to more suitable jobs. This was part of a general strategy. which at 
last 
seemed to address specific management failures. Indeed, the 
firm's Finance 
Director, Alan McNeilage reported that a revised budget and business plan was 
being prepared for the period August 1983 to March 1984 on the 
basis of a reduced 
number of employees and a revised company structure. 
Hovvevcr, persistent dclav s 
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with the fitting out of the firm's last naval contract, HMS Challenger continued as 
major rewiring work had been undertaken over the failure of Raychem supplied 
cable. Indeed, it was further noted that the firm had lost confidence in GEC local 
management to control the repair programme. By this stage. however. Scott Lithgo« 
had thus far accepted 530 redundancies mainly from the hourly paid workforce. 118 
Consequently, Kooymans had re-examined the position with regard to ceasing 
production at Cartsburn by early November. One exception. because of the need to 
use shed rolls in the West Bay, was agreed until January 1984. ho«we-ve r. the 
chairman, Dr. Milne stressed the need to vacate all premises at Cartsburn where 
there was no work without further delay. ' 19 As part of the Survival Plan it was 
incumbent upon management to re-negotiate the delivery dates for Sea Explorer and 
Ocean Alliance respectively. It was by no means certain, however, from the outset 
that BP and Britoil would be inclined to comply in any event. Scott Lithgow could 
do no more than try to reform its internal procedures in the hope that they' would be 
allowed to finish both platforms. As well as cutting labour costs, especially 
excessive overtime and waste, planning was now seen as a basic service to the 
manufacturing department, wherein the steel and outfitting trades w ere now the 
responsibility of one director where before two had been responsible. Indeed, the 
planning function had been split into three distinct areas. First, production 
engineering dealing with build strategy, design liaison. forwards planning and 
programmes schedules. Second, production controls to check targets and %\ ork out 
processes to achieve them, and last, production services to ensure that the needs of 
120 both planning and manufacturing were put into practice. 
The cherished hope of interchangeability, however, was to a large extent reliant on a 
national rather than on a local agreement. By October, the firm's shop stewards had 
drawn up an alternative survival plan, which included an integrated and 
interchangeable platers and shipwrights department, but did not concede full 
interchangeability. 121 Nevertheless. by this stage, Sea Explorer looked liked being 
delivered over a year late with attendant penalties and Ocean . -alliance was already 
eighteen months late. Consequently, Britoil gave thirty days notice of cancellation of 
the thirty per cent completed Ocean . -Alliance, with 
its joint managing director, 
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Malcolm Ford stating that they were still willing to re-negotiate terms if the contract 
could be completed by January 1985. This ultimatum brought a sharp response from 
Graham Day, who had by this stage replaced Robert Atkinson as BS Chairman, that 
Britoil should stick to the terms of its original deal with agreed financial penalties of 
£7,000,000 or cancelling. Britoil chose the latter by exercising a drop dead clause 
in the contract, thus avoiding payment of an instalment of £44.000,000.122 
Accordingly, BS then instituted legal proceedings against Britoil. prompting an 
opposition MP to note that it was rather ironic given that one wholl\ owned state 
corporation [BS] was suing another [Britoil] that was forty-eight per cent 
government owned. 123 In reply, a junior Minister of State, Norman Lamont retorted 
that, `since 1977, eight per cent of employment in British Shipbuilders had been 
accounted for by Scott Lithgow and no less than thirty-eight per cent of the 
accumulated losses'. Indeed, Ocean Alliance had been the most disastrous contract 
ever undertaken in a British shipbuilding yard. At March 1983, loss provisions on 
this contract alone stood at nearly £44,000,000. Accordingly, Lamont indicated that, 
`the national interest is not to pour good money after bad'. 124 Clearly, Scott l, ithgow 
was already drinking in the last chance saloon. 
In early January 1984, Scott Lithgow shop stewards had issued a statement that they 
were ready to make a commitment to offshore conditions of employment if BS or 
the Government gave a reciprocal commitment to continuity of employment and the 
chance to complete Ocean Alliance. Such was the union feeling that the convenor. 
Duncan McNeil was quoted as saying that, we will sign any bloody thing that takes 
us into the construction industry'. 125 This was despite the general feeling among the 
workforce that BS had attempted to engineer the closure of Scott Lithgow by an 
orchestrated effort on behalf of the Government. To its credit, the Greenock 
Telegraph went on the offensive to expose the worst of the smears and distortions 
that had occurred. Mrs Thatcher's willing lieutenant in the break up of BS, Graham 
Day had in the previous September spoken about a Ben/Odeco platform that boy s 
from the fields of South Korea had built on time. A comment echoed in a radio 
interview by the Scottish Secretary in the Thatcher Cabinet, George Younger wvho 
said that the Koreans had built a similar rig on time and on budget, *with people who 
were more or less taken off a paddy field'. Both Day and Younger ww ere economic 
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with the truth, as the Korean rig, in comparison to Ocean Alliance. was primiti\ e. 
being secured in position by anchors and only able to operate up to a depth of 2.000 
feet. In contrast, Ocean Alliance was at the forefront of technology and was capable 
of drilling to a depth of 4,500 feet without anchors. Thereafter, bad news 
predominated as it was announced that unless a private buyer could be found. 3.000 
jobs would go by August when HMS Challenger was due to be completed. 126 
By this stage, however, Day who had stated that, `politics and social responsibility 
are for those who are elected... We [BS] are required to act commercially'. when 
announcing that Scott Lithgow would close in March unless a buyer could be found. 
had admitted that negotiations had been going on behind the scenes to privatise Scott 
Lithgow with one British and one foreign company. Indeed, Day's predecessor, 
Robert Atkinson had begun talks with the industrial conglomerate. Trafalgar House 
in May 1983, and thereafter it seems that Trafalgar were the Government's favoured 
bidder. 127 However, references to this in the Scott Lithgow archives are conspicuous 
by their absence, and only in January 1984 when it was common knowledge does a 
reference reveal that local management were aware that a London-based 
conglomerate was interested in buying the entire firm. ' 28 
Trafalgar House, ostensibly a holding company chaired by the late Sir Nigel Broakes 
owned the prestigious shipping line, Cunard and ran a national newspaper, the Daily 
Express, an avid supporter of the Conservative Government. In addition to a sizeable 
portfolio of property and civil engineering interests. Trafalgar also owned an 
offshore modular construction yard, Cleveland Redpath Offshore. However, as a 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins remarked in the context of 
Trafalgar being the preferred bidder, he found it, `just a little peculiar that the 
Government should have apparently have trailed in the Daily Telegraph of 1 
February 1984, the fact that submarine orders were to be forthcoming'. Furthermore, 
`it [was] a rather curious approach to competition that. before one knows who ow nns 
the yard, before one knows what the management is, before one has thought about 
asking for tenders, one announces that, if the yard is privatised. one will give it 
submarine orders. whereas presumably there was no question of doing so when it 
was publicly owned'. Finally, Jenkins asked why Trafalgar as thought to he so 
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good at running a shipyard? 129 The crucial question, however. was would Trafalgar 
with the aid of BS be able to renegotiate the Britoil and BP contracts, and complete 
them on time with substantially the same personnel as before. Nevertheless. 
Trafalgar could easily import industry specialists in offshore and submarine work. 
and project management. Irrespective of this it did seem that the Government had 
already made up its mind to oil the wheels of any subsequent take-over. This was 
confirmed when the Trade and Industry Minster, Norman Tebbit, a former airline 
pilot used to restrictive practices but now adept at condemning them, announced on 
1 February that the Government would pay for the losses incurred thus far at Scott 
Lithgow. Moreover, the State would also meet the cost of future redundancies for 
those men who would have to lose their jobs. 130 Indeed, substantial job losses among 
the 3,000 plus workforce was confirmed in a visit to the yard on 3 February by 
Trafalgar's Nigel Broakes who announced that not more than a thousand men would 
be needed. This news obviously did not go down well with the Scott Lithgo« 
workforce who subsequently staged a spontaneous walk out to express their anger 
and bitterness over the now what appeared to be a `conditional' deal with Trafalgar 
to take over the yard. 131 
By this stage, however, Trafalgar had some competition as the British subsidiary of 
the American construction giant and project management specialist, Bechtel had 
declared its hand. Indeed, it soon became apparent that Bechtel had a far more 
radical plan for Scott Lithgow than Trafalgar had. This involved making the entire 
workforce redundant and closing the facilities for ten weeks to reassess the one-third 
completed Britoil contract. Bechtel maintained that this was the minimum period 
required to sort out the chaotic state of affairs left by the previous management. 
Bechtel also intended to bring the Scott Lithgow welders up to the highest offshore 
standards owing to their discovery that the firm possessed hardly any top rated 
employees. The Bechtel option would have apparently cost BS some £8.000,000 
more in redundancy payments, but around 1,500 jobs could be saved, and 
employment could peak at 2,500 to 3,000 employees. In addition. Bechtel 
intended 
to a have a supervisory ratio of one manager to twelve workmen due to the 
complicated nature of the contract, rather than the pertaining ratio of one manager to 
twenty-five workmen. Bechtel, did however, later admit that they wanted Scott 
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Lithgow as a long-term offshore facility, as a week earlier its vice president. Derek 
Hedley had said that they were only interested in completing the Britoil Ocean 
Alliance, and not Sea Explorer or HMS Challenger. 'Nevertheless, another indication 
that Trafalgar House was the preferred bidder occurred when it announced that it 
been given a 28 February deadline by the MoD to declare an interest in tendering for 
a submarine refit. However, the day before the submarine refit deadline. BP had 
announced that it had cancelled Sea Explorer, which was allegedl}- ninety-six per 
cent completed, but BS decided nevertheless to continue to complete the contract. 
By 3 March Bechtel had withdrawn, as it was unable to convince Government and 
BS of the acceptability of its bid. By this stage, however, another offshore firm. 
Howard Doris had entered the fray and the Bechtel withdrawal prompted the 
apparently rival bidders, Trafalgar and Doris to later announce a joint bid on the 
basis of the former paying seventy-five per cent of it and the latter the remainder. 1 '2 
The Scottish Affairs Committee Report 
In the interim, the Scottish Affairs Committee of the House of Commons had been 
investigating the economic and social effects of closure at Scott Lithgoýv , and 
published their report on 23 March. 133 Predictably the Committee, which contained a 
Conservative majority, had split on party lines and over ninety votes had been taken 
on amendments. This prompted the local MP Dr. Norman Godman to describe the 
report as a travesty as party loyalties had been uppermost. 134 So, no change there- 
then! Nevertheless, in what was in fact a fair report. the fundamental point that 
Britoil had lost confidence in Scott Lithgow and BS was acknowledged. The saving 
of jobs, therefore, depended on renegotiating a new contract with whatever private 
enterprise that would succeed in taking over the troubled firm. The SAC did, not., 
however, venture an opinion on the grounds of sub judice whether much of the 
problems on the Britoil rig had been caused by undue delays from Odeco in New 
Orleans or on the performance and record of Scott Lithgow. 
135 The effects on 
employment of closure were, however, thoroughly investigated. It was noted that 
ninety-two per cent of the Scott Lithgow workforce resided within the Invercly de 
district, with ninety-three per cent living \\ ithin four miles of the yard. Male 
unemployment in January 1984 in Greenock and Port GlasgoN\ stood at just under 
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twenty-two per cent of the total workforce resident in Inverclvvde where Scott 
Lithgow was the largest single employer. In Port Glasgow alone, nearly eighty per 
cent of young adults were without a permanent job. and if Scott Lithgow were to 
close, the male jobless rate in Inverclyde would reach thirty-six per cent. There 
would also be a substantial additional indirect job loss effect on local businesses 
reliant on Scott Lithgow. Indeed, as the respected Fraser of Allander Institute 
estimated these indirect effects of closure would lead to 3,200 job losses in the short 
term and 3,900 in the long term. Moreover, as was estimated by the Scottish Office 
taking account of direct and indirect job losses the cost of closure to the state would 
be £10,000,000 per annum in 1984-85 and 1985-86. However. this covered onl\ the 
immediate costs of state benefits and incorporated some unstated assumptions about 
the rate of re-employment and the proportion of people eligible for unemployment 
benefit. On the other hand, the Fraser of Allander Institute noted that relative to 
direct job losses only in the event of total closure estimated that the cost to the state 
over a full year would be £22,000,000 per annum. Moreover, if indirect job losses 
were taken into account, then this figure might have to be doubled. However. as %\ as 
further noted, these figures should be set against Scott Lithgow's losses, which 
averaged over £30,000,000 in the past five years. Irrespective of this, the In\'ercl\ de 
unemployment rate was a disturbing one as forty per cent of the unemployed had 
been without work for over a year, and of this percentage fort` per cent were under 
the age of twenty-five. 136 
Given the highly damaging effects of closure the SAC noted that of the three 
potential bidders, Trafalgar House foresaw an ongoing market for floating 
production structures of at least a decade. Bechtel believed that the yard offered an 
ideal location for floating structures and a likely increase in demand, as did Howard 
Doris. Nevertheless, the SAC also noted that the Scott Lithgow workforce had 
acknowledged that a variety of shortcomings had contributed to the firm's poor 
performance, but that they were also very bitter about the comments made about the 
yard by BS senior management. Indeed they held that management should take the 
brunt of the responsibility for the situation that Scott Lithgow found itself in. F% e in 
the Conservative dominated Committee [conveniently ignoring their own Part\ ), 
duplicity on this] concurred, and considered BS to be, ` gravel\ at fault in not 
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ensuring that the yard was properly equipped in terms of management. training and 
facilities' to undertake its offshore role. The Committee did. however. reco<Lnise that 
the situation had improved at Scott Lithgow in the past few months. Moreov er. these 
improvements in part stemmed from the appointment of a ne«w Chairman, ManaginL, 
Director and Manufacturing Director from the summer of 1983. Overtime had been 
cut, the yard's activities had been rationalised and centralised to cut overhead costs 
and absenteeism had been brought down to below ten per cent. 137 The priority. 
however, remained to attract a private buyer to complete existing contracts and to 
secure new contracts to maintain an adequate level of employment. 
Three days after the SAC report was published the Scott Lithgow «orkforce had 
overwhelmingly voted to accept a bridging deal from BS. This included no 
compulsory redundancies, and provided that the BS Redundancy Scheme or an 
equivalent should be kept in situ for a period of two years. Additionally, during the 
first year of the take-over, all hourly-paid workers aged forty or over ww ould be 
allowed to leave and take redundancy with timing at the discretion of manauenment. 
As a further sweetener, after privatisation all Scott Lithgow employees would 
receive a payment of £600 repayable on redundancy or taxable after two years. 
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Accordingly, on 28 March 1984, Scott Lithgow became the first BS constituent yard 
to be privatised in its entirety when a bid of £12,000,000 from Trafalgar [louse had 
been [with Howard Doris expected to take up a quarter share in a few \%eeks], 
accepted. As part of the agreement a new completion date for Ocean , -11liance of 
March 1986 had been agreed, with Britoil already in receipt of substantial 
compensation for delay. Although no agreement had yet 
been reached with BP on 
Sea Explorer one was nevertheless expected, and the completion of HMS 
Challenger was also assured. With monumental chutzpah, Graham Day commented 
that it was, `a most satisfactory outcome to what had earlier 
deteriorated into an 
apparently hopeless situation in the yard. The new opportunity minimises 
the 
economic and social consequences, which would 
have stemmed from closure'. 
Asked how the new owner would succeed where the old had failed, Albert 
Granville 
of Howard Doris, summed it up in one word, 'management 
i. 139 
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Chapter VIII: Dejä vu all over again, Trafalgar House, 1984-1988 
It had been already been made clear to BS in the run up to privatisation that 
Trafalgar House had been keen for some time to become a major player in the large 
offshore structures market. The future success of Scott Lithgow1w, which had become 
almost entirely geared to offshore construction hinged in the short term on delivering 
Sea Explorer, and crucially, the Britoil semi submersible. Ocean, -1lliance on time 
and to budget in the spring of 1986. Not only would this go some way to re-establish 
the yard's already badly tarnished reputation in the offshore community. it would 
also be a vindication of privatisation. From the outset, however. Trafalgar House had 
zero experience in either the drillship or in the complex semi submersible market 
and in the run up to privatisation was ultimately reliant on the BS view of Scott 
Lithgow's capability to complete its outstanding contracts. Ne''ertheless. Trafalgar 
did secure the technical co-operation of experienced Howard Doris staff in order to 
complete Ocean Alliance on schedule. Moreover, with the tantalising prospect of 
future submarine orders, combined with the Government's desire to privatise the 
warship firms, it would have been commercially inept had not Trafalgar considered 
the naval dimension of Scott Lithgow as being equally important. If, for example, 
the firm could either win a refit, or make a successful bid for the follo\\ on orders for 
the new Type 2400 conventional submarines, then it could re-establish its reputation 
in the domestic market, and become the alternative supplier to the lead yard. Vickers 
at Barrow. Indeed, even if Scott Lithgow failed to do so, Trafalgar House could still 
use the yard as a launch pad to allow it to bid for other soon to be privatised warship 
builders such as Yarrow or Vickers with their virtual monopolies over frigate and 
conventional and nuclear submarine construction respectively. 
All this, however, was ultimately dependent on political considerations. Trafalgar 
had, nevertheless, at a price of £12,000,000 purchased Scott Lithgow rather cheaply. 
A statement from Howard Doris, who were expected to purchase a quarter of the 
shares, explained that the £ 12,000,000 would equate to the net asset value [the 
aggregate value of the share capital and reserves] of Scott Lithgow. BS. had, 
however, already spent £ 13,000,000 at Scott Lithgow in additional capital 
expenditure on offshore work alone. 
I In the event, an allotment of 27.500.000 
Ordinary Shares in Scott Lithgow was made to BS on 28 March 1984 on a 
renounceable Letter of Allotment in two parts. The 
first part, for sc\ enlty-fi\ c per 
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cent of the share capital was renounced in favour of a «holl\ owned subsidiary of 
Trafalgar House, Cleveland Redpath Engineering Holdings (CREH) on the same 
day. The remaining twenty-five per cent was left open with the intention that 
Howard Doris, or later, the Swedish platform builders. Gotaverken Arendal would 
take up the shares. 2 Just as the purchase price was favourable, the terms of payment 
were even more so. The terms were £3,000,000 in cash by banker's draft on 
Completion and the balance by three equal instalments each of £ 1.000,000 in cash 
by banker's draft on the anniversary of Completion in each of the years 1985.1986 
and 1987. Simple interest for the amount of each instalment from and including the 
Completion Date down to and excluding the date of payment at the rate of one per- 
cent above Bank Rate was payable. Nevertheless, CREH could at any time repaa\ 
part or all of the balance outstanding plus interest without notice or penalty, 
however, if on receipt of the Completion Accounts from BS relating to Scott 
Lithgow, the net asset value should exceed £12,000,000 CRLH %Nould pad BS the 
excess. 3 
In explaining the terms of privatisation in the House of Commons on 28 March. LE 
Minister of State, Norman Lamont, informed that Trafalgar had bought the 
`currently bankrupt Scott Lithgow, reconstructed so as to be able to meet its existing 
liabilities and the cost of essential rationalisation'. The net cost to Government, 
however, after taking into account the purchase price and deferred loans, which 
formed a part of the deal was £71,000,000 a sum that according to Lamont ýý as 
broadly equal to the cost of closure of the yard to the taxpayer. 
' That clay, the 
existing Scott Lithgow directors duly resigned and were replaced by Trafalgar 
House personnel, with Eric Parker. Trafalgar House Group Chief Executive as 
chairman and Jim Grice, a director and general manager of Cleveland Redpath 
Offshore as managing director. At the first meeting of the new Scott Lithgow it was 
noted that Trafalgar House had received from BS the sum of £82,000,000 by 
telegraphic transfer, `bv way of an interest free loan and forming part of the 
Waivable BS Loans'. 
From the outset of negotiations it had been nevertheless recognised by all parties 
that there would be a large shortfall between the original contract price and the 
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actual cost of completing Ocean Alliance. Indeed. at 30 December 1983 Scott 
Lithgow had estimated that the shortfall would be almost £_55.000.00O. --Accordingly. 
prior to privatisation and as a condition of purchase. Trafalgar had made it known toi 
BS that it required that a new or amended contract with Lloyd's Leasing and Britoil 
should be agreed. Trafalgar also required that BS should protect it against any 
shortfall, and that an agreement would be negotiated with the Scott Lithgow 
workforce on interchangeability, on a reduction of numbers employed. and on the re- 
training of welders. For its part, BS required (although there was obviously a `good 
deal of flexibility here) that Trafalgar should acquire Scott Lithgo« on the proviso 
that the cost to BS, including the shortfall should not exceed the cost of closing 
down Scott Lithgow altogether. Moreover. Trafalgar. Scott Lithgo\\ and BS should 
arrive at arrangements with Lloyd's Leasing and Britoil satisfactory to BS. which 
would enable the latter to be discharged from liability under the BS Guarantee and 
that the sale should be completed before the end of the financial ti ear on )1 March 
1984. By 7 February, however, BS had informed Trafalgar that the shortfall on 
Ocean Alliance would now not exceed £64.000,000. Thereafter. in the course of 
negotiations, Britoil informed Trafalgar that they would only concur to an 
agreement, which stipulated a new contractual date for delivery of Ocean Alliance. 
Britoil also required liquidated damages and or penalty provisions for late deli% ery, a 
final deadline for delivery and the replacement of the BS Guarantee \\ ith a guarantee 
from Trafalgar House. Accordingly, Trafalgar had to determine %\ Nether it Could in 
fact meet these conditions and met with Britoil and Odeco represcntativ es over a 
very short time-scale. 6 Nevertheless, due to its relative inexperience in this field, 
short of pulling out of the deal, Trafalgar had little choice but to rely on historical 
data and management opinions pertaining to the completion of Ocean. -l1liance 
before eventually purchasing Scott Lithgow. Given the yard managements past 
performance and failings, however, and the BS desire to offload it, this approach had 
to be at the very least, questionable. 
Post acquisition, Scott Lithgow's new managing director, Jim Grice, who was also a 
former contracts and operations manager at the offshore constructors, Redpath 
Dorman Long at Methil, highlighted the firm's main market area. Grice informed 
that Scott Lithgow's marketing effort would concentrate on providing structures for 
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the development of marginal oilfields. Such areas had lain untapped because of 
prohibitive costs, but tax concessions in recent budgets had helped to reduce these 
costs, and Scott Lith ; ow's experience of semi submersibles would stand them in 
good stead to attract further orders to exploit this potential market. ' he priority. 
however, remained to complete Ocean Alliance on time 
Meanwhile, it will be recalled that Scott Lithgow had continued ww ork on the almost 
completed BP semi submersible, Sea Explorer despite the oil major cancelling the 
contract, and by 18 April it had been announced that the order had been reinstated at 
an apparent cost to BS of £25,000,000. An undertaking to complete . E'c'u Explorer by 
31 July had been given and it was understood that BP had already received adequate 
compensation from BS for late delivery, and that accordingly it had terminated its 
civil action against BS. By this stage, however, Howard Doris. had pulled out of its 
potential partnership with Trafalgar House although no reason was given. To 
speculate, it would not have been unreasonable to assume that Howard Doris may 
have had severe reservations that the timetable to complete both semi submersible s 
could be kept. 
During the negotiations to acquire Scott Lithgow, Trafalgar had made it known to 
two senior Government ministers, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Gcor_ge 
Younger and Norman Lamont that it expected their support on selective financial 
assistance under the Industrial Development Act of 1974. Trafalgar proposed a total 
spend of £20,000,000 on re-training personnel, capital improvement and computer 
systems at Scott Lithgow. Although Trafalgar considered that these proposals were, 
`essential for the long term success of Scott Lithgow', they would, nevertheless only 
be able to proceed, `if adequate financial support by way of grants was made 
available by Government'. Prior to acquisition, Younger had apparently confirmed 
that he would do everything he could to support any application. ` Crucially . the 
question of just what 'adequate financial support' meant was to be the subject of a 
great deal of correspondence and of meetings from the date of acquisition onwards. 
From the outset officials at the Industry Department for Scotland (IDS) wcrc keen to 
establish links between them and the new Scott Lithgow mainaggement. By April 
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1984, however, John McClellan of IDS had noted that one of the issues that required 
close co-operation was the suspicions already expressed in the media and in 
Parliament that Trafalgar House, 'may make a killing out the Scott Litho-ow deal by 
selling land surplus to its requirements at vast profits'. Civil servants were in fact 
dealing with such allegations by referring to an assurance already given by I rafalgar 
that they would be willing to sell any surplus land, 'at an appropriate apportionment 
of the price paid for the land and assets'. And, 'to the discussions which are being 
set up between [Trafalgar's] Property Department and the Property and Environment 
Directorate of the Scottish Development Agency (SDA)'. 10 Beforehand. Trafalgar 
had been quick off the mark and had already sent a detailed application to the IDS 
on the day after acquisition on 29 March. Accordingly, on 4 June the IDS had 
offered Trafalgar a total Project Grant. including Regional Development Grant of 
£4,973,580 an in-plant Training Grant of £4,429,600, being eighty per cent of 
£5,578,000 and an exchange risk guarantee not to exceed £7,500.000 possibly re- 
negotiable to £10,000,000. One of the conditions attached was that there would be a 
claw back on grant in the event that Scott Lithgow did not continue for four \ cars 
All in all, on a total spend of £20,000.000 Trafalgar was being offered £9.223,180 in 
grant, when it had been looking for £15,000,000. By this stage, it had transpired that 
Trafalgar were in fact attempting to ensure grant assistance to a similar level to that 
provided by the D. T. I for Redpath Offshore on Teeside. 
1' By 7 June, howc\ er, 
Trafalgar had withdrawn its application as it was considered that the level of 
assistance proposed was inadequate, but it did ask the IDS to reconsider. 
12 Pending 
another application, the IDS then placed Trafalgar's application 
for assistance in 
abeyance. 13 
In a later off the record comment by Allen of the IDS 
it was noted that one of the 
principal differences between the unsuccessful 
Scott Lithgow proposal and the 
successful Teeside proposal was that the latter, 
`created "real" jobs rather than 
preserved or purported to create jobs'. In, -a very off the record remark' 
that R. A. 
Wallace of Trafalgar preferred not to have quoted or used, 
Allen had stated that 
Trafalgar House, had done very well out of the Scott Lithgo\ Acquisition and 
from 
Central Government generally on the question of assistance in its capital 
developments'. Given this, it was time for Trafalgar, to put more of their- money 
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into the business'. As Wallace further noted, this attitude could x\ ell be the real 
problem we face in these negotiations and will require delicate handling'. 14 
Nevertheless, although an element of brinkmanship applied. Trafalgar had by 25 
June re-submitted a revised application for a smaller scale project. The revised 
application involving a sum of £15,626,000 had been considered by C. H. Coulthard 
at the Department of Industry in Glasgow and by 20 Jul. -,., it was anticipated that the 
Department would ratify the following. On a total spend of £ 15.626,000 
Government would provide £8,130,000 in grants, which equated to fifty-m o per 
cent. 15 
By October, however, Trafalgar had accepted an IDS formal offer of assistance of 
24 August under Section 7 of the Industrial Development Act 1974. This was in 
relation to Regional Development Grant and Regional Selective Assistance a grant 
of up to £3,396,000 and an exchange risk guarantee on a direct European Coal and 
Steel Community loan of up to £4,855,000 in respect of the upgrading of the Glen 
and Cartsburn yards and of computerised facilities. In addition Trafalgar also 
accepted a training grant of up to £2,186,000 (or up to £4,372,000 if European 
Social Fund Assistance were not received) to aid a programme to re-train about one 
thousand employees in advanced welding techniques and specific management 
skills. ' 6 As was earlier noted at Scott Lithgow, in view of the sums of money 
involved in grants and other existing problems it would merit the employment of a 
full time member of staff with suitable support for about two years. 17 
Earlier in July the full extent of Scott Lithgow's financial position before 
privatisation for the financial year 1983-1984 was revealed when the BS Accounts 
revealed a loss of £74,584,000. Moreover, the BS overall trading loss at 
£161,000,000 was the highest since nationalisation. For the Corporation. Graham 
Day explained that £100,000,000 of this loss was attributable to just four offshore 
contracts. Day commented under the sub heading "Scott Lithgowt , ". that. the 
financially ill-fated venture into the construction of complete offshore units has 
impacted upon [BS] in a number of ways. The financial results speak for 
themselves'. Day further noted that the efforts required of BS management and stat't`, 
to address the contractual, technical, manufacturing, industrial relations and other 
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matters associated with Scott Lithgow and currently Cammell Laird. are such as to 
place much of the day to day Corporation business into the comparative back, -, 1-0 Lind for significant periods'. BS had, nonetheless. since September 1983.. divested itself 
by sale or closure seven constituent firms and intended to rid itself of its last two 
remaining ship repairing firms and general engineering interests during 1984-198 
Preparation to privatise the warship sector was already under way and only t\ \o of 
the previous five divisions now remained, Warship ý, N ith six firms, and 
Merchant/Composite (mixed naval and mercantile) with fourteen. The BS position 
on the privatisation of Scott Lithgow was, however, made a little clearer when it was 
confirmed that a provisional payment of £82.000,000 had been made to Scott 
Lithgow. And, that on receipt of the audited Completion Accounts. (which had not 
yet been received) an adjustment of the provisional payment «ould be made 
dependent on the net asset value revealed. BS, did, however. remain liable for any 
penalties for late delivery, on one semi submersible' with a contract sales value of' 
£78,000,000 [Sea Explorer] and in the event that the customer should become 
entitled to terminate the contract, BS had given an undertaking that it would 
purchase it. 18 The running of BS had by this stage come under increased 
parliamentary scrutiny, and Day had earlier been forced to hand over a copy of the 
BS Corporate Plan to the Trade and Industry Select Committee of the House of 
Commons after he had earlier refused to do so claiming that it was sensitive. 19 With 
losses on this scale, however, it would have stretched credulity, to breaking point had 
not the Government interfered in the running of the Corporation. Nevertheless. I)av 
was clearly under orders to dismantle BS. As he would later state, `I Joined BS... and 
moved to get rid of as much of the loss-making assets as I could. as promptly as I 
could' . 
20 
Beforehand, the Scott Lithgow workforce had accepted in April 1984 a thirty-six- 
page document, which in effect offered the possibility of sweeping aw a\ much of 
the restrictive practices in the yard. This apparently marked a clean break from 
extant shipbuilding practice, by envisaging complete interchangeability betvv, een 
welders, platers, and caulker-burners, in addition to interchangeability in the outfit 
trades. By May, however, the hourly paid vv orkforce had joined a Scottish Trade 
Union Council one-day stoppage in support of the National I ! pion of' linevv orkers 
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Strike. Despite this. Trafalgar's chairman. Sir \igel Broakes highli(., hted that Scott 
Lithgow would win more orders in the next few months, would break e% en during 
the year and return to profit in 1985. It was also reported that Scott 1, ithgo« %% as 
hopeful of securing a submarine refit in November 1984 and that MoD (N) had 
repeated their interest in new building tenders for the new Type -IQO cony entional 
submarines. This prompted the local MP, Norman Godman to comment that lie was 
`certain that the refit order would go to Scott Lithgow [and added that] he \\ as 
convinced that new builds would follow' . 
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Just how Godman was so convinced remains uncertain, but given the recent history 
of MoD `promises' to Scott Lithgow his stance must have owed more to optimism 
than sense. Scott Lithgow did, however, appoint Graham Strachan as executive 
director in charge of attracting MoD work. Strachan a former deputy chairman at 
John Brown Engineering had at least a credible reputation in the industry. l3ý Juli , 
Scott Lithgow had also hired on a consultancy basis Greg Mott who had beeil 
recently sacked by BS as chairman of Vickers. Mott had recent experience on the 
Trident project and had been bought in to offer advice on tendering for the T'pc 
2400 submarine follow on orders. 22 On the face of it, as Vickers was in the pmcesý 
of building the first of class, this seemed to be a shrewd move, as the real 
competition for these orders would come from either it or Cammell Laird. Both 
firms had already received substantial Government investment to build Polaris, and 
in Vickers case to build Trident nuclear submarines. However, \\ ith the recent 
announcement of the Government's intention to privatise seven warship firms by 
March 1986, which now apparently included Cammell Laird, Swan Hunter, Brooke 
Marine and Hall Russell in addition to the three designated warship firms, Vickers. 
Vosper Thornycroft and Yarrow, other bids could be expected. 23 Nevertheless. Scott 
Lithgow had by this stage finally completed the ill-fated Seabed Operations Vessel, 
HMS Challenger-, more than a year later than scheduled primarily because of 
defective cabling and a defective MoD saturation diving system at a reported cost of 
£ 100,000,000.24 It is to this contract that I now turn. 
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HMS Challenger 
As the Committee of Public Accounts heard, Challenger was meant to improve the 
Royal Navy's deep diving capability and to fulfil seabed search. recovery and 
research roles. As such, Challenger was a major innovation. with capabilities 
unique in the Western World'. Although not strictly a warship, Challef go- \\ as 
nevertheless the fifth largest vessel in the Fleet. With a towed unmanned 
submersible and an integrated navigation and dynamic positioning system as well as 
a saturation diving system Challenger was a complex product from the beginning. 
Accordingly, design responsibilities were split between the MoD and four main 
contractors, but primarily rested with Scott Lithgow. The design of the saturation 
diving system (SDS) was the responsibility of the MoD, but it did sub contract to 
Camper and Nicholson Electrical Industries to provide assistance in finalising the 
SDS design. The day to day management of the project was split between the ship 
and weapons system areas, each with its own project team. This involved the 
supervision of a complex network of sub contractors although current practice ww ould 
have demanded a prime contractor, but this was not the case with Challenger. 
Moreover, staff shortages on MoD project teams, and at Scott Lithgovv were a 
feature of the contract and from the outset the project had suffered from cost 
escalations and delays. In September 1976 the MoD had approved the project at a 
cost of £35,500,000 (September 1975 prices). However, no detailed design %%ork had 
taken place and a revised estimate of £71,500,000 (September 1978 prices) %% as 
approved in 1979. An increase that was primarily due to an `underestimation of the 
complexity of the equipment fit', nonetheless the new estimate contained 
contingencies for weapon systems and for the vessel itself. MoD committees were 
accordingly assured that no major development problems were 
foreseen. By early 
1983, however, the estimated cost had soared to £133,000,000 (constant July 1982 
prices) mainly due to weapons systems. Moreover, due to 
faults in wiring and in the 
SDS discovered in 1983 additional costs had been incurred and the latest estimated 
costs at July 1983 constant prices was £153,000,000 (approved 
in January 1985). 
This represented a real cost increase of around seventeen per cent over the 
1979 
estimate again primarily due to weapons systems, which 
had had increased as a 
proportion of the total estimated cost 
from thirty-cight per cent in 1979 to forty-eight 
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per cent at current prices. Clearly. given what had already occurred, much could be 
learned from the handling of this project. 25 Subsequently. after acceptance from 
Scott Lithgow in July 1984, improvements in the SDS were required in 1986 when 
after a competitive tendering exercise, Thorn-EMI , giere awarded the contract which 
it in turn sub-contracted to Humber Shiprepairers. 26 
Post Challenger, any hope of further naval orders now rested entirely on either a 
submarine refit or new build work coming to a yard essentially geared to the 
offshore sector. To the latter end in October 1984, Trafalgar House Offshore (THO 
had become one of the largest offshore players in the UK, when with , S'c'u Explorer 
due to go on trials, it had been given the go ahead by Government to purchase the 
RGC offshore construction yard at Methi1.27 RGC was purchased from the British 
Steel Corporation for £15,000,000 and gave Trafalgar a facility for heavy jacket 
construction, as well as a large fabrication hall. With Scott Lithgoýý concentratinnýe on 
semi submersibles, and Cleveland Offshore and Redpath Offshore on -fccside, vvhcrc 
the Redpath yard was undergoing a major upgrading, including three module 
assembly halls at a cost of £9.000.000 THO had now a wide ranging capability . 
capability enhanced by Trafalgar Davy Offshore, which provided design, 
management and construction services for oil and gas field projects. Dcspitc this 
expansion, by November, productivity on Ocean Alliance was reported to be 'too 
low' and the repair rate, `unacceptably high' 29 Nevertheless, Scott Litlhgow had hv 
this stage at least won its first order since privatisation, as Gotm-erken l\rcndal had 
placed an order in October worth £2,000,000 to construct pontoons and deck units 
for a platform under construction in Sweden. 
30 
Whilst the Gotaverken order was no doubt welcome, it was hardly' a major contract. 
which could justify the considerable overheads at Scott Lithgow. Moreover. by this 
stage the naval dimension had suffered a considerable setback when it was 
announced that the inexperienced Humber Graving Dock Company had won the 
submarine refit order, HMS Otter that Scott Lithgow had tendered for. This contract, 
for which Vickers and Cammell Laird had also tendered, had been awarded 
in line 
with the Government's stated intention to extend competition to vv arship refit vv ork. 
If Scott Lithgow had hoped that expertise would outweigh straight cash 
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considerations then they were sadly disabused as Humber had underbid them. to the 
tune of several million pounds'. On the loss of the refit, a management spokesman at 
Scott Lithgow apparently professed to be -amazed' and to be -extremelvv, 
disappointed'. With male unemployment in Greenock at just under eighteen per cent 
and in Port Glasgow at 31.5 per cent, 300 more jobs were at risk. mostly in outfit 
over the loss of the refit. Scott Lithgow's managing director Jim Grice admitted by 
this stage that owing to the high rate of voluntary redundancies that had already 
taken place, the yard had a lopsided labour force in terms of its requirements. 31 
Clearly this situation would test the firm's determination to remain in the submarine 
market, but if it wished to be a serious contender for the forthcoming T pL' 2400 
orders, more money would have to be spent. 
By December 1984, Syd Fudge of RGC Offshore in his capacity as an 'observer' 
had informed Scott Lithgow management that the decision had been taken to 
mothball Scotts' Engine Works, pending the decision to award a contract for the 
Type 2400 submarines. Fudge also pointed out that production management in 
particular should look into productivity instead of increasing manpower. Mloreoýver. 
on Ocean Alliance the head of quality assurance had highlighted that production 
management still did not have the quality under control. 32 This brought a sharp 
response from the manager responsible for production, Kooymans. \\ ho pointed out 
to Fudge [the latter believed that production found productivity targets to be 
impractical], that information regarding productivity had to be accurate. 
Furthermore, Kooymans believed that up until now it appeared to be impossible for 
the Scott Lithgow organisation to provide accurate information. Fudge had also 
pointed out that that the overall estimated man-hours did not compare with job cards. 
To this, Kooymans suggested a solution, which he had apparently mooted some 
months beforehand. Namely. to use the job card system as the basis of the reporting 
system, to the full extent by allocating the man-hours to the job card number, so 
that [he could] single out those who are not performing'. Kooymans also suggestcd 
that the present Quality Assurance system on Ocean Alliance was holding back 
production. 
33 Clearly, with the Ocean Alliance programmes slipping back. tensions 
within the management structure were becoming apparent. 
Indeed, in a response to a 
memorandum of 1-0 December 1984 from Graham 
Strachan regarding the danger of 
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losing submarine experienced foremen. Kooymans pointed out that the firm had too 
many outfitters. Strachan had heard that the new -Blueprint is based on a reduction 
of our electrical foremen from seven down to two and our mechanical foremen from 
fourteen down to six'. If correct, Strachan thought that this in addition to senior 
personnel already lost would be, even more alarming in the context of our bidding 
for three submarines with a work content. spread over six years. of some nine 
million man hours'. Kooymans, obviously frustrated, replied that Scott Lithgow had 
no submarine contracts, no definitive plan to retain submarine - kno \\ how'. that the 
impracticality of using outfit foremen to supervise steelwork trades remained, and 
that restrictions placed on the firm by Trafalgar House did not help. Koovn-ians 
clearly believed that in the event of redundancies that Scott Lithgow could reinstate 
the `know how' through sub contractors or short term contracts, or could buy the 
`know how', if and when it was required. Nevertheless, he \\ as fully aware of first 
class supervision for every job, but the present imbalance in the vorkforcc did not 
help and the sooner that [Scott Lithgow] 'could bring down the numbers to an 
acceptable level', the better it would be for the firm in general. Konti mans \%-as, in 
essence, reflecting the inherent uncertainty of Scott Lithgow attaining MoD 
contracts . 
'4 
Tensions persisted and in discussing the future of outfit departments at Scott 
Lithgow in January 1985, Neil MacFarlane pointed out that although Trafalgar had 
taken the decision to bid for the new Type 2400 submarines `enthusiastically', the 
Production Services Department now found itself investigating the cost of transfer 
from the Engine Works; the minimum outfit needs of Occuri 1l1iunce: and another 
exercise based at Cartsburn to accommodate the manufacturing needs for the 
submarines. MacFarlane tellingly commented that, in the past this type of 
fragmented approach was costly in terms of staff supervision and uneconomical in 
terms of plant and labour utilisation'. Plainly, if no submarine orders were won then 
the retention of such a large complex as the Engine Works could not be cost 
justified, although an alternative manufacturing site could be found «ithin Scott 
Lithgow. MacFarlane also pointed out that by far the greatest proportion of outfit 
manufacturing hours were spent on the production of non-proprietary components 
by personnel who had acquired the necessary custom made skills 
in-house over 
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many years. Thus, if subcontracted, man-hours would increase, as ýý ould supervision 
costs not least through adequate control over the multiplicity of parts needed for 
submarine work. 35 
This all served to highlight the dilemma facing Scott Lithgo«. however. Occwi 
Alliance not yet thirty per cent completed, remained, `significantly in delay. even 
with the borrowed labour'. Moreover, the expected loss on this contract alone now 
stood at the end of January 1985 at £7,740,000.36 Clearly. suggested productivity 
improvements were still not yet filtering through on this contract and overall 
productivity remained poor. By the end of February. however. Kooymans had 
resigned, `for personal reasons' after Sea Explorer had been officially handed over- 
to BP earlier in the month. By March, construction had began on a new road at a 
cost of £500,000 within Scott Lithgow to allow the passage of modules completed at 
Cleveland Redpath Offshore to be transported and fitted to Ocean . llliance. 
In the 
interim, Malcolm Ford of Britoil presenting his company's annual report, noted that 
Ocean Alliance due for delivery in May 1986, would miss next summer's drilling 
season and would not now be ready until September 1986.37 
Scott Lithgow's situation with effectively only one contract [and a major loss 
making one at that] in hand, was serious, and management continued to seek 
candidates for redundancy. In this regard, Graham Strachan noted to Scott Lithgoýv's 
future general manager, Harry Nicholas on 30 April 1985 that he had just heard that 
a key manager with submarine experience, David Scott was a candidate 
for 
redundancy. Strachan commented that if the firm lost Scott, on top of all the others 
that had gone, we are virtually down to one man, namely Neil MacFarlane, 
in the 
whole area of manufacturing and outfitting'. Given this. Strachan then reminded 
Nicholas that the latter had agreed to try to retain all submarine personnel in any 
forthcoming redundancy situation. 
38 With Trafalgar having already lost out to GEC 
over the Yarrow privatisation, 620 compulsory redundancies were announced at 
Scott Lithgow on 1 May unless voluntary redundancies were accepted by 7 NIa\ 
This moved the chairman of the Scott Lith`gow shop stewards. 
Bart \Ionaghan to 
comment that. `we have co-operated with everything they 
have asked us to do on 
work practices... now they have stabbed us 
in the back'. Compulsory redundancies 
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had prompted an earlier one-day walkout by the workforce on ? May. By 14 May. 
however, with an extra payment of £2,000 available to new applicants under the age 
of forty years for redundancy. a total of 415 manual workers and 184 staff had 
volunteered. This brought the hourly-paid workforce at Scott Lith`go\\ down to 
1,600. A situation given further focus with the news that the submarine order 
situation had taken an entirely new twist when it was announced that the still 
nationalised Vickers, prior to privatisation. had taken over their nationalised 
submarine rivals, Cammell Laird at Birkenhead for the derisory sum of £ 1.39 
Cammell Laird had already been `saved' by the award of a type 22-frigate contract 
in January, which as the Committee of Public Accounts later noted had been placed 
their to ensure the Birkenhead firm's survival as a major warship builder at an extra 
cost of £7,000,000.40 
By this stage, however, the deal by which GEC had bought Yarrow, who it wi 11 be 
recalled that Scott Lithgow had withdrawn from purchasing in 1970. had been made 
public. The reported purchase price of just under £34,000,000 comprised: 
£ 17,000,000 payable in cash by GEC for the Yarrow shares. A loan to be repaid by 
Yarrow Shipbuilders to BS on completion of sale of £3,080,000. The dividend 
declared by Yarrow Shipbuilders to BS prior to completion of t 10,000,000 and an 
estimated payment to be made by Yarrow Shipbuilders by March 1986 to BS for 
group tax relief of £3,700,000.41 As Johnman has noted, once the profitable warship 
sector had been privatised then by definition the rump of BS, the mercantile yards, 
would be unprofitable. Indeed, between 1980-1981 and 1983-1984 the cosseted 
warship sector of BS had made a profit of £185,000,000 in stark contrast to the 
mercantile sector losses of £525,000,000. Clearly', as Johnman has further noted. the 
privatisation of the warship yards was intended to foster a long held ambition of the 
MoD to have realistic competitive tendering, even though this involved the 
deliberate creation of over-capacity in the sector in relation to likely naval demand. 
42 
Throughout 1985 the ramifications of the real cost to Government of the Trafalgar 
House take-over had rumbled on and on 17 June, Norman Lamont revealed that the 
respective auditors of BS and Trafalgar House had failed to reach agreement on the 
Scott Lithgow Completion Accounts. Accordingly, the matter had been referred to 
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an independent expert for determination. In the interim, BS had a<Lrtcd to make a 
payment principally for the cost of completing Sea Explorer, which Was not in 
dispute 43 However, the BS Accounts for the year 1984/1985 %%ere more re%elatory. 
BS had paid to Trafalgar House on 19 June, £30,649.000 of which. £26.000.000 was 
attributable to Sea Explorer for which BS was liable to complete following the 
privatisation of Scott Lithgow. Taken together with interest thereon of £4.509.000 
and professional fees, dilapidations, plus further liquidated damages and subcontract 
costs in respect of the two drilling rigs of £18.? 98.000 this comprised a grand total 
to BS of £53,456,000. This left an amount remaining in dispute in the Completion 
Accounts amounting to £49,618,000 plus interest from March 1984. Clearly. 
taking into account the original Waivable BS loan to Trafalgar of £82.000.000 the 
further payment of £53,456,000 and the disputed Completion . -\ccounts. the cost to 
the taxpayer of saving Scott Lithgow, potentially in excess of £ 180.000,000 had to 
exceed the cost of closing it down in March 1984. By September 198 5. ho\\ c\ c r, 
with Scott Lithgow still in effect in a one-order situation, the MoD had announced 
that it was delaying the placing of contracts for the Type 2-100-class submarines until 
November [subsequently delayed to January 1986]. Scott Lithgow had also 
announced that it was axing one thousand jobs and had declined to tender for t\\ o 
frigates and two RFA oil replenishment vessels as they were too complex, involving 
missile and helicopter pads as well as ammunition stores. Tellingly, the firm no 
longer had the design capacity to deal with new design work on this type of vvessel. -'5 
Just how it expected to cope if awarded the three Type 2-100 class submarine orders 
remained unclear, nevertheless, it is to the events surrounding the a\\ and of this 
contract that I now turn. Before doing so, however, it should be noted that Trafalgar 
House had already intimated [although the exact date remains unclear] to BS that 
owing to the losses on Ocean Alliance being substantially in excess of those 
indicated at the time of privatisation, that it intended to sue BS for 
misrepresentation. 46 
The Type 2400 Tender 
As Wrobel has noted, as part of the 1981 Defence Rev, ieww. Government had 
announced a reduction in the planned size of the Royal Navy's surface fleet \\ ith a 
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continuing build up of hunter killer nuclear submarines. `loreov-er. it «-as also 
intended to proceed with a new class of diesel-electric powered submarines. 
Previously, in the mid 1970s with the Oberon class due to be phased out in the late 
1980s, the critical choice for the planners as Wrobel saw it was whether to continue 
operating conventional submarines or to go all-nuclear. The decision to go ahead 
with a conventional submarine was. however, not based on a comparison between it 
and a nuclear version's capabilities, but was made on the basis that the two t% pes 
could complement each other. A conventional submarine although lacking the speed 
and endurance of a nuclear alternative, was considerably cheaper over time, quieter 
and better suited for covert operations in shallow waters. Indeed, a mixed submarine 
fleet had considerable advantages in the range of tasks it could perform. From a 
broad initial range of requirements and designs the Royal Navy eventually settled on 
a design with `a very sophisticated weapon/sensor fit and a submerged displacement 
of 2,250 tonnes'. This was subsequently approved in 1981 and a contract for the first 
submarine of the Type 2400 class was placed with Vickers two years later. 47 
Notwithstanding the late Ross Belch's insistence that MoD (N) had promised that 
Scott Lithgow would be the follow on yard for the Type 2-00 submarine project. and 
the undue delay in beginning the project, the situation had materially changed \\ ith 
the onset of privatisation of the warship firms from BS control. That Scott Lithgovv 
were allowed to tender at all owed much to the commitment oiWickers to the 
Trident programme, and an all too belated attempt by MoD (N) to introduce an 
element of `real' competitive tendering into warship procurement, rather than the 
hollow sham that had hitherto persisted. In tandem with the Trident nuclear 
submarine decision, the slow build up of resources had also marked the Type 2400 
submarine programme. In November 1982, however, the Government had approved 
a modernisation project at the lead yard for design and development, Vickers at 
Barrow, including a construction hall to facilitate the building of modern warships 
including the Trident programme. The project was likely to take five years to 
complete at a cost of £220,000,000. Part of the reason given to the Committee of 
Public Accounts (CPA) for this government largesse was that improvements in 
productivity would accrue, as Vickers would become more efficient and competiti\ e 
than hitherto. This did not necessarily follow, particularly as Vickers 'v as already the 
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monopoly supplier of nuclear submarines. and more realistically amounted to a 
pious hope rather than anything more concrete. Given the amount of taxpaý er 
monies already expended, however, the CPA ýý ere nevertheless very concerned at 
the low rate of productivity in the warship yards in general and in particular it had 
cause to regret that MoD (N) had allowed Vickers to exploit its monopoly position 
in nuclear submarine procurement. On warships in general the builders had. 'found it 
easy to make profits in the past and the taxpayer [had] not received value for 
money' . 
48 This was hardly an earth shattering conclusion as other committees 
beforehand had arrived at the same conclusion and as the author has consistentl\ 
pointed out over the course of this thesis in relation to collusion. the warship firms. 
despite their self-appointed reputation for efficiency. ýv ere at heart fundamentally 
inefficient. 
As Vickers were already heavily committed to Trident and the lead Tl ppe 2400 boat. 
BS and MoD Procurement Executive had established a joint ý\ corkin`g party to 
recommend other suitable BS yards for the remaining Type 2-1000 work. : -\ccordingl\ , 
Scott Lithgow, along with four other BS companies attended a presentation at 
Barrow on 25 January 1983. There, the working party outlined the criteria against 
which individual firm's would be judged, and invited them to respond to this in their 
submissions. The essential criteria were management structure and organisation; 
industrial skills and resources; shipyard facilities; production methods; quality 
assurance; dockside test organisation and facilities; planning/production control 
organisation; follow yard services and support; and training and financial 
implications. It was also understood that in mangy' areas the T' pc 2400 class would be 
built to nuclear standards. By this stage, however. it was evident that the majority of 
the Cartsburn yard was already doomed as Scott Lithgow wished to concentrate its 
offshore and submarine construction in its Port Glasgow shipyard at Kingston and at 
the adjacent Inchgreen Dockyard site in Greenock. Of the three alternatives put 
forward, Cartsburn would need capital expenditure of £ 1.500.000 and would be 
made available if the MoD wanted a dedicated site: Kingston would require 
£1 £2,500,000 and Kingston/Inchgreen, , 500,000.4Q 
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It will be recalled that in an earlier BS exercise to ascertain the costs of eýtablishing 
the capacity for nuclear submarine construction at Cammell Laird and Scott 
Lithgow, the cost at Scott Lithgow alone would have exceeded £68.000.000. In this 
light, the firm's bid to build the Type 2400 which would require nuclear standards of 
construction whilst still a part of BS and suffering huge losses on offshore 
construction was nothing more than ersatz. To be really economical. submarines are 
best constructed under cover; indeed Scotts' had built this way in the Great War. but 
had not done so since. Although the firm's plans made it clear that it \\ ould seek 
approval from BS to concentrate its production facilities at the Kingston and Glen 
yards and at Inchgreen, no under cover facility was planned o« ing to cost and time 
considerations. In short, with additional plant and equipment. Scott Lithggovv 
intended to build the Type 2400 much as it had done in the past vv ith the Oheron 
class. Nonetheless, to be fair to Scott Lithgow. the firm had ev entuall\ been 
entrusted by Vickers and MoD (N) to ensure quality standards on the fabrication of 
approximately thirty per cent of the pressure hull units complete with internal 
stiffeners and bulkheads for three nuclear powered submarines between 1980 and 
1982. '0 
It was later alleged, however, that from the date of Cameron Parker's departure in 
June 1983 that BS top management had `actively encouraged the experienced 
submarine workforce both shipyard and workshop to volunteer for redundancy 
despite protests from local management as to the damage this would cause'» This 
may have been done in line with the wish to concentrate production in Port Glasgo\\ 
and as an acknowledgement that the Cartsburn yard was unlikely to receive any 
further orders. Indeed, Scott Lithgow had already been dealt a crushing blow as a 
result of the Nott defence cuts and the vvish to concentrate refits in the Royal 
Dockyards and thereafter to put these refits out to competitive tender. However. III 
the past five years only two major and a number of minor refits submarines had been 
carried out as part of a, `planned programme of six major refits which MoD 
considered «ould keep Scotts' submarine building specialist team together until the 
Type 2-100 could go into series production'. These hopes \ ere cruell\ dashed when 
the MoD, `abruptly terminated this programme in 1981-1982 after the first of' tvv O 
refits, principally as a result of the Nott 
defence cuts'. 
;7 
By 19 April 1984, however, Trafalgar House through Scott Lithgo\\ were asked to 
confirm their interest in being invited to tender to build the second and third o1'what 
had now become known as the Upholder class of patrol submarines. either 
singularly or together. Trafalgar House, in response, offered an updated version of 
the Scott Lithgow response of February 1983 for the first round of tenders in 
November. By this stage Trafalgar had omitted the Kingston/Inchureen option and it 
was the firm intention to develop the Cartsburn site for the construction and 
outfitting of submarines, with dry docking being carried out at the Inch`grcen site. 
However, as alternative build strategies developed, Scott Lithgo\v again moved 
towards concentrating its submarine effort at the Kingston % ard. as it ran do\\ n the 
Cartsburn activities. 54 Nevertheless, the Vickers take-over of Cammell Laird of` June 
1985 must have thrown a metaphorical spanner in the works. but (, )av c Trafalgar a 
potential get out of jail clause. The conglomerate could and subsequently did bid for 
Vickers/Cammell Laird when the Barrow and Birkenhead firms were put up for sýde 
by BS, although after losing out to GEC on the Yarrow privatisation, a successful 
Trafalgar House bid was by no means guaranteed. 
Subsequently, by September 1985 in what was an iterative tendering process, 
Trafalgar had submitted its third tender for the Upholder class in direct competition 
with Vickers/ Cammell Laird and the now GEC owned, Yarro\\ Shipbuilders. 
Clearly, Vickers/Cammell Laird held all the aces in the tendering process. but could 
still be trumped on the final selling price. As the lead yard for the design and build 
of the first of the Type 2400 [Upholder] class, and the monopoly supplier of nuclear 
powered submarines, Vickers either on its own or through its surrogate, Cammell 
Laird could tender with a high degree of accuracy due to its detailed know ledge 
already gained. By December, however, Trafalgar House had officially entered the 
race to buy Vickers/Cammell Laird, which offered it the possibility of getting the 
contract by the back door in any event. All effort expended in securing the three 
Upholder class follow-on orders was to no avail, as in January 1986 it %\ as officially 
announced that Cammell Laird had won the £300,000,000 contract. 
' 'onethelc s. 
in what was clearly a consolation gesture. the MoD had apparently 'promised' to 
award Scott Lithgo«- at 10.000,000 contract for the design and build of a range 
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mooring vessel later in the year and two powered mooring lighters subject to the 
satisfactory negotiation of appropriate terms and design conditions. In addition, 
Scott Lithgow would also be allowed to tender for all new MoD construction and 
refit orders and for steelwork on the Trident programme on a sub contract basis. 
On hearing of the loss of the Upholder contracts and the MoD offer of the three 
small vessels the Trafalgar House Offshore-managing director. Sv d Fudge publicly 
commented that `if this was not a sop he did not know what is'. Furthermore. Fudge 
was `appalled and if MoD thought that this would keep Scott Lithgow alive, they 
could forget it'. On the range mooring vessel Fudge pointed out that with all the 
problems at two other yards, Ferguson Ailsa and Hall Russell all that Scott Lith`gowwý 
would be doing was `taking the bread out of their mouths. The effect on employment 
would be nil and would eventually mean a further rundown'. Moreover, Fudge also 
stated that as Scott Lithgow was to design the vessel then no benefit would accrue 
for a year. This arrangement was also considered by the local MP Norman Godman 
as `bloody awful'. However, in relation to the Upholder bid, the Scottish Secretarv 
George Younger prior to taking up a promotion as Minister of Defence informed 
that the Scott Lithgow bid was not sufficiently competitive in price terms. Later, in 
the House of Commons, John Lee informed that the Cammell Laird bid was 
£20,000,000 less than MoD had expected to pay. About half of the saving was due to 
ordering all three vessels together and half was due to competitive pressures. 58 
At least Trafalgar could still play its get out of jail card by vv inning the bid to 
purchase Vickers/Cammell Laird. By March, however, it had been revealed that the 
conglomerate had lost out to a management led consortium, VSEL Employee 
Consortium plc. The Consortium offered a downpayment of £60.000,000 allied with 
a profit sharing arrangement for the period 1986 to 1992, which would provide BS 
with further payments of up to £40,000,000 in 1992 and 1993. Part of the deal was 
that the Consortium would undertake to complete and fund the remainder of the 
work on the submarine facilities project began under BS control in order to be able 
to complete the Trident programme to MoD requirements. Moreover. the 
Consortium gave a further undertaking to the MoD that that it would renegotiate the 
contract for the first Trident submarine, on terms, price. programme and conditions 
which represents a significant improvement to the MoD on the terns prey iously 
375 
negotiated with Vickers under BS control. 59 This announcement prompted a local 
Liberal politician, Ross Finnie, now a Minister of the Scottish Parliament to 
comment that the decision was a scandal. He noted that in recent months. Trafalgar 
had lost out on submarine orders because the Government had only considered the 
cheapest bid. Now, Government, had let Vickers go to a management bid of 
£100,000,000 despite Trafalgar House bidding tens of millions of pounds more'. 
Moreover, according to Finnie, the Government had overruled a recommendation 
from British Shipbuilders that Vickers should be sold to Trafalgar House . 
60 Even 
by the non-standards of the Thatcher led administration this appeared to be a 
perverse decision, and indeed, Finnie's comments seemed to have considerable 
substance. Indeed, this was substantially confirmed by the Secretary of State at the 
Department of Trade and Industry, Paul Channon, in the House of Commons. 
Channon revealed that BS and its financial advisors had judged the commercial 
terms of the [Trafalgar House] bid `in so far as they affected BS, to be superior to 
the Consortium's bid'. However, Channon, falling back on the cloak of commercial 
confidentiality, revealed that that there was a further term in the Trafalgar bid that he 
found very difficult to accept, and one that he would not disclose without the 
permission of the bidders. Moreover, BS had also acknowledged that other- intere-sts 
beyond its remit had been involved in the sale. Accordingly, Channon had decided 
to declare the Consortium the winner over Trafalgar House. It then transpired that 
the Government had demanded that the bids contained theoretical, but not firm terms 
for the construction of Trident with the entire process being squeezed into a matter 
of days to enable a firm price to be registered. Even so, Trafal ar had been allowed 
to submit its terms after the deadline. 
6 
Nevertheless, the entire tendering process in the nether world of MoD procurement 
bids as the Scott Lithgow Board later noted 'left very much to be desired'. Assuming 
that their bid was second (that is, £20,000,000 lower) to that of Vickers Cammell 
Laird the Scott Lithgow board surmised that the latter had bid £ 10,000,000 less than 
it had for the three vessel order. Scott Lithgow had apparently been penalised by 
another £10,000,000 due to its refusal to accept clause 
41.2 (c) of the MoD contract. 
which required the firm to accept all changes without compensation. 
This was in all 
likelihood the term that Channon had refused to disclose to the House 
of Commons. 
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Moreover, MoD did not provide equality of information to the two follow on 
builders, Scott Lithgow and Yarrow and the policy of iterative tenderino. «vhereb`v 
four tenders were submitted between March and November 198 , 
inevitably gay c 
rise to a significant risk of a breach of confidentiality in the intervening( period. As a 
Scott Lithgow director had earlier noted, the following points %\ ere worth recording. 
However, although these points should be viewed with the proviso that they could be 
considered to be one-sided, they are still worth considering in detail due to their 
content. 
1. Scott Lithgow's response to the problem of the lead boat's design being 
incomplete was to tender on the basis of bills of quantity with extras or rebates to 
be negotiated if final drawings showed variations. This «was rejected by the NIoD 
as it did not have staff qualified to assess bills of quantity. and although Scott 
Lithgow offered to accept arbitration by MoD this was also rejected. 
2. Vickers as the design authority. and latterly Cammell Laird \\ erc in possession 
of full design data and know how and with the lead boat already two years in 
construction knew or could better anticipate costs arising from design changes. 
3. Although Trafalgar had met the Chief of Defence Procurement, Peter Levene 
who was apparently sympathetic to the inequality of tendering information and 
allegedly promised to investigate the provision of further information, none was 
forthcoming. Neither was a further meeting agreed to allow Trafalgar to rcmm c 
its qualification. Trafalgar thought that this implied that the vicvv prevailed 
within MoD that Cammell Laird should be awarded the contract. 
4. During the period from March 1985 to January 1986 (first tender submission to 
order), the ownership of Yarrow changed from BS to GEC. Cammell Laird 
became a subsidiary of Vickers. The Director General Submarines retired and 
was appointed as a consultant to Vickers. Various personnel left one Company 
and joined another who could have been in possession of price sensiti\ e 
information. The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher informed two MPs Norman 
Godman and Anna McCurley that Scott Lithgow was £4,000,000 too high and 
that this was subsequently reported in the press in October 1985.62 
In view of the above it was the opinion of Trafalgar that, one must question the 
whole ethics of the MoD's competition policy. which smacks of manipulation to 
meet a political end'. Given Scott Lithgow's position the firm 
had asked if the 
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`consolation prize' of the range mooring vessel and two lighters could be brought 
forward. However, the MoD had informed that this would not be possible. unless 
Scott Lithgow could make an unofficial approach to the new Defence Secretary. 
George Younger to do so. 63 
Subsequently, in February 1986, Graham Strachan and Syd Fudge visited MoD (N) 
at Bath to discuss with T. L. Cork the Director of Contracts/Submarines and Nuclear 
and his staff at the MoD why the Upholder tender had been unsuccessful. From the 
outset the Scott Lithgow representatives informed Cork that they were now a varc of 
the Cammell Laird price and estimate as a result of the Trafalgar House review of 
Vickers/Cammell Laird accounts prior to privatisation. The Scott Lithgo\v tender 
was given a financial weighting of £3,000,000 (total for three submarines) on the 
following basis. On the follow-on builder interface contract MoD would have to pad' 
Vickers a fee of £2,000,000 for lead yard services, documents. drawings. etc, to 
either Scott Lithgow or Yarrow if either won the bid. However, if Cammell Laird 
won, Vickers would give these services to the Birkenhead firm at no cost to the 
MoD. Accordingly, MoD added the £2,000,000 to the Scott Lithgow tender to take 
the latter into account. Moreover, the Cammell Laird estimate included a sum of 
£1,500,000 for lead yard services from Vickers. Tenderers were also required to list 
in Schedule 8 any exclusions to their tender. and in this regard Scott Lithgow had 
more exclusions than Cammell Laird did with the relative sum assessed for 
weighting being £1,000,000 which was also added to the Scott Lithgoyv tender price. 
At this stage, however, Scott Lithgow's basic price for the three submarines which 
was lower than the basic price of Cammell Laird by £2,500,000 had now exceeded 
Cammell Laird's price by £500,000 as a result of the £3.000,000 of %% sighting. 
Although MoD had reservations over non-compliant areas of the Scott Lithgow 
tender, these were not costed as `it would have only made [Scott Lithgoww's] position 
worse'. These reservations included clause 41.2 (c) Documents and Drawings as the 
MoD did not know how to cost this and admitted that; it could be anything from 0- 
£15 million'. Nevertheless, Scott Lithgow had not been given an opportunity to 
discuss this. Other MoD reservations included price variation clauses in regard to 
labour costs and overheads, both of which on Scott Lithgow's estimation would 
have added another £1,800,000 to their bid wweighting. The MoD also informed that 
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it would not have accepted a Scott Lithgow amendment to the Default and 
Determination of Contract clauses as these w ere cast in stone nor w ould they have 
accepted Scott Lithgow's limitation of liability to ten per cent. 64 Throughout this 
process, although hidden in the background, the wider strategic imperativ e in 
relation to the Trident programme had to have been a factor in the award of the 
Upholder class contracts to Vickers/Cammell Laird. It certainly made the latter a far 
more attractive prospect for privatisation. And post privatisation, the \ loD on the re- 
negotiation of the price for the first Trident submarine as the Public Accounts 
Committee later noted, had secured a price reduction of £25.000.000.6' Moreover. 
as previously stated, Trafalgar House intended to make a case for misrepresentation 
against BS over Ocean Alliance from March 1984 and its Board considered a paper 
on the subject in August 1985.66 Given that either Trafalgar had either informed B 
of this (and by association, Government), or the information had leaked out 
beforehand it is likely that BS had become aware of this already got wind of this 
before the Vickers/Cammell Laird privatisation. As Trafalgar House intended to 
pursue BS for damages at least equal to the conglomerate's expenditure on Scott 
Lithgow since acquisition, what was to stop Trafalgar doing the same if it was 
successful with the Vickers/Cammell Laird bid, and a similar situation arose" 
Contemporaneously with the Upholder bids, Scott Lithgo\v were pursuing a possible 
order from Algeria for a refitted Oberon class submarine although the deal rested on 
the firm being able to purchase a second hand submarine from the MoD. By March 
1986, however, the Scott Lithgow Board had decided to enlist the aid of the Scottish 
Office to intervene with the MoD over the latter's refusal to allow the disposal of a 
surplus Oberon to allow the project to go ahead. Moreover, the Cartsburn 
Drawing 
Office had been relocated to the Kingston yard in Port Glasgow and the whole area 
beyond Inchgreen on the Greenock side had bee closed. As this was less than four 
years after Regional Development Grant aid had 
been granted. repayment in relation 
to Cartsburn was being sought. Although this had previously been provided 
for, the 
provision had in fact been released to profit and 
loss account. By this stage it was 
plain that Ocean llionee would not 
be delivered as promised in the restated contract 
on 26 May 1986, with liquidated damages running 
from the follovv ing day. With 
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progress on Ocean Alliance at sixty-six per cent. the launch had no%\ been targeted 
to take place in July. 67 
Earlier in April, 275 sub contract workers, mainly pipefitters and electricians had 
been dismissed for apparently attending an unauthorised union meeting. but Scott 
Lithgow employees were told by their union convenors to cross picket lines. 
Subsequently, the sub contract workers many of whom belonged to a Trafalgar 
House subsidiary, Lawrence Allison Services were reinstated. 68 That the Scott 
Lithgow workforce had refused to cross picket lines having lost some 1.31331 men in 
the past two years to redundancies, was at least indicative that the climate of 
industrial relations within the firm had substantially changed. Moreover, the unions 
had co-operated in the recruitment of 1.800 sub contract steel« orkers and the do\\ n- 
manning of that number when the balance of trades needed had shifted to outfit sub 
contractors. 69 By 22 July, however, Ocean Alliance had been finally launched 
without ceremony with reported penalties running at £40,000 per da\ to a limit of 
£12,000,000.70 
The Lithgow fight for compensation for nationalisation. 
It will be recalled that Sir William Lithgow had resigned from the Board of Scott 
Lithgow shortly after nationalisation to concentrate his attentions on the l ithgo\\ 
Group of companies. By December 1985, Sir William had also stepped down as 
Chairman of Lithgows Limited to devote his time to prepare a case for compensation 
for nationalisation to be presented in the European Court of Human Rights at 
Strasbourg. 71 Subsequently, in July 1986 the European Court had adjudicated on the 
merits of cases brought by Sir William Lithgow and others [which at one stage 
included Sir Eric Yarrow and a French national, Mrs Monique Augustin-Normand] 
over what the former shareholders had alleged was grossly inadequate and 
discriminatory compensation for nationalisation. At no stage did Sir William. \\ ho 
was primarily concerned with the amount of compensation for his ordinary shares in 
Kincaid, contest the principle of nationalisation itself. 
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It will be recalled that compensation was to be fixed on 1973 11974 a\ era(-Je share 
values to the six months ending on 28 February 1974. although the shares did not 
vest in the Government until July 1977. However. some payments were dela\ ed 
until 1981, by which stage the Conservative Government had finalised the 
compensation to be paid. By then, the British Government argued that the 
compensation paid met the international standard of prompt, adequate and effecti\ C 
compensation. An argument that the Court concurred with and also held that it was 
reasonable to make no allowance for developments in the companies during the 
compensation period to 1 July 1977. Indeed, why would shareholders further invest 
in a company that was about to be nationalised in any event? The Court also held 
that it was reasonable for the Government not to make allowance for inflation, which 
had been considerable, and in essence that it would respect the Government's 
judgement in the matter of compensation unless that judgement was manifestly' 
without foundation. Moreover, although the Court accepted that the taking of 
property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its clue would 
normally constitute a violation of Article I Protocol I of the European Con% cration 
on Human Rights, it qualified this by holding that Article 1 did not guarantee a right 
to compensation in all circumstances. In nationalisation cases in particular, 
Governments had a wide discretion to fix terms and in this respect the Court 
recognised that the standard of compensation may be different, in effect lower than 
in other cases. In the case of Kincaid, in which it will be recalled that Sir William 
Lithgow held a substantial preference shareholding, these shares being quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange, he was also the largest ordinary shareholder in what were 
unquoted shares in the Greenock firm. From 1974 to July 1977 a total of £513,000 
was paid in dividends on the ordinary shares, but, according to Sir William, 
Government imposed dividend restraint resulted in £1.953,000 being added to 
company funds between the Reference Period and Vesting Day. In the six years 
ending 31 December from 1971 to 1976 Kincaid' s profits before tax averaged 
£1,032,666, and in the half-year to June 1977 pre tax profits were approximately 
£700,000. Kincaid's net assets at June 1977 totalled £5.998.096 and Sir William 
declared that Kincaid had cash reserves at that time of £5.058.000 that he described 
as being surplus to requirements. Nevertheless, counsel for Sir William. despite the 
fact that net assets at 31 December 1973 were 0.762-3.5218 contended that that 
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during the Reference Period, Kincaid had net assets of approximately E9.500,000. 
The latter figure was based on a recent valuation undertaken on behalf of'Sir 
William indicating that the value of the company at 28 Februars 1974 in accorýianýý 
with the 1977 Act on the basis of a hypothetical Stock Exchange quotation. was in 
the region of £8,750,000 to £10,250,000. In addition, Sir William had estimated that 
the net assets attributable to ordinary shareholders as at Vesting Day were worth at 
least £18,000,000. These figures all took account of a revaluation of Kincaid's 
premises and plant, which indicated that they were worth substantially, more than 
was shown on the firm's balance sheet. For the Government, the chartered 
accountants, Messrs Whinney Murray's valuation report on Kincaid had been 
submitted in February 1978 and was based on earnings. 73 
The Whinney Murray report took no account of a revaluation of fixed assets, 
effected after the end of the Reference Period. Agreement on the original valuation 
of the unquoted ordinary shares after some haggling towards a mid-price \\ as 
eventually secured with the Stockholders' Representative. Accordingly, b\ 
November, a figure of £3,809,000 was put to the vote of nine ordinary shareholders, 
including Sir William who abstained on the grounds that the settlement %\ as 
insufficient and that it did not represent the true value of the firm. Howcv'er, the 
eight other shareholders unanimously accepted the settlement. and in the e%ent Sir 
William received a total of £1,071,340 for his ordinary shareholding. 'ir William 
stated that he spent this sum on trading assets, in which he sustained a liability to 
capital gains tax of £207,752.74 This aside, in the matter of the £5,000,000 in cash 
surplus to the firm's requirements, the Government had nonetheless made an 
immediate profit of £ 1,191,000, which it could be argued represented a good deal to 
the taxpayer but not to the shareholders. 
With Ocean Alliance finally launched in July 1986, and with the collapse in world 
oil prices already evident from the beginning of the year and likely to continue 
for 
some time, the future for any upturn in demand for semi submersible exploration 
platforms was particularly bleak. Taken together with the 
failures to secure the 
Upholder submarine orders, and Vickers/Cammell Laird on privatisation, further 
redundancies at Scott Lithgow seemed 
inevitable. By September. with the emphasis 
382 
now on outfit of Ocean Alliance, 195 employees mostly sub contract steelworkers 
had been paid off, but following the launch there had been disappointin`g production 
for the following three weeks. with the main problem encountered being the pulling 
of continuous electrical cables throughout Ocean Alliance. Such was the size and 
complexity of this vessel that it required 391,000 metres of electrical cabling. By 
this stage it had also transpired that the submarine for Algeria had been put iii 
abeyance due to the Algerian Navy putting the project to the back of its programme. 
However, a marketing visit on Oberon submarines had been authorised to Saudi 
Arabia, after preliminary work had been done in London, at as low a cost as 
possible'. 75 In the interim the arbitration of a third party expert over the Completion 
Accounts of Scott Lithgow had continued, and a draft report had been issued in 
September. This had resulted in Trafalgar receiving an additional payment of 
£10,000,000 but its directors did not accept the contents of the report, and allotted a 
further additional provision for the completion of Ocean Alliance charged directl\ to 
reserves of £54,900,000.76 
With the problems of keeping to programme on Ocean Alliance continuino. 
disciplinary action against employees and sub contractors by Scott Lithgo\\ had 
increased, and in November four employees were suspended who wcrc found locked 
in a howf [cabin] away from their jobs. This action prompted a 24-hour stoppage of 
work by the firm's hourly-paid workforce, who had been up to this point, 
remarkably restrained. 77 Nevertheless, owing to Trafalgar House involvement, Scott 
Lithgow had that month `won' a £12,000,000 contract from Cunard to extend a 
container vessel; Atlantic Conveyor originally built by Swan Hunter. With eighteen 
firms tendering throughout the world, a contract to extend four similar vessels had 
gone to Hyundai of South Korea. The Atlantic Conveyor contract did not mark a 
return by Scott Lithgow to shipbuilding and repair. as under the terms of the 
privatisation agreement Scott Lithgow was precluded from receiving SIF monies 
from the European Community as it had been designated an offshore yard. 
78 Had 
not the Atlantic Conveyor contract been the subject of much advanced publicit\ . 
it is 
likely that all five vessels would have gone to Hyundai on price alone. Realistically . 
even if it were so inclined, Scott Lithgow with its high offshore overheads \\ as 
highly unlikely to be successful in winning a substantial shipbuilding contract. the 
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yard remained in a one-order situation and by December 1986 only thirty -three 
employees had volunteered for redundancy. accordingly. it was therefore proposed 
that compulsory redundancies would ensue before Christmas. Progress on Ocean 
Alliance continued to be patchy and as the structure neared completion in "onic areas 
the owners' attitude to signing off work had hardened. ^" By January 1987. Scott 
Lithgow's workforce comprised 1,847 employees and 690 sub-contractors. 
However, no new hiring was envisaged as a result of the Atlantic Conveyor contract. 
which would need only a maximum of 350 men to complete the various stages of' 
construction. By this stage another 225 manual grades and twenty supervisors were 
to be made redundant with effect from 30 January. Again the remaining workforce 
took no action over these compulsory redundancies, and vet another completion date 
had been negotiated on Ocean Alliance with delivery expected in \o' emher, almost 
four years later than originally agreed with BS. 80 This would inevitably involve a 
further payment for late delivery, a far cry from Trafalgar House boss, and one of 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's favourite businessman, Sir Nigel Broakes 
unwise comment that Ocean Alliance would be delivered before Christmas 1985. ` 
In the interim, Scott Lithgow had doggedly persisted in trying to «in submarine 
contracts to compensate for its poor prospects in the offshore sector and it to these 
efforts that I now return to. 
The search for naval contracts continues. 
It will be recalled that Scott Lithgow had intended to tender for a submarine order 
from Saudi Arabia, and in this regard Graham Strachan had visited the country in 
November 1986. Strachan noted that the Saudis were interested in a bid before 15 
December, a deadline that he believed was clearly not possible. Strachan's 
considered view was that three alternatives existed, first, update the Oberon design: 
second, adjust the design for known changes: or last, scale down the Upholder 
design. 82 By the 15 December deadline, however. Scott Lithgo« had at least 
submitted an indicative price letter to the Royal Saudi Naval Forces for an impro\ cal 
Oberon Mark 6 submarine in a joint venture wit the defence contractors, Ferranti. 
Moreover, in what was apparently a breach of protocol the Scott Lithgowti letter did 
not go through the British Embassy in Saudi Arabia, an indication that the British 
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Government favoured a bid by Vickers. By this stage. however. the Scott 
Lithgow/Ferranti bid apparently hinged on the former being able to purchase two 
second hand decommissioned Oberon submarines from the Royal Na% y. H. 1LS 
Oberon and the Scotts' built HMS Walrus that had put up for sale either for scrap or 
for further usage. As was noted this marked a change in MoD policy as previously 
MoD would only offer these submarines on a further usage basis on a Government 
to Government basis to foreign navies. Indeed, Scott Lithgow had earlier hoped to 
obtain an option on one submarine for a possible contract with the Algerian Nlinistry 
of Defence, but MoD policy precluded this. Moreover. the submarines were being 
offered for sale without MoD assistance on manpower. training or design and \\ ith 
no guarantees on the availability of spare parts. As such, Scott Lithgo\% Ferranti 
were very much dismayed by the way the sale w% as being handled as completion b\ 
January 1987 left little or no time to interest potential foreign bu\ crs for re-dicsi`gincd 
Oberon submarines. Strachan then estimated the scrap value of an O/ ron at 
between £75,000 to a £100,000 with the added value of spare part sales to interested 
customers. However, the resale value promised to be much higher as the \ IoD had 
apparently offered an Oberon to Malaysia for £2,500,000 representing the 
submarine's value, `as a going concern, with a potential re-sale value after 
refurbishment of £10/13m subject to the vessel's condition'. Nonetheless. Strachan 
found it difficult to recommend that Scott Lithgow should tender for these vessels 
and welcomed the Board's views on the subject. 83 
By January 1987, however, the Scott Lithgow Board had protested to the Head of* 
Defence Sales about the way the sale had been handled, and it was clear that by this 
stage both submarines would be sold for scrap. In these circumstances and in the 
belief that Vickers had presented the Saudis with a better deal Scott Lithgow 
declined to tender. 84 In the interim an exploratory discussion had taken place in 
December with MoD over the `promised' range mooring vessel, where it was noted 
that the Scott Lithgow design was too large for MoD requirements on grounds of 
cost, and that a vessel of single screw design would be preferable. In this regard 
Scott Lithgow agreed to submit a revised tender by 31 January 1987 vV ith a tender 
clarification meeting to take place in February, and a final tender 
in March in the 
hope that the contract would be awarded by the end of April. : \lreadv . this 
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represented a delay in the original programme of three months. and on the attendant 
powered lighters, MoD had again cavilled on the grounds of cost. $? 
At a later meeting in January 1987 attended by Strachan at the %1oD. the Project 
Director arrived and stated that Scott Lithgow's prices for the range mooring vessel 
and the two powered lighters were far too high. Moreover. the Project Director was 
only prepared to place the three contracts at the original price of £ 11.000.000 with 
payment deferred to the end of the project split into £4.500.000 for the range 
mooring vessel and £6,500,000 for the two lighters. To this. Strachan pointed out 
that it would cost £2,900,000 to purchase the materials for one lighter alone, and this 
in turn prompted the MoD representative to reply that Scott Lithgo\t should submit a 
revised price that would show how the offshore rates applicable at the firm e\ceedcd 
the standard BS rates. 86 Clearly by announcing the price, [at that stage f 10,000.000] 
before the contract was awarded, the MoD had to a large extent tied the hands of 
Scott Lithgow. With its large offshore overheads and with a one-order situation, 
Scott Lithgow's tender was likely to be on the high side in any event. 
By March 1987, however, Janes Defence Weekly had reported that Scott I ith(o\\ 
had made a last minute tender for ten Oberon Mk 6 submarines for the Saudis, and 
also that the tender had undercut Vickers tender for the provision of ten (j)Ilolder 
submarines. Moreover, it was also reported that MoD were 'upset. b% the Scott 
Lithgow bid, which seemed to consist of building new Oberon hulls \t ith updated 
electronics and weapons systems'. 
87 In due course neither firm was successful, an 
indication that the MoD preferred Upholder submarine was not a suitable vessel for 
export purposes, and that the Oberon had had its day. Indeed, the whole process 
surrounding the establishment of the Type 2-00 later Upholder class submarine and 
the subsequent tendering process, in addition to the decision to again 
incorporate a 
conventional element into Royal Navy submarine strategy 
left much to be desired. In 
the event, only four Upholder class submarines were 
built at a total programme cost 
of nearly £1,000,000,000 with the class proving unsuitable 
for export purposes. 
Moreover, by 1994, all four submarines had been mothballed at the end of the Coll 
War without ever becoming operational and were eventually sold 
in 1999 on an 
gs 
eight-year option basis to the Royal 
Canadian Navy at a price of t"6,000.000. 
386 
By March 1987, Trafalgar House had sold land surplus to its requirements to the 
SDA, including 10.24 acres comprising Scotts' Engine Works. ? 1.80) acres of the 
Cartsburn shipyard, and 2.70 acres comprising the Cartsdyke Canteen. \loreover. 
Scott Lithgow also sold two leased subjects, 7.50 acres of the Cartsdyke shipyard 
and 5,20 acres of the Garvel Dry Dock at an undisclosed price. which was in fact for 
£1,000,000.89 On later reporting this news, but not the price paid. the local 
newspaper lamented that, `Greenock no longer builds ships'. 90 With a General 
Election due in June, the Labour Party spokesman, Roy Hattersle% on a visit to 
Greenock promised that if elected his party would award the range mooring, two 
lighter contract to Scott Lithgow. 91 It remains a moot point whether in fact Labour 
would have done so as they lost the election in any event. Earlier the Defence 
Secretary, George Younger who later left politics to take up a directorial position in 
a leading Scottish bank, stated that Scott Lithgow would get the order if the` 
lowered their price. However, with the Conservatives again elected, the only option 
left open to Scott Lithgow seemed to be a substantial reduction in price. With the 
MoD preferred price being £ 11,000,000 it had been reported that Scott Lith go\\ had 
stipulated a revised price of £16,000,000. By the end of July. hovvcv cr. both particý 
had failed to agree and the Government had announced that the three-vessel order 
would be put out to competitive tender in mid-August, by which stage Scott l. ithgo\\ 
had cut its price to £12,300,000. This was not enough to secure the order, and amid 
much indignation, an MoD spokesman claimed that the Scott Lithgow design for the 
range mooring vessel was unacceptable and that the firm did not re-submit one 
despite MoD requests to do so. Moreover, no `promise' was apparently made, only 
an opportunity to bid without competition. 92 This news coming some eighteen 
months after the original `promise' had been made, yet again showed the snail's 
pace of procurement decisions. The MoD, as usual, were being disingenuous as they 
had in the past always been willing to back a political decision on contracts when it 
suited their purpose and were equally willing to fall back on the market forces 
argument when it did not. 
Nevertheless, the implications for employment of the workforce of 1.800 at Scott 
Lithgow were stark, with Ocean. -1lliance nearing, completion. touether with the 
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Atlantic Conveyor extension no other orders were in sight in a yard totally geared for 
offshore construction in a market that had remained in a very depressed state. 
Indeed, this point was re-iterated to the General Secretary of the CSELU. Alex Ferry 
in August 1987, when Sid Fudge intimated the obvious that if no orders were 
secured by the end of the year then the position would be serious. 9' By N o% ember. 
by which stage the MoD three-vessel order was effectively lost, senior union 
officials again met Scott Lithgow management to discuss the firm's future. For the 
unions' the Chairman of the CSEU, Jim McFaul opened the discussion h\ stating 
that at privatisation there was a fair amount of optimism. however. commitments 
promised in 1984 had never been fulfilled and neither the employees nor the firm's 
expectations had been met. Moreover, the workforce had gone out of its w Lw to be 
flexible, even during periods of large-scale redundancies. It had therefore come, 'as 
a big bombshell when they were faced with the current situation. The workforce is 
the only party to suffer and the social consequences in the area are immense'. 
Accordingly, the unions were looking for certain commitments from l rafalgar and 
in particular desired assurances that the yard would be viably retained, but not 
mothballed, however, this was more in hope than in expectation. McFaul further 
pointed out that unless a design and marketing team were kept together, a care and 
maintenance basis of operation was worthless. In response, Trafalgar's Victor 
Grundy stated that it had bought Scott Lithgow to make it a success, and since then a 
number of strategies had been tried including placing the contract for . Itlawic 
Conveyor at a loss. Moreover, MoD (N) had been pressed, 'without success and at 
no little cost'. However, with the present downturn in the market and without the 
prospect of more orders, there was no alternative other to go on to a care and 
maintenance basis, not with a view to closure but to continue to look for work and 
re-establish Scott Lithgow'. At this point, Grundy also presented an undertaking 
given to MoD (N) to keep the yard open into the 1990s. For the unions, Alec Ferry 
stated that he was in no doubt that the state of Scott Lithgow on privatisation ,` as 
much worse than anyone thought, and that this had resulted in the Yard being 
unable to perform satisfactorily and obtain more work'. Ferry noted that in spite of 
all the disappointment about work failing to materialise, the «orkforce had agreed to 
many changes in an attempt to salvage their future. However, the firm now faced a 
care and maintenance situation, which if the late 1970s and early 1980s %\ ere 
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anything to go by, was a prelude to closure or disposal. Ferry . therefore, echoed 
McFaul's sentiments that a design and maintenance team should be kept on in 
anticipation of an upturn in demand. but also that former employees should be `-, i\ en 
assurances that they would be re-employed. The Scott Lithgow Convenor. Duncan 
McNeil then pointed out that he had to sell an agreement to the workforce by the end 
of the week, and that the workforce had not tried to take advantage of Trafal`gar's 
position on Ocean Alliance, `and did not wish to do so now'. In short. the workforce 
needed a proper and an acceptable run-down agreement. It «as then agreed to 
approach this at the local level and that a prospective agreement should include a 
proper care and maintenance and not a closure agreement with the exact numbers of 
people employed under it to be made known. Additionall\. it was mooted that there 
should be a policy of recruiting former Scott Lithgow employees if ne\\ work was 
obtained and that a severance package should be given to those employees «ho had 
to be made redundant. If in the event that no agreement was reached then it as 
agreed that the meeting including national officials would be re-convened. 
Two days later, Trafalgar House intimated to the staff of Scott Lithgow that they 
intended to retain it as a viable company to take advantage of any upturn in the 
market and that following the completion of Ocean Alliance the yard \% ould be 
placed on a care and maintenance basis if no further orders were secured. Thereafter, 
the numbers employed would include a strong estimating and technical team to 
actively pursue new orders and if successful redundant workers would be rc- 
recruited. Trafalgar House would not sell off the assets of Scott LithgowN for re- 
development, and would allow other companies to lease its premises for construction 
purposes, and the company would also give every assistance to other firms such as 
Vickers who wished to recruit redundant employees. Subject to the acceptance of 
this deal, a lump sum payment of £400 would be paid to all redundant employees 
with the first compulsory redundancies taking effect from Friday 13 November 
1987. `'' This was all well and good, but those employees. manual and staff. given the 
lack of work at Scott Lithgow who were able to travel to other yards to gain 
employment were likely to do so. Moreover. union 
fears that care and maintenance 
was merely a prelude to complete closure. which were 
based on hard \\ on prc\ bus 
experience, must also have taken 
into account that Scott Lithgoyv. post Oc can 
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Alliance had no realistic prospect of obtaining another major offshore order in a 
depressed market. 
Throughout this period, Scott Lithgow had persisted in trying to win shipbuilding 
contracts against specialist yards, which were geared accordingly. In June 1987. the 
firm lost out on a £8,000,000 ferry contract to Appledore Ferguson. 96 The latter had 
been merged a year earlier by BS and as a result the Ailsa yard at Troon was 
eventually sold to a private buyer in January 1987.97 By November. Scott LithgowN 
again lost out on an Overseas Development Agency order to the privatised Hall 
Russell for a £15,000,000 ferry for St. Helena. And, by December. Scott Lithgow 
had also failed to persuade the Government to give it SIF status to help it obtain as 
£40,000,000 order for two ferries. which would have provided 400 jobs for tv o 
years. 98 By this stage, the firm's last hopes seemed to rest on obtaining an order 
worth £50,000,000 from the MoD for a covered floating jetty for the latter's 
Coulport establishment, and a floating hotel for Antigua. Earlier in June, hoo\\c\cr, 
the position over the third party expert's report on the Scott Lithgow Completion 
Accounts had become clearer as both parties had been able to agree, -a full and final 
settlement of all disputes arising out of the sale agreement'. This had resulted in BS 
sustaining a further loss in the profit and loss account of £21,000,000 and after 
adjustment, a cash outflow of £29,000,000. However, it was also noted that 
Trafalgar intended to submit a claim for misrepresentation, with BS of the opinion 
that no liability could arise. 99 
Ocean Alliance 
With Atlantic Conveyor successfully delivered and payment received, Scott 
Lithgow's remaining contract, Ocean Alliance was by October 1987, ninety-four pCi- 
cent complete and preparations had begun to move it offshore. Some 200 sub- 
contract electricians had been released and specialist firms brought in their place. 
which had led to a significant improvement in performance. Previous problems with 
the engines had now been mostly overcome, the majority of the cables had been rc- 
installed, but difficulties in the drill area persisted and this had led to arguments %v ith 
the design authority and supervisory firm, Odeco. 
100 Nevverthelcs, > ct a, 11, Scott 
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Lithgow was still unable to deliver the vessel in time under the re-negotiated 
contract. In this regard it is worth reconsidering this contract in some detail. not only 
because it had proven to be the most disastrous ever undertaken in a British 
shipyard, but also because the problems with the structure had persisted post 
privatisation. It will be recalled that Ocean Alliance. the largest dynamically position 
semi submersible ordered at the time was originally due for delivery on i1N larch 
1984. Previously, at a meeting between BS and Britoil in December 1982. by which 
stage it had become clear that the programme had substantially slipped. a joint 
working party was instituted to review the date of delivery.. report on the situation 
was completed in January 1983 with Britoil indicating a completion date of October 
1985, whereas BS indicated a delivery date of September 1984. After a meeting 
between the principals, it was agreed that the erection period was paramount and that 
a programme of six critical events or milestones would be instituted against which 
the performance of Scott Lithgow would be measured and monitored. On 19 April 
1983, Malcolm Ford of Britoil met Scott Lithgow representatives and %% as given an 
assurance by the latter that no redundancies would take place among its «orkforce it' 
they could be productively employed on Ocean Alliance. By May, howw ever, Scott 
Lithgow had indicated to Britoil that the first three milestones had been missed. and 
by August, Britoil had requested that a full re-negotiation of the contract should take 
place in terms of damages for late delivery. Accordingly. BS reserved its position. 
Britoil nevertheless commissioned an independent report, which was passed to BS in 
October, which concluded that the then Scott Lithgow deliver}, date of January 1985 
was not achievable and that a less optimistic date for deli very vv could be in the 
autumn of 1986. By this stage, BS had concluded that re-negotiation of the contract 
was not feasible. Ben Odeco with the authority of Lloyd's Leasing intimated that in 
their opinion that the vessel would not be delivered within 300 days of the deliver} 
date as defined in the contract, that is by 19 February 1985. Ben Odeco then gave 
Scott Lithgow thirty days notice on 19 December 1983 of their intention to cancel 
the contract unless Scott Lithgow could give an assurance, which they did not, that 
Ocean Alliance would be delivered according to the contractual terms. Without 
prejudice Scott Lithgow then advised Ben Odeco that they believed that they had a 
valid reason for seeking an extension by as much as ten months to the contract 
delivery date because of external causes of delay. These causes turned out to he the 
9' 1 
time taken to obtain Odeco approval of drawings from New Orleans and the nature 
of the on site supervision by the American team. Predictably. Ben ()deco did not 
accept that they had caused a delay in the progress of construction. but Scott 
Lithgow responded by re-affirming that they had. Thereafter. Scott Lithgow 
maintained that Ocean Alliance would be delivered within 300 days of the delivery 
date, and produced a report by the consultants A&P Appledore which criticised the 
earlier Britoil report. Subsequently, Ben Odeco with the authority of Llo\ d's 
Leasing issued a notice of cancellation on 19 December 1983. however, Scott 
Lithgow claimed that this was invalid and issued a writ to Lloyd's Leasing the next 
day to that effect. Thereafter, most but not all of the work on Ocean Allicnice was 
stopped by BS and resources were transferred to completing the BP rig Scu E_-VIplorcr 
and HMS Challenger. 101 On the cancellation of Ocean . 1lliance actual progress \\ as 
assessed at just over thirty two per cent against a planned progress of nearly thirtyy- 
seven per cent, and this was the situation that apparently existed prior to 
privatisation and the re-instatement of the contract. 102 
What had gone so badly wrong with Ocean Alliance would later be the subject of a 
writ issued by Trafalgar House against BS alleging negligence and negligent 
misstatements prior to privatisation. In the writ, Trafalgar cited fundamental 
weaknesses in Scott Lithgow's planning organisation as had been found as a result 
of a BS internal audit on or around February 1983. By this stage the auditor had 
noted that many systems were still in the development stage such as vv ork 
evaluation, project control and materials listing and were consequently of little use at 
that time. Moreover day-to-day labour resourcing was non-existent and there was no 
procedural manual to provide an overall framework for control. 
103 By May 1983, 
Scott Lithgow's auditors in a work appraisal report on Ocean Alliance had identified 
various weaknesses in systems and controls for forecasting outstanding work such 
that it was not possible to forecast accurately the labour requirements to complete 
the contract or to ascertain the quantity of steelwork already fabricated. If this «as 
not enough, labour outcome forecasts varied substantially on a month by month 
basis and such information that was available suggested that there '\ ould be a major 
overrun in man-hours, costs and in the programme for deliv ery . 
Moreover. a similar 
104 
situation persisted on the less complex. Sea Explorer. 
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Clearly there were fundamental weaknesses in the Scott LithLo\\ s "tern of contract 
assessment hanging over from the firm's move from traditional shipbuilding 
techniques mostly based on a historical cost accounting basis to the far more 
demanding standards of offshore construction. The firm had in particular a lack of 
knowledge at the tendering stage of the work content involved and the standards of 
quality required for such complex structures as state of the art semi submersible rigs. 
Accordingly, Trafalgar House alleged that prior to pri\ atisation Scott Lithgo\v had 
failed to correct its deficiencies and therefore that the information provided to it 
relating to the state of construction and the cost and the time required to complete 
both Ocean Alliance and Sea Explorer was inherently unreliable. and that it vv as 
susceptible to substantial error and/or misleading. In short, Trafalgar contended that 
both BS and Scott Lithgow knew or ought to have known that this %% as the case. 10ý 
Throughout the period prior to privatisation Scott Lithgow had experienced 
problems in retaining labour and consequently the numbers of sub contract %\ orkcrs 
had risen accordingly. This was a common enough situation, but it %\ as also one that 
required strict control over costs, design development and modifications, work 
content, supervision and general direction within an agreed planning t'rame%\ cork. On 
privatisation, under new management, Scott Lithgow suffered the hangover from its 
previous failures, Sea Explorer-, far from being almost complete, required extensive 
modifications to the stability and secondary de-ballasting systems. I1(mever. 
problems with Ocean Alliance were far more pronounced owing to the complexity 
of the vessel, which required huge amounts of cabling and complicated pipework, 
and the rigorous attitude of Odeco to dimensional control, approval of drawings and 
design modifications. Although Scott Lithgow complaints over delays by Odeco in 
approving drawings and over zealous supervision have some validity. in a strictly 
contractual sense Odeco had the absolute right to do so in any event. The old 
shipbuilding attitude of considering work 'good enough for its purpose. an attitude 
prevalent in the industry as a whole. did not pass muster in the demanding \\orld of 
offshore construction. The other common argument put to the author 
in intervie" s 
that in time of recession owners would inevitably stall on deliver\ by making litt 
difficult in not approving work on vessels also has some validity, particularl\ at'ter 
9- 
the collapse in the price of oil at the beginning of 1986. Semi submersibles being 
primarily costly exploration vessels were particularly vulnerable to downturns in the 
oil market, but conversely when oil prices were high these vessels were more cost 
effective. However, given the penalty clauses for late delivery on Sea Explorer and 
Ocean Alliance both in the original and re-negotiated contracts, the owners, BP and 
Britoil were substantially compensated for delay in any event. Nevertheless. the 
story of semi submersible construction at Scott Lithgow. alike the move into `giant 
tanker construction in the 1970s was a sorry one, particularly for the damaging effect 
it had on the firm's reputation. A reputation that Trafalgar House despite attempts to 
win new work was not able to recover. Given the failure of the British shipbuilding 
industry in general in the offshore structures market, an intelligent observer might 
ask why these structures were successfully completed elsewhere by foreign 
shipbuilders. Indeed, in the other country to share North Sea oil. \orwati , the 
shipbuilding firm, Aker had moved into offshore work with no prior experience in 
1965 and continued despite the first OPEC price hike and thereafter increased its 
exposure to the sector as its traditional shipbuilding markets declined. By 1975. 
Aker had under construction twenty-four semi submersibles, with half being built 
under licence in Finland and in Japan. 106 Moreover. the success of the Finnish 
shipbuilding firm, Rauma Repola, which it will be recalled had %v on the Shell \1 ý' 
order in competition with Scott Lithgow, was even more remarkable. In addition to 
its shipbuilding programme, Rauma had re-adjusted its manufacturing capabilities to 
take advantage of the offshore market. Such was the success of this firm that 
between 1974 and 1986 it had delivered fourteen semi submersibles. three drill 
ships, two MSVs and two jack up drilling rigs for customers in France. Norway, the 
Soviet Union, the UK and the USA. 107 Without even considering American. 
Japanese or Korean constructors, this level of performance closer to home paints a 
stark picture, even when complexity of product is taken into account, of Scott 
Lithgow's performance in the offshore structures market. 
The end is nigh. 
By December 1987, redundancies in the work-force were proceeding at an a(, reed 
steady rate with a care and maintenance 
level to be reached by the end 1'ebruarvv 
394 
1988. Beforehand, in November 1987. Vickers had held a series of interviews vv ith 
171 redundant Scott Lithgow welders, platers. caulkers and a number of technical 
staff. 108 The last BS engine builder. Clark Kincaid at Greenock had taken on one 
apprentice welder and three apprentice steelworkers to allow them to finish their 
apprenticeships. All other Scott Lithgow apprentices had opted for voluntary 
redundancy. From December, Scott Lithgow with the assistance of the Invercly de 
Enterprise Trust were organising four information days for redundant employees to 
take place in January and February 1988.109 With the three vessel \IoD contract lost 
to Hall Russell on competitive tender, and with no real hope of gaining an\ further 
submarine orders, the firm moved inexorably towards care and maintenance status 
by the end of March 1988. By this stage, labour on the sole remaining contract, 
Ocean Alliance was virtually down to care and maintenance level, and by June onl\ 
eighty-two staff members remained in employment, including sixteen \woking on 
the misrepresentation claim against BS. Of the sixty six remaining employees. 
thirteen staff remained on care and maintenance, sixteen on Ocean . -1Illance support. 
[reducing to nil by the end of July], eight administrative staff, nine for transfer, and 
four apprentice draughtsmen who it was hoped would transfer to John Brown 
Engineering. In addition, sixteen staff mainly in the accounts departments, had all 
been given dates to leave by the middle of June. ' 10 Earlier, in April it had been 
publicly announced that Ocean Alliance would be completed in the Cromart} Firth 
with Scott Lithgow picking up the bill. Work on this contract had virtually ceased by 
the end of February and Britoil had received liquidated damages I'or delays. 
111 'l he 
move to the Cromarty Firth had been sealed in a Glasgo\v public house with a Scott 
Lithgow representative, a Britoil executive and Dr Terry Petty of Odeco in 
attendance. 112 This enabled the yard to be put on a care and maintenance basis from 
which it never really recovered, despite providing employment for 350 employees 
on a number of relatively small contracts in 1991. Earlier, on 29 April 1988. 
Trafalgar House had at last issued its threatened writ for alleged misrepresentation 
against BS for £ 191,046,000 this being the net loss to Trafalgar since buying Scott 
Lithgow for £ 12,000,000 in March 1984. BS had continued to fight its case and 
denied liability up to March 1991, by which stage a cash settlement of £ 17,000,000 
was reached in favour of Trafalgar, with BS foregoing their counterclaim of 
£8,000,000.111 
3') 
There ended the long running saga of claim and counterclaim that had been a feature 
of Trafalgar House involvement with Scott Lithgow. Not only had volume 
shipbuilding effectively disappeared on the Lower Clyde before privatisation, where, 
under BS control, Scott Lithgow had cost the taxpayer some £234,000.000 mostly 
from losses on offshore construction. Moreover, these losses had continued to be 
borne partly by the long-suffering taxpayers' in the brave new world of privatisation. 
Indeed, this level of state subsidised losses, which Sir James Lithgow abhorred in 
relation to the money pit of Harland & Wolff surely would also have frankly 
astonished his contemporaries. In the cradle of Clyde shipbuilding this left only the 
still surviving former Scott Lithgow Newark yard of Ferguson Brothers, which first 
as Ferguson Ailsa and latterly as Ferguson Appledore had accumulated trading 
losses in excess of £33,000,000 up to 1986-1987. Taken together with SIF monies of 
£ 12,000,000 the Newark yard alone had £45,000,000 of taxpayers' support. 114 Scott 
Lithgow designated as an offshore yard from privatisation could not access such SIF 
support, but nevertheless Trafalgar House did receive substantial sums of public 
money from BS and other sources. However, the figures speak for themselves to a 
large extent, with the estimated loss at the end of 1988 on Ocean Alliance, the most 
disastrous single contract ever undertaken in a British shipyard, at a whopping 
£211,000,000.11' In the light of the Touche Ross observations prior to this contract 
being undertaken one can only conclude that no sensible management would have 
undertaken it in the first place under such onerous terms and with no clear idea of its 
eventual cost. By that stage, however, employment considerations were paramount 
and hard commercial sense was sadly missing. Nationalisation had undoubtedly 
saved Scott Lithgow, and privatisation at least preserved a modicum of employment, 
where there would have otherwise been none. Trafalgar House had taken on BS 
largest loss maker with considerable help from the Government in the hope that it 
could transform Scott Lithgow's prospects. In the event, despite trying to break even 
by litigation, it failed. That Ocean Alliance left the Lower Clyde some four years 
later than originally anticipated from a firm that had once been the district's largest 
employer and which eventually closed down for good post 1990 was really a case of 
dejä vu all over again. 
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Chapter IX: Conclusion 
This thesis has been undertaken in an attempt to place the gro-mh and decline of the 
two major shipbuilding firms on the Lower Clyde. Scotts' and Lithgows. in context 
and in historical perspective. Although the bulk of this work has concentrated on the 
history of the two firms in the post-1945 period, separately and merged. their story 
prior to 1945 is no less important. In this regard it is fortunate that the earlier history 
of Scotts' is relatively well documented in an unpublished thesis covering the % ears 
1820-1920 and in the post-1945 period in a book published in 1961 celebrating 250 
years of what was then the world's senior shipyard. 1 In stark contrast, the history of 
Lithgows has been less well served as no proper company history exists. although 
the career of the leading shipbuilder of his generation, Sir James Lithgow, is better 
2 known. 
Whilst noting the generally uncritical nature of most company-inspired histories. of 
which the history of Scotts' is an excellent example, I have attempted to analyse the 
development of both Lithgows and Scotts' and latterly Scott Lithgo\\ by the use of a 
wider range of primary sources. In particular, I have extensively used yard records, 
SRNA material and the records of Government departments that have shared 
responsibility for the shipbuilding industry over the twentieth century. In so doing, 
my intention was to cast a more critical eye on the events; internal and external that 
shaped the history of these giants of the Lower Clyde through to their eventual 
demise. Accordingly, what has transpired is neither a standard business history nor a 
work of general reference, but a holistic treatment of a complex subject by \ ay oi' a 
micro study. Through this approach it is hoped that the reader will have gained a 
better perspective in which to judge whether or not certain inferences and parallels 
can be drawn that will enhance our knowledge of cause and effect in the overall 
decline of the British shipbuilding industry in the twentieth century. 
In the earlier chapters of this thesis I have concentrated more on Lithgows rather 
than on Scotts' but have supplemented the history of both firms through reference to 
yard and subsidiary firm records, although the latter are decidedly patch} in content. 
Throughout the period under consideration, Scotts' was btiy far the more 
sophisticated and technically innovative builder, particularly after the firm's initial 
success in supplying engines to the Admiralty in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, 
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by this stage the success of the shipyard was indivisible from the success of the 
Engine Works and remained so throughout the twentieth centur-Y. Supplying engincý 
to the Admiralty gave Scotts' sufficient impetus early in the twentieth century to ego 
on to build and engine the cruiser. HMS Argyll. From there, the firm then entered the 
submarine market, and also went on to build a set of steam turbines for the 
Admiralty. This experience enabled the firm to later build and engine two 
battleships, HMS Colossus and HMS Ajax. Taken in tandem with the fundamental 
importance of Scotts' bespoke links with Holt, and in particular with S\ti ire that had 
grown through mutual respect and trust from the 1860s onwards. the later 
combination of mercantile and naval work proved invaluable to counteract lack of' 
demand in either sector. 
Through two World Wars, Scotts' concentrated almost exclusiv el\ on naN al 
construction and contributed significantly to the salvation of their country on both 
occasions. During the Great War, Scotts' links with Holt and Swirc were cemented 
further when Ocean took a third of the Greenock firm's Ordinary shares. ; after the 
somewhat predictable speculative post-war boom had led to over capacity in 
domestic and world shipbuilding, Scotts' survived the equally predictable slump in 
both naval and mercantile demand by relying on bespoke linkages and laying off 
labour, and through the judicious use of reserves. Understandably. when the very 
survival of the firm was at stake, significant investment to modernise the shipyard 
facilities, particularly to extend the berths and cranage during the intcrvvar period 
was notable by its absence. Despite gaining a continuous river frontage through the 
Cartsdyke shipyard deal with the Greenock Dockyard Company in this period, 
Scotts' remained a small to medium sized firm that prized both its bespoke linkages 
and naval status. Although the firm had built two battleships prior to the I irst World 
War, as the tonnage and sophistication of warships grew after the lifting of treaty 
restrictions. it would never again build capital ships. A signatory. alike Lithgmw s_ to 
NSS, Scotts' survived the nadir of the interwar period, mostly due to bespoke 
linkages until naval rearmament arrived to boost its profits. In the Second World 
War, Scotts' concentrated exclusively on naval construction, ww ith production being 
severely hampered by Luftwaffe bombing in 1941. 
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With the downturn in naval demand in the aftermath of war as Britain to 
redefine its world role in the light of economic. strategic and political realities. 
Scotts' again returned to bespoke mercantile construction. By this stacc. much of the 
entrepreneurial spirit that had once characterised the firm had been dissipated. The 
author advances no specific reason for this assertion other than the observation that 
Scotts' no longer seemed inclined to innovate. either in engine design or in ship 
types. One can point to generational shifts in management and in attitudes as beine 
symptomatic of declining competitive instincts., but this takes us only so far and 
tends to the subjective. Contemporaneously, the firm kept its submarine experienced 
team together first by a succession of refits, and thereafter on the construction of 
Porpoise and then Oberon class submarines. Under the respective chairmanships of 
Douglas Phillips and Michael Sinclair Scott, Scotts put the issue of the firm going 
public to the vote of its shareholders. Nevertheless, with, Swire. through its 
subsidiary, the Taikoo Dockyard taking over Ocean's one third share in Scotts' as a 
lock-up investment, and family ties remaining important, the firm vvas always likelv 
to remain a private concern. Scotts' did, however, increase its share capital h\ 
incremental stages and consequently the amount of dividends paid to famil\ 
interests. Throughout the 1950s Scotts' remained a profitable concern. vet by the 
early 1960s mercantile construction had become less profitable as the bu\ ers market 
for tonnage intensified. It was also clear by this stage that Scotts' future as a \ýarship 
builder was under threat as too many warship firms existed to satisl'\ likely future 
demand. The MoD as always hedged its bets, and to a large extent relied upon 
natural selection to take its toll. Scotts' did, however, despite its lack of 
capitalisation, at least attempt to win orders to build nuclear-powered submarines. 
Nonetheless. the Admiralty conclusion that the firm was in fact too small to 
undertake such a programme. despite a willingness to involve John ßrovv n's in their 
bid and given the investment needed. to a large extent came as a relief. Indeed, the 
earlier stimulus to modernise the firm's shipyards and Engine Works ww as fuelled by 
the realisation that if it did not do so then the firm would have in all likelihood been 
unable to survive the onslaught of international competition. Hov%ev er. Scotts' 
modernisation was completed just as the international market for ships had 
irrevocably changed. Not only were ship types getting bigger, owners vv crc also 
demanding increasingly sophisticated tonnage, tied to advantageous O\\ nCr- 
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orientated credit terms. By this stage then. the retention of profitable naval work ý%as 
a sine qua non to Scotts continued existence as an independent shipbuilder. 
In stark contrast to Scotts' the thrust of Lithgoww s policy, first through Russcll and 
Company aided and abetted by the entrepreneurial talent of William -I odd Lithg, ovv. 
was the construction of standardised volume cargo tonnage in good times to order. 
and in bad, by building speculatively. On his death, his sons, James and Henr\ 
Lithgow who were left financially secure by their father continued his policies \\ ith 
the aim of developing to perfection the ocean-going tramp steamer. '\c\ ertheless. 
James Lithgow's wider talent was soon recognised beyond Port Glasgow in 
employers organisations, at the Admiralty and in other industrial sectors as lie first 
consolidated then expanded the legacy of his father. Throughout, James Lithgo\v 
was undoubtedly the driving force of the firm, however, the significant contribution 
of his brother, Henry to its growth should not be underestimated. The purchases of 
first the Bay yard of their father's old partner, Anderson Rodger, tol l0>vv ed bv the 
agreed purchases of the East yard of Robert Duncan and the Inch yard of'Dunlop 
Bremner all contributed to the consolidation of the Lithgow brothers hold on the 
local labour supply in their unlikely power base of Port Glasgow. These acquisitions 
were essentially conservative and defensive by nature. As Russell and Compan\ 
were finally consigned to history and Lithgows Limited formed, that povv cr base was 
further consolidated by the purchase of a half share in the Glen yard of' William 
Hamilton. James Lithgow, even by this stage an enormously vvealthy man [not least 
through his substantial shipping investments] soon reacted to the post-war 
speculative boom and the danger of outside interests impinging on his personal 
fiefdom by purchasing the coal, iron and steel masters, James Dunlop. Moreover, 
Lithgows also consolidated their interests in the Clydeside marine engine building 
sector through their substantial shareholdings in the Glasgow firm of David Row an. 
and the Greenock firms of J. G. Kincaid and Rankin and Blaekmore. 
Knighted by Stanley Baldwin in 1925, Sir James Lithgow then yy ent on to play a 
central role in the rationalisation of his own interests and those of the shipbuilding 
industry as a whole. As the leading light in NSS. and much else besidc'ý. he %v as the 
subject of a barrage of vitriolic criticism from certain quarters, much of it ill- 
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informed, that stayed with him until his death. Nonetheless. Sir James Lithgo«'s 
links and influence with the financial and industrial establishments were virtually 
unparalleled and owing to his wealth he was beholden to no one. In the 
rationalisation of the Scottish steel industry he %\ as ruthless. and would undoubtedly 
have been equally ruthless in shipbuilding if given the chair at the money pit of 
Harland & Wolff. However, in both the steel and shipbuilding sector" significant 
rationalisation, given lack of demand and excess capacity would have probably 
occurred in any event. 
The Lithgow brothers were financially sophisticated and always paid for the best 
advice they could get; both were, however, implacably opposed to any form of 
nationalisation. A factor, which could explain their decision to -transfer' the share 
capitals of Lithgows and Robert Duncan to Canada. and again explains the later 
purchase of Beardmore subsidiaries before the nationalisation of the coal, iron and 
steel industries. By 1935, however, the acquisition of the virtually bankrupt 
Fairfield, not only saved thousands of jobs at Govan in the long run, but also `gave 
Sir James Lithgow what he had hitherto lacked, access to naval orders. There, and 
later at Beardmore, Lithgow brought his essentially conservative style of' 
management to bear by again building up reserves, but he also encouraged ncww 
talent to emerge. 
For a substantial period in the interwar years, Lithgows Limited had nevertheless 
struggled on through self-imposed rationalisation, declining demand and market 
uncertainty. With the exceptions that it did not carry substantial naval overheads 
until the Fairfield purchase or an engine works, no significant investment in 
modernising Lithgows core Port Glasgow shipyards took place and up to the Second 
World War these yards had remained much as they had been beforehand. During the 
War the Lithgow yards again concentrated on what they did best. the construction of 
economical standard tramp ships, with Fairfield turning to naval construction and 
Beardmore to armaments. Again. Sir James Lithgovv served his country vv ith 
distinction, but his public position militated against any overt modernisation of his 
shipyards at Port Glasgow. where Henry Lithgovv once again held the fort. Gi\ en the 
enormous demands of wartime production it is evident that Sir James and 
I Ienrv 
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Lithgow's demanding schedules would have taxed much younger men. Thereafter. 
the early, and therefore unexpected death of Henry Lithgow in \1aß, - l94S. followed 
in February 1952 by that of Sir James Lithgow was a devastating blow to what had 
become by that stage the largest privately owned shipyard group in the world. 
Despite sizeable death duties, Lithgows Limited survived the death of its founders. 
At this point perhaps a break with the past was justified, but famil\ interests 
remained sacrosanct and the firm carried on, but lacked the dynamism and 
ruthlessness that it had once been known for. No successor to Sir James Lithgow had 
been appointed, save that his son, William, would eventually come of age after his 
mother had led the family firm in the interim, before leaving it to her son as its 
largest shareholder. It is beguiling to compare generations in business, but ultimately 
unsatisfactory. The conditions that had propelled Sir James Lithgow to industrial 
dominance in the West of Scotland, were barely applicable to his son, and b% the 
time the latter had taken over the firm its Port Glasgow }'ards were in dire need of 
modernisation. Moreover, the dual character of much of the Lithgo\\ businesses 
after the demise of the founders meant that decision making, in light of the 
beneficial interests concerned, was apt to err on the side of caution. The 
management situation at Fairfield after the death of Sir James Lithýgo\\ also left 
much to be desired, and the hard decisions that needed to be taken to modernise 
what had always been a major shipyard before the onslaught of international 
competition began, were not taken. Later modernisation, both at Fairfield and fort 
Glasgow was extensive, but again erred on the side of caution, was too late. and took 
far too long to complete. Lithgows remained under-capitalised throughout its 
existence, and by the early 1960s the policy brought forward by Sir 
William 
Lithgow of consolidation of Lithgows marine engine building subsidiary companies 
at no little cost was spectacularly unsuccessful. In this regard, 
Lithýgoww, s practice ol- 
devolved decision making has to be called into question. Even at Port Glasgow. with 
the purchase of the Brocklebank interest in William Hamilton's 
Glen yard, it has to 
be borne in mind that by the time of the SIC Inquiry the yard v as virtually 
being 
used as a dump. Indeed, the prior modernisation of 
Lithgows flagship Kingston urd 
to build larger ships was nothing less than a recognition that the firm could no 
lý+ti ß_e1 
rely on its staple market. International competitors such as 
Japan and Sweden had 
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moved into the big ship league quicker- had more efficient labour practice, and 
utilised more capital intensive equipment in two and three-shift «orkingf. and hoth 
favoured the building dock method of construction. In this light. with the 
disappearance of its long Order Book of the 1950s the survival of Lithgo« s %\a,,, 
already at stake, a recognition that resulted in far less money being spent on the hast 
yard. By the early 1960s, Fairfield was also in deep trouble as was Fairfield Roan. 
but Lithgows did at least come to terms earlier than most with the growing 
importance of credit terms in the market by forming. in conjunction \\ ith the Bank of 
Scotland, Kingston Financial Services (Clyde) Limited. By the onset of the SW 
Inquiry, however, the writing was on the wall for much of the Lithgow shipbuilding, 
and marine engine building interests, and it is to this period that I now turn. 
Prior to the publication of the SIC Report, Scotts' had bought Scott &. Sons of 
Bowling, and had been involved in extensive negotiations leading to the succcssful 
purchase of the Greenock Dockyard Company. There is no doubt that these 
acquisitions were undertaken to strengthen Scotts' position in any subsequent 
merger talks, either with Lithgows or with the Upper Clyde firms. Given the 
collapse in mercantile demand, however, and the intensification of both domestic 
and international competition, the naval dimension at Scotts remained of paramount 
importance to the firm's future prospects. Scotts' had already modernised just to 
survive, and in the scramble to group in the light of the SIC' Report. survival 
remained the pre-eminent objective. Lithgows. on the other hand vv CC in a far vv msc 
position, particularly with Fairfield and Fairfield Ro%v an, and the subsequent 
implosion of these firms was fairly and squarely due to management failures. 
Primarily, the Lithgow insistence on local accountability, although that had been 
somewhat diluted by Lithgows Limited representation on the Boards of both 
companies had had its day. Lithgows, on its own did not have the resources nor the 
inclination to rescue Fairfield and Fairfield Rowan, and thereafter the rescue of the 
former but not of the latter was undertaken by Government. 
3 By 1966. therefore. 
Lithgolwý s core shipbuilding interests were making losses. The firm vv as no\\ Ic I 't 
with its East and Kingston shipyards and the virtually derelict Glen yard at Port 
Glasgow, and the smaller Ferguson Brothers yard at Ne« ark. With Lithýgovv s already 
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committed to building larger ships. it remained to be seen if the manaLement lesson 
consequent upon the collapse of Fairfield would in fact be learnt? 
Although the SIC Inquiry was essentially an exercise in confidence building, for 
Scotts', its recommendation that main engine building should be rationalised and 
divorced from shipbuilding, must have come as a severe blo\\. A blovv compounded 
by the recommendation that warship building up to frigate and destroyer classes 
should be concentrated on three firms. 4 The portents, therefore, for both main 
engines building and warship building were not good. and with the decision made bý 
the Royal Navy to go all nuclear in submarine construction, Scotts' hopes rested on 
export orders for Oberon class vessels. By this stage, how ever, it %\ as virtually 
certain that the rather bleak outlook for shipbuilding on the Lower Clyde would be 
bleaker on the Upper Clyde. With even the SIB's own consultants «arning) that the 
Upper Clyde merger would not be viable, all business sense went out the ww indow as 
political considerations, particularly the preservation of employment. predominated. 
That Government allowed this sorry situation to happen and compensated \\ hat 111 
effect were failed industrialists beforehand, and also allowed them to sta\ on the 
Board of UCS afterwards speaks volumes for its ad hoc approach to industr\ in 
general and shipbuilding in particular. Moreover, it hardly required the services of 
consultants to figure out that such a disparate group, including the already rescued 
and virtually state-owned Fairfield, would fail. not least through the overvýhelmino 
self-interest of the constituent firms and personalities involvvcl. Given that the 
possibility of merging with this child of political expediency ww as al%ý ays on the 
cards, certainly if the Government and the SIB had its way. it was always likely that 
Scotts' and Lithgows would collaborate defensively to frustrate this. Both of these 
private firms were geographically isolated, had co-operated on labour matters, 
particularly in resisting calls for wage parity with the Upper Clyde. and had long 
traditions of family control. However, Scotts' and Lithgoýv-s bloody mindedness 
whilst being a source of strength in resisting both the Upper Clyde and Government 
preferences for a single Clyde group, was ultimately a source of weakness because 
of it. Consequently, both firms were far too conservative in taking an a``e to merge 
their respective shipbuilding interests. In this regard, it seems that Lithgows vv ere the 
more reticent partner, essentially because Scotts' naval status remained unresolved 
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throughout most of the merger negotiations. The strategy that evolved in the course 
of merger negotiations was unnecessarily complex, but was undertaken primarily to 
preserve the shareholders' ultimate interests, that is. beyond their shipbuilding 
interests. In this, self-interest was paramount, a situation that the SIB was all too 
conscious of as it attempted to nudge both firms towards a meaningful merger, 
whilst retaining the largely uncosted belief in the economies of scale and scope that 
had characterised the SIC Report. It remains difficult, however, to determine with 
any real sense of certainty how much of a role family tradition played. short of 
innate conservatism, in the eventual decision to undertake a merger of sorts. It would 
be safe to say that neither Michael Sinclair Scott nor Sir William Lithgow wished to 
be the first of their respective families to preside over the end of volume 
shipbuilding on the Lower Clyde. Both were, however, apparently happy with 
retaining the individual identities and traditions of the constituent firms, when it was 
arguable that this approach to running a modern group of shipyards was already 
outmoded. Nevertheless, it remains evident that both Scotts' and Lithgows were 
unwilling to commit significant amounts of working capital to give the newly 
merged Scott Lithgow an adequate chance of success. The marriage of convenience 
that resulted at least served as a solution of sorts to eventually divest the respective 
family shipbuilding and engine building interests. 
With Scotts' in imminent danger of losing its naval status and Lithgows already 
committed to the big ship market, a merger of sorts eventually did take place by 
February 1970, but the respective firms basically carried on much as before. From 
the outset this marriage of convenience was under capitalised and was also fatally 
flawed in that management techniques were not sufficiently evolved or indeed 
recognised as being fundamental to the success of Scott Lithgow as a whole. 
Planning was deficient, as was the crucial function of effective control over costs 
and overhead recovery across the group. The extant management philosophy was by 
this stage already well past its sell by date as it had remained stubbornly 
individualistic when it should have been recognised [certainly at Lithgows in the 
wake of the Fairfield debacle] that the sum of the whole was in the end more 
important than the individual parts. Even the chance, albeit an inherently risky one 
to purchase Yarrow was foregone as conservatism and the unwillingness to commit 
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substantial capital was essentially missing. This was also the case with the decision 
to build giant tankers in two halves as part of an intermediate scheme of e\pai> ion 
and forego the more expensive building dock method of construction. The assertion 
that Scotts' and Lithgows were unwilling to commit large sums to Scott Lithgovv to 
strengthen liquidity is further evidenced in that both firms had to go to the SIB for 
loans for working capital, but only after the SIB insisted that each firm would also 
have to contribute by way of loans. 
Although, as it turned out, Scotts' and Lithgows had been vindicated in not joining a 
single Clyde group despite Government and SIB pressure to do so. the possibility of 
purchasing Yarrow had forced a re-think, as had the probability ofmounting losses 
on fixed price tanker construction in a period of unprecedented inflation. Lithgows 
had no previous experience in building tankers of this size and of the method [that 
they had after all chosen themselves] required, and this eventually sho%% ed, although 
the late delivery of the giant Goliath crane certainly had an impact. Ho%\ c% cl-, %% el I 
before the collapse of the tanker market in the wake of the first OPEC price hike, the 
Lithgow tanker strategy was already in ruins. That the firm did formulate an 
alternative strategy, based on the offshore market was to be commended and showed 
considerable initiative. Nevertheless, fundamental management failings \\ crc just als 
likely to re-surface in this equally risky market, as had been the case %v ith the 
disastrous giant tanker strategy where Lithgows had essentiall\ become a one 
product firm. Moreover, as a result of this no real entry into the larger offshore 
structures market could be undertaken until the firm divested itself of its remaining 
giant tanker contracts. What then was the alternative for the Lith`go\\ end of Scott 
Lithgow apart from entering the offshore structures market? It 'a ould seem that short 
of limping past the post of eventual nationalisation to gain a measure of shareholder 
compensation, whilst at the same time being fundamentally opposed to the concept. 
the only other course of action open to the shareholders \t as closure. Io do so at that 
stage would not only have been an admission of utter failure. it would also have 
severely jeopardised family finances. 
Up to this stage, the Scotts' end of Scott Lithgow had fared a little better, but its 
former source of strength in the submarine market was shrinking, towards re tits as 
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the Oberon was getting a little long in the tooth. The experiment of building oný: as 
carrier, Gas Lion, was apparently just that as no real attempt. in part oo%%ing to the 
increasing size and complexity of these vessels, was made to build another. InstcaLl 
Scotts' skills were used to build two drill ships, but the intention to build these 
vessels in series was never realised. Even at the profitable [at that stage] Fergusoºn 
Brothers yard, with its shorter Order Book, losses were sustained on offshore supply 
vessel construction. By the two General Elections of 1974. however. it ' as clear that 
the victorious Labour Party Government would nationalise the shipbuilding industr\ 
in any event. The case for nationalisation was a strong one as the industry up to that 
point had grossly under-performed and was already in danger of being completely 
marginalised in the world market. By this stage the overall Scott Lith<goww strate`g\ 
that Government grants and future profits would outweigh losses sustained on fixed 
priced contracts, particularly on tankers, was already in tatters. Moreover, the 
productivity assumptions made on increasing the labour force to facilitate tanker 
construction had been inherently flawed from the beginning. One must nevertheless 
ask, given the millions of pounds poured into UCS and its successor, the state owned 
Govan Shipbuilders, due to the greater political clout of Glasgow -based politicians. 
and the millions of pounds poured into the money pit of Harland & Wolff what 
incentive at this stage, short of pride, was there to limit losses on the Lovver Clyde in 
any event? Such losses that were borne at Scott Lithgow were clearly unsustainable 
even in the medium term, and as such there is absolutely no doubt %v hatsoev er that 
nationalisation saved the firm from the ignominy of liquidation. Moýreov'er. long 
before nationalisation, Scott Lithgow's future as a vyiarship builder had been in 
considerable doubt. Warship Group status had initially allo\\ ed the firm to punch 
above its relative weight in this protected market, but by 1974 this was patently no 
longer the case. At least nationalisation offered the hope, if not an entirely realistic 
one, that the firm might be allowed to continue in the conventional submarine 
market in the hope that it would be in a position to tender for any future orders of 
this type. 
The establishment of British Shipbuilders after a protracted period of parliamentary 
opposition may have brought to an end a period of ad hoc intervention 
by 
Government in the British shipbuilding industry. but it did not alter the ad hoc 
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mentality. Up to this stage, the cloak of private anonymity had masked the scale of 
past, present and likely future losses at Scott Lithgow. It vv as alwa% s likely, 
however, that control of the industry would increasingly be centralised. as the state 
of the constituent firms' finances became known. It nevertheless soon became clear 
that management failings at Scott Lithgow. which in large part had resulted in huge 
losses on tanker construction, were in all likelihood apt to be repeated in the move 
into the large offshore structures market. Indeed, this was implicitly recognised by 
consultant's reports, and moreover, by local management in that the contracts were 
expected to be loss makers from the very beginning. Such assumptions that ý\ere 
made on increasing productivity to limit losses were flawed ab initio. 1-ven if less 
workers worked harder than ever before. an unlikely scenario `given the high rate of 
institutionalised absenteeism in Scott Lithgow among certain parts of its vv orkforce. 
fundamental failings in production planning and control \\ ould negate this in an% 
event. Moreover, manpower assumptions had been proven to be disastrously' «rongin 
relation to giant tanker construction, and on such complex structures as semi 
submersibles undertaken with little experience of their true costs and complexity of 
construction, were likely to be more so. The overall lack of manpo« cr ()\\ in- 
large part by employees leaving for better paid jobs elsewhere particularly in 
offshore related construction, placed an even greater premium on production 
planning and control. That this proved to be the case ý, v as evident in that b-\ taking 
manpower from one job to another on a fire-fighting basis losses \\ ere sustained on a 
wider range of vessels than would probably have been the case if sufficient 
manpower had been available in the first place. 
In the interim, the naval dimension had altered significantly in that Scott Lithgow 
could no longer rely upon naval work to compensate for losses elsewhere. The cable 
disaster although not the fault of Scott Lithgow radically altered the firm's hard %\ ()Il 
reputation on submarines. Yet, by this stage. problems elsewhere had 
impacted on 
RFA work too. Cartsdyke, which had built two drill ships, Ben Ocean Lancer and 
Puenorse 1, Scott of Bowling, and Scotts' Engine Works %v-ere the first casualties of 
a BS inspired rationalisation of the firm's productive capacity.. - 
belated recognition 
that what had been previously still a collection of individual firms under the 
umbrella of Scott Lithgo'v was no longer a viable shipbuilding entity. 
Indeed, the 
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enforced move into the BS Offshore Division was nothing less than recognition by 
Government that Scott Lithgow, the State Corporation's largest loss-maker, was 
effectively on its last chance. By this stage. however. much of the old guard of Scott 
Lithgow senior management had retired, and responsibility for the future 
performance of the rationalised firm lay much more with BS appointees than had 
hitherto been the case. Ultimately centralised, and also increasingly subject to 
stringent Government financial controls and targets. it wt ould have been some\\ hat 
akin to remarkable if British Shipbuilders had turned Scott Lithgow's prospects 
around 
Indeed, as it turned out, like the previous management, the new BS management \\ as 
unable to solve the internal problems of the firm to effectively stem losses, which 
were mounting by the day. Industrial relations in this climate, just \\hen the\ needed 
to be focused on increasing productivity on the basis of a joint managcmcnt 
workforce effort, were more likely to deteriorate into sectionalised strife as 
redundancies took their toll on morale. Nevertheless, even when survi \ al \\ as at 
stake, demarcation still held sway long after it should have been consigned to histor\ 
and strikes including the inherently stupid frozen toilets and crossword disputes 
were particularly damaging. By this stage, however, the previous vy arnings voiced 
by the consultants buche Ross, which had on the whole went unheeded by senior 
BS management at both the local and national levels had come back to haunt the 
Scott Lithgow efforts in the semi submersible field. Although there is little doubt 
that over-zealous supervision by Odeco had a deleterious effect on production. the 
lack of a primary planning approach of project control in production planning on 
such complex products as Sea Explorer and Ocean Alliance and management's 
inability to deliver it, hastened the beginning of the end. 
Even though Government policy regarding the rationalisation of the warship sector 
on the back of both the SIC and Booz Allen and Hamilton Reports had taken its toll 
at Scotts' it had still not vet holed the firm below the water line. Ho\\ C\ ei-. the '-, 'ott 
Defence Review of 1981, effectively provided the coup cle grace. Scott Lithgotiv 
could no longer rely on either RFA or promised submarine refit work to 
keep the 
firm going until it could bid for the new class of conventional submarine. With the 
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focus of production shifting to the Lithgow end of the operation and with the closure 
of the Engine Works. Cartsburn was effectively doomed. All too late. the tv L'nts 
surrounding the eventual privatisation of what had become BS biggest loss maker- 
did move the workforce to a recognition that it had to change its internal d\ namics 
towards interchangeability of labour rather that separation of trades. I-yen then. in 
any event it was arguable that this was too late a conversion, albeit a reluctant one. 
That Trafalgar House were able to secure such a good deal on the first BS 
constituent yard, and its largest loss maker to be privatised owed much to the 
Government's desire to offload it. Indeed, in this respect, previous statements in 
public castigating Scott Lithgow by senior BS management and Government 
ministers were nothing short of disgraceful. In attempting to divest itself of an 
industry that was already in danger of being a statistical irrelevance in terms of 
world competition, the Government through BS then embarked upon the thoroughly 
dubious method of privatising its most profitable elements, the three protected 
warship firms, Vickers, Vosper Thornycroft and Yarrow. This cherr\ -picking 
formula was all too symptomatic of the Conservative approach to pri\ atisation in 
general, in that formerly favoured firms were more easily sold as they offered the 
potential to substitute private monopoly for public. More cynical still, v% as the 
inclusion of under-capitalised smaller firms such as Brooke Marine and I L111 Russell 
in the warship category for privatisation. From then on. by definition, the 
unprofitable rump in the mercantile-only sector, which was left on the whole to face 
crippling international competition, despite Shipbuilding Intervention Fund 
assistance, was effectively doomed. 
Had not Trafalgar House 'saved, Scott Lithgow, then BS under the chairmanship of' 
Graham Day who had left the Organising Committee before nationalisation, and had 
belatedly returned to dismantle it, undoubtedly would have closed it down. Just how 
Trafalgar House intended to resurrect the prospects of a yard whose reputation in the 
offshore structures sector lay in shreds, albeit ignoring unconvincing) noises on 
proper management, virtually beggars belief. Given what eventually 
happened then 
it would seem that the Bechtel option of closing down the yard immediately to re- 
assess the Ocean Alliance contract before re-employing some of the vvorktorce 
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would have been far better. Nevertheless, Trafalgar House always had the inside 
track with the Conservative Government, and at least did attempt to rectify what had 
previously been regarded as a hopeless situation at the yard. Unable to secure any 
further major offshore contracts and with the Ocean Alliance programme inexorably 
slipping back, Trafalgar adopted a twin pronged strategy of trying( to resurrect the 
yard's submarine capability. but more convincingly attempted to purchase Yarrow 
and Vickers/Cammell Laird as this would have virtually guaranteed future profits. 
That Trafalgar's previous supporters in Government had grown weary of it %% as 
evident in the wake of the failure to secure the Upholder class submarine follow oi-i 
orders and in the failures to purchase Yarrow and Vickers Cammell Laird. despite 
apparently being the highest bidder for the latter. In this regard, given Trafalgar's 
consistent pursuit of reparations from BS alleging misrepresentation over its original 
purchase of Scott Lithgow, Government was obviously wary that this pattern of 
behaviour would be repeated if Trafalgar was successful in taking over Britain's 
premier submarine builder, Vickers at Barrow. Throughout this thesis I have 
attempted to shed some light on the nether world of nav al procurement. and in doing, 
so it has not been difficult to observe that the MoD has been on the «hole little 
better than a supine servant of Government throughout. Presumably, both the 
defensive and offensive capabilities of the Royal Navy were to be enhanced when it 
had been initially decided to re-introduce a conventional submarine element in the 
form of the Type 2400 to the fleet. As it turned out, ho\\ e\ er, that element w1 as 
eventually sold off without ever becoming operational. That this vv as allowed to 
occur speaks volumes. but it nevertheless remains highly problematic to come to any 
firm conclusions about the role of the MoD in the demise of Scott Lithgow as a 
whole. However, that demise was assured when Ocean Alliance. undoubtedly the 
most disastrous contract in the history of British shipbuilding left the Clyde some 
four years later than anticipated. Accordingly, with no real prospect held out of 
securing further large-scale contracts, the yard inexorably slipped into a care and 
maintenance basis in 1988 from which it never really recovered. 
Returning to the introduction of this vvork. if one can drativ inferences and parallels 
that would aid our understanding of the decline of the British shipbuilding 
industry 
from it, then the primary conclusion in the case of Scott Lithgovv has to he one of 
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fundamental management failure. That this was the case in private hands, then under 
State control and finally in private hands again is not in doubt. Moreover. at the local 
and national levels, no amount of post hoc gloss such as blaming the trade unions 
holds water, and would only do so if owners and management alike had totally 
abandoned responsibility for the running of their businesses, which they did not. 
Management, after all, is supposed to manage. As to Governments, bearing in mind 
the notoriously short attention spans of ministers, no long term strategy for Britain 
maritime industries has existed throughout the period under consideration. Ad hoc 
solutions predominated, and deteriorated at one stage before nationalisation into 
little better than outdoor relief schemes for industrialists and employees alike. 
Employment and political considerations provided the motor for State intervention 
but not for efficiency and nationalisation in 1977 only saved the inefficient rump 
[including the cosseted warship builders] of what had been before the Great War the 
greatest shipbuilding nation in the world. By the nationalisation stage. however, the 
descent into also ran status had well and truly begun, a descent that privatisation 
failed to halt. That the industry now is insignificant in world terms is beyond doubt, 
at the national level the three warship building firms (Vickers, Vosper Thornycrott 
and Yarrow) identified by the SIC Report and by Booz Allen still survive, as do the 
past recipients of massive Government largesse, Harland & Wolff and Govan 
Shipbuilders. Although management failure had primarily resulted in the demise of 
Scott Lithgow, this is not put forward as a monocausal reason as other external 
factors intervened. It does not necessarily follow, however, that this is true of all 
firms in the industry, although one might strongly suspect that this would be the 
case. Indeed, this is why micro studies like this are important, and 
indeed more are 
needed if we are fully to understand the underlying reasons 
for the decline of the 
British shipbuilding industry. 
By way of epitaph, a stranger walking along what had 
been the two and a half-mile 
length of Scott Lithgow would now be hard pressed to recognise that shipbuilding 
had once flourished there. This is particularly the case 
in the Greenock end of the 
operation, where new service orientated firms now predominate. 
In the Port 
Glasgow end of Scott Lithgow, one can still see some of the 
former sites and 
distinguish the Lithgow end of the operation. At Newark, Ferguson Brothers. no\\ a 
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niche shipbuilder, remains in business, albeit against the odds, long after volume 
shipbuilding in the cradle of Clyde shipbuilding has disappeared. 
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Bravenes B/C UK 22.906 L 
Consortium I S/B UK ?. 549 FB 
Saint Benedict T UK 1.4-54 FB 
1973 
British Forth P/T UK 15.540 S 
Hyatt Sub Chile 1,610* S 
Jag Prakash P/T India 15,849 S 
British Tweed P/T UK 15,540 SC 
Sugar Carrier B/C UK 17,775 SC 
Nordic Clansman O/T UK 138,702 L 
British Spey P/T UK 15,540 L 
Cambrae Dred UK 3,366 FB 
Goth T UK 1,448 FB 
Roman T UK 1,448 FB 
Grampian Monarch T UK 480 SB 
1974 
Orion Sub Australia 1,610* S 
Sugar Trader B/C UK 17,779 SC 
Jhansi-Ki-Rani B/C India 42,141 
L 
Sand Weaver D UK 3,366 
FB 
Norse T UK 1,448 
SB 
Mateus De Cordova FPV Mexico - 
SB 































UWR Royal Navy 4.510* S 
Sub Australia 1,610* S 
B/C India 220,416 SC 
B/C India 43,141 L 
O/T UK 1338.651 L 
OSV UK 1,376 FB 
OSV UK 1.376 FB 
FPV Mexico - SB 
FPV Mexico - SB 
FPV Mexico - SB 
T UK 1'7 SB 
T UK 127 SB 
RFA MoD 15,049* S 
DS UK 10,823 SC 
B/C India 42,141 L, 
O/T Liberia 126,239 L 
SB UK 1,952 FB 
Dred UK 427 FB 
SB UK 2,663 1: B 
Tug UK 193 SB 
Tug UK 193 
SB 
Cargo UK 2.3 51 
SC 
DS Liberia 10,820 
S/C 
Cargo UK 9,015 
L 
O/T Liberia 126,260 
L 
438 
Clarknes Cargo UK 2,351 FB 
1978 
Fort Austin RFA MoD 16,053* S 
Orapesa Cargo UK 9,015 L 
Lady Chilel Ferry Gambia 702 FB 
M. S. C. No. 51 Barge UK 340 FB 
M. S. C. No. 52 Barge UK 340 FB 
M. S. C. No. 53 Barge UK 340 FB 
Pinewood Cargo UK 1,599 SB 
Shannon Willow Car Ferry Eire 360 SB 
1979 
Maron Cargo UK 16,482 S 
Mentor Cargo UK 16,482 Sc 
Mlawa B/C Poland 2,996 FB 
Auricala TST MoD 982 FB 
Zgorzelec B/C Poland 2,992 FB 
Holmgarth Tug UK 204 SB 
Hallgarth Tug UK 204 SB 
Carron Tug UK 204 SB 
Laggan Tug UK 204 SB 
1980 
Myrmidon Cargo UK 16,482 S 
Sulisker FPV UK 1,177 FB 
Donald Redford Dred UK 595 FB 
1981 
HMS Challenger SOV Royal Navy 6,907* 
S 
lolair ESV UK 
11,019 L 
1982 












Ocean Alliance S/Sub UK 15,517 [. 
Key to Ship Type: B/C-Bulk Carrier, Cargo-Cargo Ship, Co-Coaster, D-Dredge, DS-Drill Ship, ESV- 
Emergency Support Vessel, Exp/Trials-Experimental Trials Vessel, FPV-Fishery Protection Vessel, 
F/R-Fishery Research Vessel, OSV-Offshore Supplies Vessel, O/T-Oil Tanker, P/T-Products Tanker, 
R/C-Refrigerated Cargo Ship, S/B-Sludge Boat, SOV-Seabed Operations Vessel, Semi/Sub-Senmi 
Submersible, Sub-Submarine, T-Trawler, TST-Trials Sonar Tender, Tug-Tug-boat, UWR- 
Underwater Research Vessel. 
Key to Firm: FB-Ferguson Brothers, L-Lithgows, S-Scotts', SB-Scott Bowling, and S C-Scotts- 
Cartsdyke 
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